The politics of experience : constructing a non-identitarian feminism for theory and practice. by Heberle, Renée,
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1996
The politics of experience : constructing a non-
identitarian feminism for theory and practice.
Renée, Heberle
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heberle, Renée,, "The politics of experience : constructing a non-identitarian feminism for theory and practice." (1996). Doctoral
Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1958.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1958

POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE: CONSTRUCTING A NON- IDENT ITARIAN
FEMINISM FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE
A Dissertation Presented
by
RENEE J. HEBERLE
Submitted to the "ate School of the
university of Massachusetts MS.erst in
partial f»
of the requirements tor tne uey^
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 1996
Department of Political Science
© Copyright by Renee J. Heberle 1996
All Rights Reserved
THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE: CONSTRUCTING A NON- IDENT ITAR IAN
FEMINISM FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE
A Dissertation Presented
by
RENEE J. HEBERLE
Approved as to style and content by:
Ann Ferguson, Chair
(JO
tf6an Cocks, Member
(I
Johrl 1 Brigham, Member
Eric Einhorn, Department Head
Political Science
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I call my committee the "saviour committee." They all
came on late in the process after a series of crises no one
could have predicted. In spite of her extraordinarily busy
schedule, Ann Ferguson agreed to take on the responsibilities
of Chair in the middle of the process. I thank her
for her
commitment to the project and for consistently pointing out
the big political questions that my work tends
to beg. John
Brigham provided critical institutional and
intellectual
support. Joan Cocks read my work with critical
but respectful
consideration for the ideas and a remarkable
eye for sloppy
articulation.
The experience and challenge of teaching
in the Social
Thought and Political Economy Program
sustained me through the
process of putting together a
dissertation. I owe the
students of STPEC a special thanks
for their curiosity about
politics, their enthusiasm, their
kindness and their company.
tod I owe a special thanks to
Sara Lennox for hiring me in
the
first place and helping keep
the various crises in STPEC and
in my classroom in
perspective. STPEC was truly an
academrc
and political home to me.
Marc Belanger-s intellectual
and personal friendship
Sustained me through the
difficult early years. Sharing
an
office with Marc and
subseguently with Marsha Marotta
made
Hfe in Thompson Tower almost
enjoyable. I will not forget
office #410 and the
friendships developed there.
IV
Beyond the Political Science department, Patricia
Moreno's demanding humanism and active political commitment
helped me remember who and what I was writing for. Jackie
Humphreys' life and work and friendship were an inspiration.
Patricia Hanrahan has been a source of strength- -though I
will never be able to structure my life so well as she does
hers !
Thanks to my parents and all my sisters for emotional
and financial support. We're still learning to
»talk
theory' (and politics) together.
And thank you to Bill. He never gave up on me
in spite
of my best efforts to convince him it was
all over. Among
Bill, Lena, Blue and our most recent
addition to the family,
Charlie, my dissertation was destined to
be completed.
v
ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE: CONSTRUCTING A NON- IDENT ITARIAN
FEMINISM FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE
FEBRUARY 1996
RENEE HEBERLE, B.A., BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
Ph.D, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ann Ferguson
In my dissertation I appropriate the insights of
Theodor Adorno to critique identity logic in feminist
theories of knowledge and representation. I do not argue we
can "escape" identity or that we should reject it as a
salient moment of cognition that shapes our political and
sentient life. Rather, I question the privileged place of
identity logic in feminism and elaborate a dialectical
theory of experience and interpretation using Adorno'
s
theory of negative dialectics.
Adorno anticipates post-modern critiques of identity
logic and theories of representation while
sustaining a
normative commitment to the quality of experience
in the
social world. Negative Dialectics elaborates
a method of
interpretation that contributes to realizing
new forms for
self -other relations in modernity.
It is a resource
feminism can draw upon to intervene in
epistemological and
post-modern arguments about identity and
representation in
modernity.
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In his philosophy, Adorno shows us that modes of
representation and historical social relations interact in a
negative dialectic that never allows us to realize, much
less to tell, the final truth of experience. The
relationship between form (representation) and substance
(experience) is complexly mediated through the object world
as are inter-subjective relations. In light of his
insights, I critique the work of materialist feminists who
assert that material experience offers epistemological
privilege. I argue they obscure the contradictory
effects
of representation and the remainders left by
efforts to
conceptualize difference (in material experience) in
modernity. I also explore the work of post-modern
feminists
who argue that because the "truth" cannot
be told we must
focus only on the politics of representation.
I argue they
defer attention to the qualities of
experience that drive
oppositional political struggle. Adorno' s
philosophy of
experience and negative dialectics
guides me in these
readings and critiques of contemporary
feminisms.
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CHAPTER I
IDENTITY THEORY IN FEMINISM
The historical contests over the social and material
conditions of women's lives are often driven by disputes
about women's properly sexed and gendered identity (ies)
.
Conservative suspicions about how many genders are implied
in the UN Document that emerged from the Beijing Conference
on Women of 1995 illustrate only one of the more farcical
examples of the pressure brought to bear on women to make
final decisions about "just who (and what) they are going to
be." A veritable moral panic was stirred up by how the term
"gender" is used in the document. Conservative critics
charged that the document implies the possibility of five
genders, and complained that "gender" is used to modify
demands like "education." This was said to be anti-family
because "gender education" implies that women may learn
they
are not naturally or divinely inspired to be mothers
and
wives. These critics of the document want
"gender" to be
explicitly stated to equal "male and female."
Thus those
who defend the notion that there are two
natural,
essentially different, and supplementary
genders rallied as
they began to suspect the impact
historical and widespread
debates about identity in feminism and
among scholars of
gender had on the document.
l
The conflicts over identity in feminism have generated
an extraordinary number of possibilities for who and what
'women' are and can be. The possibilities for the "meaning"
of woman and women's identities are wide open in the
feminist imagination, even if they remain profoundly limited
in most women's historical realities. As feminists render
women's lives visible and demand subject status for women,
they make hugely divergent arguments about women's identity.
(Snitow, 1988) Efforts to "create" the subject of feminism
in the identity of "women" have not led to any fundamental
agreements among women. Even within feminism assertions
about identity tend to generate critique and resistance from
those who find themselves at the margins or outside of
various descriptive and theoretical limits. The intensity
of conflicts show the significance of identity claims for
feminist politics. The calls for alternatives to
universalizing claims to identity in such historical
manifestos as the Combahee River Collective Statement of
1974 and Bernice Johnson Reagon's speech, "Coalition
Politics: Turning the Century" of 1981, shift
feminist
discourse from the dicovery of comfortable
grounds for
sisterhood to asserting differences constructed
around race,
ethnicity, class and sexuality. Furthermore,
arguments
within the lesbian community about
sexual politics and
whether woman-identified relationships
challenge a
heterosexist social order inspire
deconstructive moves
directed at "gender" as an organizing concept for feminist
discourse
.
These debates are a critical aspect of the dynamics of
feminism. However, I think they slide toward a reliance on
static forms of identity politics, thereby precluding
feminist attention to the relationship between experience
and identity. This dissertation is an attempt to revitalize
a dialectical notion of experience for a feminist politics
of social transformation.
I came to feminist theory out of a general interest in
the politics and the politicization of experience and
because feminism, as a political discourse, privileges
experiential knowledge. However, I found myself caught up
in debates about identity which I have come to think reflect
a specifically modern pressure to organize and conceptualize
experience. There appears to be an unreconcilable tension
between feminist attention to gender as experience and
gender as identity. I turned to Theodor Adorno's
philosophical inquiries into identity and modernity to try
to understand this tension. Adorno never lapses into
either
acceptance of the tension between experience and identity
nor into theorizing a reconciled state. His work is
driven
by a critical (self ) consciousness of the
pressures brought
to bear through modern forms of politics
and knowledge to
identify oneself and others in the name of
conceptual order.
Most importantly for my purposes, Adorno
articulates a
dialectical theory of experience that can inform a non-
identitarian feminism.
Gender as experience is rarely addressed as an issue in
itself for feminist politics, though it is clear that it
drives many of the conflicting claims about gender as
identity. I argue that "differences" among women are
constituted in and through experience and that identity-
based politics tend to obscure the significance of those
conflicts in favor of conceptual order. Feminism must
persistently loosen the ties that bind experience and
identity within and outside of feminist discourse and
practice. However, we should neither assume we can step
outside of the terms of identity nor abandon experience as a
moment in social critique. Adorno's theory of non-identity
offers a resource for recapturing experience as a critical
force which persistently defies identity without denying the
relevance of identity to our ability to act in the world.
He shows that taking positions for or against identity
is a
false choice.
My notion of experience is informed by Adorno and
Horkheimer's interpretation of the Odyssey in Dialectic
of
enlightenment and by Adorno's Negative Dialectics..
Adorno
and Horkheimer argue that enlightenment
imprisons nature in
history, denying its autonomy as a moment
in the dialectic.
According to Adorno and Horkhexmer's
critique, Enlightenment
philosophy says experience is the imprint
of nature on the
mind and soul of man. As man becomes self-conscious as a
modern individual, his desiring and active relation to
nature will become progressively controlled through rational
consciousness. Adorno and Horkheimer argue that
Enlightenment succeeds as a colonizing, controlling myth
which produces an individual ideologically bound through the
repression of his own desiring impulses and of that which
threatens his perceived autonomy as patriarch. Adorno
sustains this idea in Negative Dialectics where he
immanently critiques various forms of Enlightenment
knowledge. He argues for the critical redemption of the
moment of non-identity in experience that is lost as
knowledge is rationalized into instrumental and conceptual
identity forms in modernity.
Adopting these insights of critical theory, my question
became: "what happens to experience as it is projected into
the world as a collectivizing, justice-seeking moment of
reference? Can feminism sustain experience as a critical
moment in the dialectical movement of history rather than
rationalizing it through identitarian categories?" In my
dissertation, I look at what materialist feminisms have made
of experience politically. I consider the relationship
between experience and identity in these frameworks.
I
argue Adorno' s theory, as articulated in
Negative
Dialectics, could inform a materialist feminist
approach
which does not negate the potentially
disruptive qualities
of experience. Adorno's Negative Dialectics offers me a
resource for thinking about how feminism might conceive of
this relationship as dialectical rather than allowing the
potentially disruptive quality of experience to be subdued
by identity politics.
Feminist theorists have staked cut various positions
for and against identity and identity politics. For
example, Wendy Brown argues that identity-based claims do
not challenge the terms of representation within a liberal
state founded in a static differentiation between the
abstract, universalist x we' and the demands of the
particularist (Brown, 1993:390) For Brown, the
'choice' between minimalizing or maximalizing one's
difference in order to achieve political recognition by the
liberal state accepts the terms the state has always already
set up for appropriate forms of participation and
representation. From a socialist-feminist perspective,
Jenny Bourne (1987) excoriates those who struggle about the
meaning of their identity in the world for diffusing
political struggle against structural dominance and material
forms of exploitation. For Bourne identity politics
constitutes a peculiar form of subj ectivized narcissism
which ignores structural injustices. Nanci Caraway (1991),
on the other hand, has attempted to reclaim identity
as a
necessary means of empowerment that must and will
occur
prior to political engagement with structures of
dominance.
Caraway refers to the critical positioning of oneself as a
subject, drawing on Minnie Bruce Pratt, Bernice Johnson
Reagon and some post-structuralist feminisms to suggest that
identity politics is a form of strategic, self-conscious
empowerment for those historically and structurally
disempowered. These feminists stake out their positions
vis-a-vis historically particular forms that identity
politics take against particular forms of domination
practiced by the liberal state, capitalism, white
supremacist culture, etc. No one of them offers a
comprehensive account of how identity works within the terms
of modernity. Rather, each account is based upon a
particular reading of how dominance works and each
illuminates particular kinds of "identity thinking". I do
not claim to have developed a comprehensive account in my
discussions, but I try to elaborate how, in all modern
contexts, the politics of experience exists in a dialectical
and sometimes productive tension with the social force of
identity. I critique the embrace of identity as a political
strategy, but argue that identity as a historical, social
force cannot be either transcended or rejected because that
transcendence or rejection would ultimately be ideological
and dismissive, not material and historical.
To begin, I look at how standpoint feminists'
theorize
the material links between knowledge and women's
experiential life. Standpoint feminism lays
critical
theoretical foundations for asserting the legitimacy and
political relevance of knowledge that emerges from
subordinate groups in social systems of domination and for a
specifically feminist perspective on the relationship
between the subject and object of knowledge. I take up the
argument that subjective (sometimes read as experiential)
proximity to the object offers better knowledge than, for
example, distancing strategies which authorize empiricist
and positivist epistemologies
. Standpoint feminists argue
that the removal of the self from knowledge creation is
ideological and obscures the situatedness of knowers in
historical social relations. They simultaneously adopt a
normative commitment to subjugated knowledges and a
materialist analysis of why they offer a truer version of
reality. According to Nancy Hartsock, for example, feminist
attention to women's relationship to the material world, to
her reproductive, nurturing and/or caring work offers
feminism a truer, potentially universalizable, perspective
on how social relations work.
I begin my work by exploring feminist epistemology
because it takes a non-ontological stance toward women as
subjects, locating women's position historically and moving
from there. I think standpoint theory, as useful as it
is
in challenging knowledge forms that abstract from
experience
and in shifting our attention from the historically
Eurocentric, masculine subject of knowledge, abandons
dialectical thinking in an effort to affirm women's subject
positions as epistemologically superior and therefore beyond
political challenge. There is in standpoint feminism a
tendency to affirm abstract principles that transcend
attention to the particular, or to differences within
diverse, socially constructed, gendered experiences. For
example, the fact that women mother (or do not mother) in
significantly different ways and even for different reasons
may be more significant for critical feminist knowledge than
the commonalities Hartsock argues are potentially
universalizable
. Univocal standpoints or strategic
positionings remove experience from political contest and
categorize it for politics rather than assuming that it may
provoke politics. Feminist knowledge has been driven by an
ethical imperative to attend to women's experiences, which
is as it should be. But this precludes feminism from
expressing a univocal truth. Feminist modes of
representation will remain in a historical and dialectical
tension with difference as they are challenged by those who
remain beyond their terms of reference. I argue that in the
effort to change the terms on which knowledge is produced
and valued, standpoint epistemologists do not challenge the
political primacy of the subject. This leaves the mediating
forces of the object world little autonomy as constitutive
agents of knowledge. For feminist epistemologists, a
9
subject's experience exists in a confluence rather than in a
dialectical tension with the object world.
Adorno's theory of non-identity challenges the impulse
to organize experience into identity forms because, while he
sustains a modernist commitment to theorizing the mediated
quality of inter-subjective life, he shifts the debate away
from locating the 'subject of the creator' and argues that
truths may emerge through our interpretive relationship to
the particulars of the object world (experience) . Adorno
does not think it possible to finally render the moment of
experience transparent to the social world; but his theory
of interpretation sustains that moment as critically
disruptive of abstract knowledge forms. In Adorno's view,
the "whole is untrue." The concept will never fully
represent the object. Critical theory therefore should not
pursue universalizing forms of knowledge.
My critique of standpoint feminism and my adoption of
Adorno's theory of non-identity invites comparison with
post-structuralist theories of representation and
interpretation. Post-structuralist theorists have argued
that what standpoint theory has in common with
Enlightenment
notions of the subject and identity may undermine rather
than further its critical claims. They
argue that
standpoint feminists' commitments to 'creating
the subject
of feminism' as a coherent and stable
subject actually
10
perpetuate the regulation and reification of those gender
relations they profess to be challenging.
Post
-structuralist feminists associate ant i -ontological
approaches to politics with anti-identitarian approaches.
Judith Butler's work is quite clear on this point. She
rejects identity politics as necessarily exclusionary --as
repeating the terms of representation feminism professes to
be challenging. Butler says the self -stabilizing effects of
identity shut down political possibilities rather than
illuminate them -- and are therefore always suspect as a
political project. For Butler, if we argue we are 'outside'
the terms of systems of domination we assume an ontology of
otherness rather than a performative positioning that is
always potentially reinventing otherness on subversive
terms. Appeals to the realities of women's lives run the
risk of stabilizing the terms on which that reality is
constituted whereas parody and performative acts destabilize
the grounds of naturalized reality. While I agree with her
critique of identity, I am critical of Butler's work because
in rejecting identity she precludes recognition of
experience and its social effects. She thinks of experience
as a text rather than recognizing its historical and
material significance as a dialectical moment of
resistance
to the modes of representation she critiques.
I argue that feminist politics should be
driven by
experience- -not the experience that is a
property of the
self, but by the experience that is a sentient relationship
to the object (social) world. I argue for a notion of
experience which privileges it as signifying differences in
and among women as feminine subjects and as therefore always
potentially disruptive of the apparently seamless effects of
systems of identity. The articulation of experience in the
public realm will always be a contested and political
project. The tension immanent to the relationship between
experience and the representation of experience should be
acknowledged as political rather than denied in a gesture of
authorization or rationalization.
Adorno warns us to take note of the contradictions
embedded in the process of conceptualizing experience. He
argues that the non- identical qualities of experience remain
a critical force in what he calls the » administered world'
.
Against modern epistemologies , he theorizes a non-
identitarian relationship between subject and object,
between self and other. Against standpoint theory, Adorno
argues that distancing the self through contemplative and
deliberative interpretations of experience does not
necessarily lead to false abstractions. Distancing the
self, in his view, means offering the object a form of
autonomy necessary to allow its qualities to emerge outside
of the control of subjective determinants. In other words,
it may point towards an inter-subjective relationship of
recognition which does not obscure or negate the
unique
qualities of what is other to the self in any given
historical moment. Adorno thus remains well within the
materialist tradition of reconfiguring self -other relations
through attention to our interdependence in the object
world, even while he critiques the overly determinist
aspects of that tradition.
One of the central conflicts in contemporary feminist
debates is whether and what manner of coherence and
stability are necessary backdrops for political commitment
and effective change. Post-structuralist feminists
criticize calls for stability- -often articulated through
assertions that there is in fact a 'pre-discursive reality'
or a subject who can speak the truth about their reality- -as
a depoliticizing move. Gayatri Spivak responds with the
notion of strategic essentialism. (Spivak, 1988) She argues
that subjects are positioned through discourse, but that the
constructedness of those positions should not preclude
specific attention to the histories and knowledge of the
subaltern. For Spivak, the politics of representation as
constituted through Western hegemony persistently defeat
efforts of subalterns to speak in their own voices, putting
aside any question about the * authenticity ' of those voices.
Therefore, it is not a question of epistemological truth
claims, but of an ethical and political decision as
to where
we look for critical knowledge forms. Bat -Ami
Bar On (1993)
makes a similar argument about the ethical
imperative to
attend to voices marginalized by structures of dominance.
However, this argument does not fully respond to post-
structuralist critique, which challenges even the strategic
epistemological privileging of subjectivity as reflecting
the metaphysics of Western systems of knowledge that produce
subaltern figures in the first place. Making political
claims on the basis of victimization or subaltern status may
participate in naturalizing, in the name of critiquing
systems of dominance, the prior positioning of marginal
others
.
I argue for the privileging of experience as an object
of interpretation that renders feminist critique coherent
while recognizing the contingencies of time and place. The
political project of interpreting experience allows us to
expose the dominative qualities of organized social life
without assuming their totalizing effects prior to
engagement. This invites engagement with identity politics
but always resists naming the
l who' or using universalizing
arguments about experience as a means to establish, once and
for all, the legitimacy of feminist critique.
A non-identitarian feminist critique politicizes
aspects of social experience previously relegated
to the
margins of political life. Feminists need not
agree on the
political significance of experiences out of
a prior, given
interest. Experiences take on a politics
through and within
feminism. The public world is transformed
through the
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politicization of sexuality, the x family,' x the community,'
the organization of everyday life, and other previously
privatized spheres of life. Thus feminism works against the
grain of a social order determined to relegate particular
experiences to the margins. This feminism advances within
the tension produced by attempts to politicize experiences
without creating new unjust structures of privilege.
In my final chapter, I consider the movement against
sexual violence as potentially illustrative of this theory
of feminist movement. Feminist struggle has had to
overcome the historical tendency to understand sexuality and
sexual violence as pre-political- -or even anti-political-
-
questions. But feminist success depends in part upon how it
takes up the challenge of creating alternative fields of
political representation for experience. Some feminist
approaches to theorizing women's suffering reinscribe the
figure of woman or of the feminine as essentially defined
through and by her sexual vulnerability. If spoken by
women, stories of suffering are assumed to render
transparent the experience of suffering and to communicate
the truth about gender dominance generally. I argue that
representations of experience are never only innocent
reporters of facts or reality. Otherwise, for example,
Anita Hill could not have been reconstructed in the
public
imagination within a matter of hours from a dignified,
conservative law professor into an insecure,
sex-starved,
sexually resentful Black female-
-in other words, into the
very picture of black female sexuality as it has
historically taken form in the racist white male
imagination
.
I argue that the movement against violence against
women should assume that representations of suffering, in
the various institutional settings in which women become
involved as they seek justice and support, are performative
and will change the construction of the feminine.
Representations of experience are slippery- -we take risks as
we speak as public figures. Even if the sentient quality of
suffering drives us to speak, and even when (perhaps
particularly when) it is about the most raw and immediate
data of pain, our speech will not come across as uncontested
"reality" to others. Representations of experience come to
life and are reorganized through the sphere of the social.
They will be conceptualized and organized on the terms of
identity even if driven by the sphere of the concrete and
material
.
In light of these observations, I suggest an approach
to sexual violence that focuses on women's differences as a
means to demobilize male power rather focussing on the
common qualities of suffering which affirm male power as a
monolithic entity to which women can only react from a
position of subordination. We should be wary of the impulse
to render the movement coherent through appeals
to the
16
common qualities of women's suffering. Appeals made on the
grounds of common suffering have not successfully inspired
an unencumbered sisterhood in the struggle against sexual
violence and may even collude with social narratives that
place women in the position of being undifferentiated
victims, ignoring racism and class as structuring the terms
on which sexual violence does its damage. 1
Sexual violence is simultaneously at the center and at
the margins of masculinist dominance. However, placing it
at the center of women's lives as a defining factor is to
collude with the goals of patriarchy in buttressing an
otherwise unstable edifice of masculinist power and to
obscure the significance of various strategies women have
used to comprehend and to resist sexual violence. Sexual
violence is so prevalent and takes so many forms that we can
safely assume patriarchy depends upon it as a means of
social control over the terms of gender relations and as a
concrete means to affirm masculinist power. But
simultaneously, it signifies the material limits of and
historical fissures in gendered relations of dominance while
sustaining the fiction of a seamless masculinist power.
Feminism should not understand the project of
representing the experience of sexual violence as expressing
a settled reality but as a means to disrupt
and transform
the social terrain on which sexual violence
thrives and does
its damage. The political terrain on
which feminism works
does not hold still. A non-identitarian approach encourages
practices that demobilize masculinist power through exposing
its fictions. It moves feminist struggles against sexual
violence forward through differences among women. It
responds to the articulation of concrete experiences without
constraining feminism to the grounds of prior assumptions
about the sexual identity of women as vulnerable.
Teresa DeLauretis argues that feminist discourses, from
Sojourner Truth to Catharine MacKinnon, might be
conceptualized as signifying the excesses of
patriarchal/capitalist structures of dominance. (DeLauretis,
1990) The figure of the feminine represents, for
DeLauretis, that which can never be fully represented within
masculinist discourse. Therein lies the power of the
threat. Feminism signifies patriarchy at its limits as a
representative system. I read feminism a little
differently. DeLauretis' argument implies that differences
among feminisms are less significant than their common
situatedness at the limits of patriarchy. I think the
differences are far more significant than she implies. I
look at feminism as an interpretive practice, which in
exposing women's experiences of the diverse dominative
strategies of men also exposes to public scrutiny and
contest, the specific strategies necessary to
uphold
patriarchal systems. I've argued that, in representing
experience, we are not expressing a settled
reality but
18
participating in the reconstitution and transformation of
the social order.
Efforts to theorize the metanarrative of feminism are
insightful and helpful as historical and cultural markers.
However, feminism will never succeed in constructing agreed
upon boundaries around itself. I have described feminism as
a series of contingent practices whose political terrain
never holds still. For example, the terrain of the struggle
against sexual violence has been complicated by the
institutionalization of various aspects of its demands, from
policing strategies, to state funding for shelters, to the
dependence upon the welfare state for material support for
women escaping violence. Feminism has the historical and
theoretical resources to move beyond the limits imposed by
the institutionalization of the movement. However, I don't
think identity politics is the direction we should move. My
final chapter addresses the specificity of suffering in the
context of sexual violence and the terms on which it does
its damage to women's bodies and to women's lives. An
approach that encourages practices of demobilization of
masculinist power can take feminist struggles against sexual
violence forward through differences rather than
constraining us on the grounds of prior identities.
Bernice Johnson Reagon's ground-breaking speech at the
Women's Music Festival in 1981 (referred to above) expresses
the urgency but also the risks involved in a
feminist
project of specifying the differences of and among women and
makes explicit arguments for their political significance.
She tells her feminist audience they are going to fail if
they don't figure out a way to persevere in coalition
building "even when it feels like death" as they take apart
or open up the identitarian spaces they have carved out in
the world. She makes clear there will be no comfort in the
process, that every move entails a risk, but that v if you
don't feel like you are about to die, you aren't doing any
coalescing.' She tells women to stop looking for safety in
sameness and to start looking for justice in and for
difference. The antagonisms she alludes to in her speech,
the contests over the dominative qualities of relations
among women, and more generally, among the
personal/political relations among those who struggle on the
grounds of identity politics, will necessarily be a part of
feminist struggle because of the feminist respect for the
particular, for experience and the sentient qualities of
everyday life. Conflicts about how the "personal" and the
"political" should be defined and the appropriate
relationship between the two have driven feminist politics
as have conflicts about whose voices and experiences
count
in feminist interpretations of the political world.
In the
course of this struggle, however, the politics of
experience
are too often subdued by the politics of
identity in the
feminist search for affirmative or 'positive'
collective
knowledge and action. This dissertation is an effort to
redeem a political notion of experience that contributes to
reconfiguring the relationship between experience and
identity for critical social theory and action.
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CHAPTER II
FEMINIST KNOWLEDGES: HOW CAN WE KNOW
WHO THE "WE" IS?
Standpoint epistemology has been an extremely-
influential area of feminist theorizing for the last fifteen
years. The efforts of feminist standpoint theorists to
render specifically feminist knowledges have informed and
even inspired many of the arguments in feminism over
identity and politics. In the tradition of Marxian critical
theory, and attentive to critiques of identity as an ideal
form or substance that exists prior to historical
construction, standpoint feminists place claims about
feminist knowledge in the context of women's everyday life
and activity. This undermines positivist and empiricist
epistemological claims about neutrality, objectivity and
truth-seeking. Standpoint theorists' attention to
particularity and the partiality of knowledge claims have
sustained the materialist tradition within feminist theory
but also have invited comparisons and dialogue with post-
structuralist theory.
The differences in the positions taken by standpoint
theorists and post-structuralist feminist theorists are
significant, but not totally polarized. Standpoint
theorists situate knowledge claims while steadfastly
resisting the final step of abandoning the
project of
theorizing knowledge and the relationship
to politics
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through appealing to identity. (Haraway 1991) Post-
structuralist feminists are aware of the need to argue the
political significance of their positions in light of their
critique of identity theory. (Butler and Scott, et.al. 1993)
Exploring the fault lines between standpoint feminists and
post - structuralist feminists profiles the state of the
feminist subject and highlights questions about the politics
of interpretation and representation in feminism. I suggest
that an examination of the political fault lines between
standpoint theorists and post-structuralists regarding
identity and identity politics, affirms the need to
reconsider the dialectics of experience and representation
in feminist theory.
Standpoint feminism offers valuable insights into
differences among women and the value of subjugated
knowledges to creating a more adequate and critical map of
social relations of domination. Standpoint feminists are
most closely associated with the tradition of socialist
feminism. In arguing the specificity of women's oppression,
socialist feminists theorize the historical relationship
between class and gender systems. In the 1970' s, as
socialist feminists developed an identifiable
movement and
theoretical framework, they differentiated
themselves from
radical feminists because they located
women's oppression in
the historical intersections between
patriarchy and
capitalism. Radical feminists structured
theory around the
discovery of generalizable facts and effects of patriarchal
power. They argued that patriarchal domination is
independent of capitalism and, in fact may shape its terms
of existence. Socialist feminists theorized the
relationship between the two systems of capitalism and
patriarchy as determining the possibilities of women's
lives. (Sargeant, ed.1982; Philipson and Hanson, 1990) They
did not wish to 'add' or substitute women in an otherwise
Marxist analysis of exploitation and production but to
identify how differing historical roles in production and
reproduction (work and sex) affect male and female power in
the public/political world.
The common thread still running through socialist
feminist work is the materialist correspondence of human
activity to knowledge and power. They refer to the commonly
experienced realities of womens' lives as source material
for theory. Thus, for socialist feminisms, material and
experiential markers of identity are placed in a causal
relationship to political knowledge and perspective. In the
epistemological traditions of Marxian and critical theory,
the analysis of the material and social constructedness of
identity remains central to creating emancipatory theory.
Women's political knowledges and perspectives will emerge
out of the quality of gendered experience but
consolidate
into feminist politics only through collective
struggles
over consciousness. Thus, feminist knowledges
emerge from
women's historically constructed, gendered roles and it is
said to be an ethical and political imperative to privilege
these perspectives for theory. 2
Socialist feminists argue for the sustained value of a
sense of self and location in the world which will encourage
moments of critical reflexivity as one enters into political
struggle. For socialist feminists, coming to consciousness
means learning to express an identity which is no less
foundational politically for being historically constructed.
This learning empowers subjects to move politically. This
work reflects the epistemological arguments developed in
standpoint theory. Socialist feminists developed theory
about a huge range of issues relating to the oppression of
women including sexual oppression and exploitation,
reproductive rights, and the complex relationship between
capitalism and patriarchy as mutually constitutive systems.
The work assumes that women's activity in the world will
forge her political perspectives. I am interested in this
area of feminist theory because it has, over time, tried to
take differences among women into account at the start of
theory, rather than layering * differences ' on as
afterthoughts once the foundations for analysis have been
laid in the cement of gender difference. Socialist
feminism
is founded in a critique of Marxist and radical
feminist
theories that ignore the historical relationships and
25
tensions between class and gender systems in favor of
collapsing one into the other.
Standpoint feminisms have subsequently argued for
privileging the complex knowledges immanent in women's
material lives in order to advance that multi-layered
approach. Standpoint feminist theory reflects explicitly on
the relationship between being in the world and knowledge,
between subject and object and between experience and
feminist identity. This work argues it is imperative for
feminism to create epistemological models that challenge the
colonizing or exclusionary effects of idealist and
positivist epistemologies
.
Feminist standpoint theory, through the different forms
it has taken, constitutes a link among the various arguments
in feminism about identity. It is the terrain on which
feminist social critique attempts to authorize itself in the
context of a fragmented, uncertain world. Socialist
feminisms grounded in standpoint theory argue that the
consciousness of commonalities in concrete experience is a
radical counter to the otherwise abstracted ideals that
motivate modern political involvement and commitment. The
authenticity and radical quality of political commitment is
thus connected to social identity. Political struggle will
be for and about particularly identified, concrete subjects
rather than for abstract, formal, political ideals. Thus
identity is linked to political knowledge and commitment
in
socialist feminism. With reference to power in the context
of oppression identity becomes like a substance, a thing to
be searched for and developed in order to sustain the
solidarity necessary to act effectively. This connection
between identity and politics is a way of sorting out
'authentic' forms of feminist commitment founded in common
experiences from liberal commitments based on abstractions
which are distanced from material life.
Standpoint feminism continues the task Lukacs set out
for philosophy, that of "creating the subject of the
creator" who will be positioned to overcome relations of
domination (Lukacs, 1967). Lukacs theorized the
y standpoint' of the proletariat as a way of conceptualizing
their emergence as historical actors who expose and ccontest
the terms of a reified, commodified world. Feminist
standpoint theory adapts his insights about particularly
situated actors in history to argue that women's knowledges
are potentially revolutionary in relation to patriarchal
ideologies and beliefs. Standpoint feminism is about the
relationship between social being and the necessary
partiality of perspective and knowledge. However, it avoids
relativism because it argues explicitly for a reformulation
of the standards of objectivity of knowledge claims. It
argues that feminist knowledges are more objective than
traditional knowledges because they map the world from
subjugated spaces rather claiming a 'God's eye view' or
distance and impartiality as do traditional positivist or
empiricist epistemologies
.
Standpoint feminisms have thus affirmed the lives of
women as offering privileged access to objective knowledge.
This encourages the general recognition of otherwise
historically marginalized voices and redefines the standard
of v objectivity' as including an acknowledgement of the
particularity, or interested nature, of any claim to
knowledge. (Alcoff and Potter, et al; 1993) Adapting
insights from Lukacs, standpoint theory shows us that the
powerful, those with a vested interest in the status quo,
have reason not to see the boundaries or limits of their own
positioning in the world. Making those boundaries visible
from the perspective of the subjugated may illuminate the
processes by which relations of domination become
rationalized in the social world, exposing them to a crisis
of legitimacy.
Standpoint feminism sets out to authorize feminist
knowledge, arguing that women's life activity in the world
offers superior ways of understanding social power
especially in the fragmented and alienated world of
modernity. Broadening the Marxist understanding of 'work'
as activity that creates the social product, standpoint
feminism grounds itself in the daily lives of women, their
roles as reproducers and the relationships they develop in
their daily lives as material organizers of family and
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community survival and well-being. These relationships are
said to shape, if not determine, the interests of women and
therefore the parameters of feminism. Women's particular
experiences as gendered subjects are placed in a necessary
relationship to what they will know and do as political
subjects. The relationship of woman to the body, to
necessity and to the object world grounds her
epistemological perspective.
I return to Lukacs for a moment to show how his essay
"Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" sets
up present political debates about the subject in history
and the relationship of this history to nature. Lukacs was
a controversial figure in Marxian thought because he argued
changes in late capitalist systems and culture to be
determined by changes not only in productive capacities, but
in the organizational and cultural imperatives of the
exchange system.
Lukacs was a major influence on twentieth century
Marxian and critical theory generally. He was acutely aware
of the difficulty in creating a democratic, Marxist theory
of consciousness in the age of modern bureaucracy and
capitalist organization. Though he allied himself
politically with some very anti -democratic figures
(including Stalin) , Lukacs showed radical democratic
tendencies as a philosopher. (Jay, 1984) It is this aspect
of his work that has had an (often unacknowledged)
influence
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on contemporary attempts to ' locate' the subject of history.
His contributions to aesthetic debates about socialist
realism and avant garde art of the early twentieth century
and his book History and Class Consciousness profoundly
influenced the work of the Frankfort School, Althusserian
Marxism and the Critical Cultural Studies movement. He was
a major figure in the reconfiguration of debates about
culture and the role of theory in Marxism.
In opposition to Leninist vanguardism, Lukacs developed
an argument about the revolutionary quality of working class
consciousness. According to Lukacs : "...the task [of
philosophy] is to deduce the unity- -which is not given- -of
this disintegrating creation [the object world] and to prove
that it is the product of a creating subject. In the final
analysis then: to create the subject of the 'creator'."
(Lukacs, 1967:140) Lukacs shows how idealist philosophers
attempt to create this subject through categories of the
mind, arguing that their categories dissolve in the x real'
world when confronted with the reified totality which
continues to stand in dominance over and actively fragment
the subject.
Lukacs draws a distinction between the contemplative
subject of the 'classical philosophy' that inspires the
attitude of early entrepreneurship in capitalism, and the
active subject of Marxism. The former seeks to understand
how the social world works without staining his knowledge
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with intervention. He looks for how the laws of movement in
society\nature might function to serve his particular
interest. This is the attitude of a proper capitalist. No
one person or project can fully determine outcomes and each
should refrain from striving for increased control or
organization of the whole for that leads to monopolies and
defeats the individualist premises and promises of bourgeois
life.
What is important is to recognize clearly that all
human relations (viewed as the objects of social
activity) assume increasingly the objective forms of
the abstract elements of the conceptual systems of
natural science and of the abstract substrata of the
laws of nature. And also, the subject of this 'action'
likewise assumes increasingly the attitude of the pure
observer of these- -artifically abstract- -processes , the
attitude of the experimenter. (Lukacs, 1967:131)
Early capitalism was thus characterized by an attitude
of experimentation, of passive observation and interventions
limited to the service of self-interest. This attitude
intensified over time in light of the increasingly reified
object world. That which is historical, ie. the movement of
capital and exchange of commodities, became a thing of
nature. Nature, then, developed in two different forms for
bourgeois consciousness; it became that which is the stuff,
the raw material necessary for production but it also became
those social effects that are removed from historical
contexts and thus out of reach of human agency. The
imperatives of human interaction itself are said to be
' natural' by bourgeois thinkers.
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Lukacs turns to Hegel for the method by which the
subject-object of history can be identified in this reified,
commodified world. For Lukacs, the objective attitude
toward the world must be universalizable and emerge not
through mind, but through the dialectic of sensuous
activity, of work and reflection in the world. "The
genesis, the creation of the creator of knowledge, the
dissolution of the irrationality of the thing-in-itself
, the
resurrection of man from his grave, all these issues become
concentrated henceforth on the question of dialectical
method." (Lukacs, 1967:141)
Lukacs comes to the conclusion that the proletariat
becomes the subject -object of history in a time when the
fragmentation of the bourgeois subject of history is
increasingly apparent. This fragmentation is signified
first by a commitment to merely experimental knowledge forms
and the removal of self from historical laws of movement.
At the same time, the subject and object come to penetrate
one another in the reality of workers lives, if not yet in
their consciousness. The subjectivity of the worker is
constituted through the necessity of selling his labor-power
(his essence- -that which is most his) as a commodity. The
worker is both a subject in and an object of history. His
position constitutes a privileged standpoint from which to
view totality and to understand concretely, not only in the
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realm of ideas, reification as a totalizing constituent of
social life.
Lukacs pulls together the fragmented subject of
modernity into the being of the worker because the essence
of the worker is his labor-power. "Inasmuch as he is
incapable in practice of raising himself above the role of
object his consciousness is the self -consciousness of the
commodity; or in other words it is the self-knowledge, the
self -revelation of the capitalist society founded upon the
production and exchange of commodities." (Lukacs, 1967:168)
It is in the worker's critical perspective of himself as an
object who is also a subject in the reified world that will
begin to subvert the naturalized categories of chat world.
Reification for Lukacs is the "immediate reality of
every person living in capitalist society. " Reification is
the oppressive social condition that needs overturning, that
needs to be exposed as contingent rather than necessary,
man-made rather than natural. Reification is defined in the
essay as the universalization of the commodity form:
[Objectively, in so far as the commodity form
facilitates the equal exchange of qualitatively
different objects, it can only exist if that formal
equality is in fact recognized- -at any rate in this
relation, which indeed confers upon them their
commodity nature. Subjectively, this formal equality
of human labor in the abstract is not only the common
factor to which the various commodities are reduced; it
also becomes the real principle governing the actual
production of commodities. (Lukacs, 1967:87)
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Lukacs argued for the privileging of the standpoint of the
proletariat because that subject position constitutes, as no
other can in capitalism, the subject-object of history.
Lukacs remains relevant to critical and feminist theory
because similar attempts to v pull together the subject of
history' are still central and considered necessary for
politics. As self-conscious as this project is, subsequent
to Nietszche's anti -Hegelian argument for the demise of the
slave-subject and Foucault's historicization of the subject,
it remains central to feminist discourses about politics.
The question, "who is the 'we' of feminism?" remains central
to the possibility of feminist critique just as the defining
x we' of class theory has been central to the possibility of
socialist critique. Standpoint feminists still found the
political legitimacy of feminism in the project of creating
the subject of the creator. Lukacs argues:
To put it more concretely: the objective reality of
social existence is in its immediacy 'the same' for
both proletariat and bourgeoisie. But this does not
prevent the specific categories of mediation by means
of which both classes raise this immediacy to the level
of consciousness, by means of which the merely
immediate reality becomes for both the authentically
objective reality, from being fundamentally different,
thanks to the different position occupied by the two
classes within the "same" economic process. (Lukacs,
1967 : 150)
Lukacs understood the project of philosophy to be to
locate the subj ect /obj ect of history through a dialectical
analysis of the relationships and social processes created
for and by capitalism. Capitalist development
fragments the
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world. it creates historically alienated selves in the
capitalist and the worker alike; but the consciousness of
the worker, constituted by his dis - interested and subjugated
subject position, is better equipped to recognize the limits
and injustices of the social contract of capitalism.
Standpoint-feminists expand this insight for differently
situated subjectivities.
Standpoint feminism invests value in women's daily
lives as potentially critical sites of knowledge production.
It redefines the boundaries around who can and should
describe conditions of "reality." In addition, as mentioned
above, feminist standpoint theory attends to the
epistemological question of the specificity and legitimacy
of feminist social critique. It theorizes the relationship
between social identity and knowledge, arguing that the
world becomes more transparent to some historically
positioned subjects than to others.
Standpoint feminism responds to a number of
epistemological positions said to reflect patriarchal and
exchange perspectives and values. Proximity to the object,
(of experience, of work, of knowledge) becomes a key to
developing an emancipatory perspective on the social world.
Nancy Hartsock's discussion of standpoint feminism
offers something like a foundational statement of purpose,
in Money. Sex and Power , Hartsock characterizes the project
as a
:
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transformation [which] can be accomplished by a
def?^^^ ° f theor^ onto the epistemological terrainefined by women's lives.
...whereas Marx relocatedpower onto the epistemological ground of production, Iargue that women's lives provide a related but more
aaequate epistemological terrain for understandingpower.
...i suggest that, like the lives ofproletarians vis-a-vis capital, women's lives make
available a particular and privileged vantage point notonly on the power relations between women and men but
on power relations more generally. The construction of
a more complete and adequate account of power relations
on the basis of women's perspectives requires the
articulation of an epistemology that grows from women'slife activity. (Hartsock, 1983:151-152)
Drawing on Marxian historical materialism but also on the
object-relations theories of Nancy Chodorow (1978) and
Dorothy Dinnerstein (1976), Hartsock argues that women's
lives and experiences are essentially and structurally
defined by gendered dualities and heirarchies which organize
the productive and reproductive sites of social life.
Women's experience for Hartsock, is fundamentally marked by
the oppressive devaluation of her work and social role in
the division of labor. Yet it is also marked by essential
qualities which can overturn the patriarchal social order.
She argues that feminism must re-value and recharacterize
women as representative of and as inhabitants of the truly
human sphere of reproductive, caring labor. In doing this
work, women engage in the most creative relationships
possible given the oppressive, alienated quality of life in
Western capitalist social orders.
For Hartsock, women's closer proximity to nature, to
the body, to the concrete sphere of reproducing human life--
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in other words, to those projects necessary to but devalued
in a world organized by meritocratic and competitive
principles and abstract values-- is not merely an accident
or work of nature, but a necessary fact of Western political
and social life. Women's reproductive capacity and men's
lack thereof is not a matter of choice but of nature.
However, the roles attached to that % natural' difference are
social and mark patriarchal domination. There is nothing
'natural' about woman being the primary care-giver.
However, having argued this, Hartsock goes on to argue that
women can look to their socialized roles, those deeply
structured meanings attached to their capacity to reproduce,
to understand their future as emancipatory subjects in
history
.
Because of the longevity and depth of this structuring
of gendered roles, she argues that the " [u] nity of mental
and manual labor, and the directly sensuous nature of much
of women's world" informs women's experiences and knowledges
and leads to " [a] more profound unity of mental and manual
labor, social and natural worlds, than is experienced by the
male worker in capitalism." Here her difference from a
Lukacsian perspective is clear. He looked at the dialectic
of nature and history as moving the worker to the
consciousness of himself as subject-object of history.
Hartsock moves "woman" to the position of subj ect -obj ect of
history through her immediate, naturalized identity vis-a-
vis reproduction. (Hartsock, 1983:118-122) Hartsock's
standpoint theory relies on a materialist analysis of
women's positioning within the sexual division of labor in
reproduction. It is with respect to the moment of women's
participation in reproduction that Hartsock sees a feminist
materialist standpoint to be possible. The moment of
reproduction centers knowledge. She argues that for Marx,
alienation is not so much connected to the reification of
the object in the process of exchange as it is to the
removal of that which is most the worker's eg. his labor.
Hartsock then removes the worker from the epistemological
center and replaces him with woman to show how she is in a
better position, vis-a-vis her relation to nature and the
production of human life, to create a different, less
alienated future.
While Hartsock argues that this particular division of
labor exists only in the West, it becomes clear that she
considers patriarchy (defined as the hierarchical, dualistic
structuring of gendered divisions of labor that privileges
male experience) to be a universalizable concept. Shifts or
differences in forms and meanings of gender relations are
less relevant for theory than the continuity of the
patriarchal ordering of the reproduction of social life
across time and cultures. Women's proximity to her objects
of concern is always already closer than men's proximity to
his objects of concern. For Hartsock, gendered relations of
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reproduction are more fundamental to understanding
oppression before and in capitalism than any other
structuring or cultural conditions of human life, including,
of course, those conditions which facilitate the production
of goods and commodities.
Women's construction of self in relation to others
leads in an opposite direction [than the Hegelian
relation to the other which is defined by a death
struggle and competition] -- toward opposition to
dualism of any sort; valuation of concrete, everyday
life,- a sense of a variety of connectednesses and
continuities both with other persons and with the
natural world. (Hartsock, 1983:242)
I am suspicious of the proximity to the object she
argues renders feminist knowledge superior. Does feminism
want to argue women "know better" because they exist in a
world of relatedness or naturalized connectedness and
thereby reiterate the necessity of that connectedness?
Hartsock argues that this is a socially constructed pattern,
this gendered division of labor. It does not necessarily
follow from women's capacity to conceive and give birth that
they become the primary caregivers. It is a patriarchal
norm constructed and variable in history. However, it is
this norm that becomes, nonetheless, definitional of what it
means to be "woman." And the close proximity "woman" has to
her patriarchally determined object of concern, the material
relations of reproduction, makes her, as opposed to the male
worker in capitalism, the potentially critical subject-
object of history.
Finally, the unity of mental and manual labor and thedirectly sensuous nature of much of women's work leadsto a more profound unity of mental and manual laborsocial and natural worlds, than is experienced by themale worker m capitalism. This unity grows from thetact that women's bodies, unlike men's, can bethemselves instruments of production: In pregnancygiving birth, or lactation, arguments about a division
ot mental from manual labor are fundamentally foreiqn
( 243 ) 3
On the one hand Hartsock leaves the political outcomes
of the relationship between experience and knowledge
somewhat open as she argues, »[t]he liberatory possibilities
present in women's experience must be, in a sense, read out
and developed. Thus a feminist standpoint may be present on
the basis of the commonalities within women's experience,
but it is neither self-evident nor obvious." (Hartsock,
1983:246) On the other hand, in the above quotations she
identifies "woman" with her life activity, reproduction and
motherhood. She leaves no distance between the woman as a
subject and her object. The relationship collapses her into
her social role. This lack of distance from the object is
compelling if one thinks the only alternative is the
abstraction or absolute separation of subject and object
offered by Enlightenment theories of knowledge. Hartsock
claims that women represent the subject -object of history
because they can be shown to be one with the external world
in which they are embedded. However, this image is
claustrophobic because it argues no distance, no space, no
autonomy for a knowing subject and the object of her life
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activity. Feminists are always already (at least
potentially) Mothers and thus emancipatory knowers
.
It is also exclusionary because Hartsock centers a
particular kind of female subject as representative of
patriarchal norms and therefore as representative of what
the feminist standpoint is be vis-a-vis relations of power
and domination:
The organization of motherhood as an institution
in which a woman is alone with ther children, the
isolation of women from each other in domestic
labor, the female pathology of loss of self in
service to others --all mark the transformation of
life into death, the distortion of what could have
been creative and communal activity into
oppressive toil, and the destruction of the
possibility of community present in women's
relational self -definition . The ruling gender and
class's interest in maintaining social relations
such as these is evidenced by the fact that when
women set up other structures in which the mother
is not alone with the children, isolated from
others, as is frequently the case in working-class
communities or the communities of people of color,
these arrangements are described as pathological
deviations. (Hartsock, 1983:245)
She centers a middle-class, white subject of motherhood as
representative of the truth about patriarchal oppression,
rendering the meaning of other experiences of families she
mentions at the end marginal to the definition of
patriarchy. They may be looked to as somehow outside
patriarchal norms for models of a better quality of life,
but are not critical positionings in and of themselves vis-
a-vis patriarchy. In Hartsock' s work, the historically
ontological status of women's place in the sexual division
of labor is privileged over the interpretation of meanings
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which circulate around different women's work and
reproductive roles in different cultural and historical
milieus. Because of her undifferentiated use of the concept
of patriarchy, her theory identifies women's experience
through only one lens, pulling together the subject of
history through a process of elimination of other meanings
attached to feminine and masculine roles. This renders
historical differences across variously acculturated
relations of reproduction insignificant for purposes of
emancipatory theory.
Thus, on the one hand, Hartsock argues for the
concrete, sensuous, material quality of knowledge, while on
the other hand, she abstracts a representative experience to
describe the cultural conditioning that offers a feminist
perspective on patriarchal norms for all women. She argues
that we should privilege the sensuous experience of
motherhood, while moving towards the abstraction of that
experience as defining the horizons of women's identity.
She privileges the ideological images of white, middle-class
Motherhood over the irreducibly different experiences and
understandings different women have of mothering.
To summarize: because Hartsock allows for no distance
between the subject and the object of concern in her theory
of "womanness , " she leaves no space for differences to be
articulated. The subject -object of history is constituted
through (the material reality and desired image of) white
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middle-class motherhood; those mothers come to define the
political objectives of feminism.
The universalizing of the standpoint produced through
patriarchal desire and subsequent arguments about how how
women are positioned vis-a-vis patriarchy has not been
adequately addressed in Hartsock's later work. She argues
that the "we" she deploys in reference to marginalized
peoples only exists as an artifice of a totalizing,
Eurocentric, masculine discourse of the Enlightenment. She
says, as if amending the above quotation, "I do not mean to
suggest that white Western women share the material
situation of colonized peoples, but rather that we share
similar positions in the ideology of the Enlightenment."
(Hartsock, 1989:191) Hartsock thus inscribes a globalizing
we and an oppressed they in advance, perpetuating the
tendency for a particular critique to be rendered
universally effective for understanding patriarchal
domination. If subjects are socially constructed through
material and ideological conditions of life, the structural
differences between and among white Western women and
colonized Third-world peoples (even if we recognize each of
them as artificial construction) may be far more relevant to
theories and strategies of emancipation than their similar
situatedness in relation to a monolithic ideological
construct . She offers up extraordinary powers to the
imaginary body of the Enlightenment thinker to proscribe
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emancipatory knowledge, defeating her own claim to value
specificity and particularity as sources of truth- telling
.
We see a similar problem in Rosemarie Hennessey's
recent wcrk. Although she offers a creative approach to
developing a non-essentialist theory of gender for feminism,
we will see that she does not respond to the question of how
theorizing patriarchy, even as a thoroughly discursive
regime of power, necessarily abstracts from particularity.
The chain of meaning Hennessey sets up across experiences to
argue the coherent, discursive totality of patriarchy does
not improve upon Hartsock's pulling together of the
representative subject (the white, bourgeois mother) of
history. She too speaks of the horizons of possibilities
and constraints on women in order to avoid charges of being
a determinist
.
Rosemarie Hennessey makes an argument for a materialist
theory of feminist knowledge, but with an Althusserian
twist. For Hennessey, a materialist feminism should employ
discourse theory to show how gender identities are enacted
through language. However, she tries to sustain the
analytical link to systems of domination functioning in the
world which make those discourses historically operational.
Hennessy offers a theory of history which places the logics
or systems of domination as the horizons or limits on how
the subject can act in the world. She argues that feminists
must locate themselves in the counter-hegemonic gaps between
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and among the discourses which condition the horizon of our
knowledges about ourselves and others.
Hennessy argues that feminism can "people" the
discursive gaps in hegemonic truths, the excesses of
masculinist ideologies, which are never totalizing but
always in process. While displacing value from objects to
discourses which create meaning and possibilities for
identification (and dis
-identification) avoids the apparent
essentialism of Hartsock's theory of subj ect -obj ect
relations, Hennessey relies on the essentially feminized
subject as the ontological grounds for emancipatory
knowledge. That subject becomes historical through choosing
to enter into battle with discursive regimes rather than as
a v result' of her identity. But the how and why of the
entry is still determined by ideological structuring of
possibilities determined by patriarchy. She echoes
Hartsock's theory of oppressed people's sharing space within
the colonizing ideological structures of Western patriarchy.
The construction of the colonial male in terms of
feminine sexual excess is only one example that
what counts as the 'feminine' subject is not
always merely a matter of empirical sex
difference. However, while the ideological
boundaries of the feminine are not limited by an
essential female body, the construction of woman's
reproductive capacity and sexuality as property to
which masculine subject can lay claim has been the
cornerstone of a patriarchal social order whose
genealogy precedes imperialist conquest and the
emergence of sexuality as a discourse. The
particular articulations of this
reproductive/alienated female body and the
interests they serve are, nonetheless,
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historically variable. (Hennessey, 1993-79
emphasis mine)
Hennessey argues that feminism should be understood as a
critical, discursive practice which retains its own
specificity only through its concrete task of
"disarticulating" the construction of the feminine in
patriarchy in all its variable forms. However, in her
concurrent attempt to develop the systemic analysis she
believes feminism needs in order to sustain its specificity,
she has to resort in the "last instance" to the monolith of
patriarchy as its defining other. Feminism is understood as
an "entry point" to the interdiscourses that constitute
patriarchy. Feminism is thus a perpetual practice of
critique on the one hand, but dependent upon an assumed
hegemonic meaning of patriarchy on the other.
Hennessey encorporates post-modern moves to "affinity"
or "articulated connections" as the basis for a feminist
politics. The terms of these politics are temporary and not
to be assumed prior to articulating the grounds for
engagement. I do not think however, that she escapes
identitarian thinking. Hennessey argues that differences in
experience and meaning can be shown to operate within a
hegemonic discursive regime of the patriarchal ordering of
gender identity. But is she right? Can "differences in
experience" be justly represented or recognized within the
given horizons she argues are constitutive of patriarchal
order? Does feminism need a unified, systemic theory of
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patriarchy to exist as a critical discourse? If not, what
might feminist social theory look like? This is a question
both Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway explore. They offer
similiar normative conclusions as to the potential for
feminist critique once the monolithic other of patriarchy is
deconstructed, but come to different conclusions about the
historical present of feminism and the timing of such a
proj ect
.
In her formulation of the feminist standpoint for
science, Sandra Harding argues that women's knowledge is, at
present, qualitatively superior to men's because it is
historically constructed to be partial. Women's knowledge
emerges from the concrete sphere of the reproduction of
human social life and is therefore more objective or
reflective of reality than knowledges that emanate from
disembodied or abstracted knowers . These disembodied
knowers make claims to legitimacy based on disengagement or
distance. This argument about the political difference
between disembodied knowers and embodied knowers hinges in
part on the politics of sustaining distance from an object
in order to better know it. Standpoint feminists argue that
the embodied knower\subj ect should admit its investment or
proximity to the object. The positivist criteria for better
knowledge demands impartiality on the part of the knower.
Standpoint theory argues this is impossible. All knowledge
can be shown to be contingent upon subject positioning in
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the world. For standpoint feminists the close proximity to
the object of knowledge, the willingness, even material
necessity, women are subject to in admitting their
investment in the object of knowledge makes their knowledge
more representative of reality than masculinist
abstractions. "They have made the move from declaiming as a
problem, or acknowledging as an inevitable fact, to
theorizing as a svtematicallv accessible resource for
maximizing objectivity the inescapable social situatedness
of knowledge claims." (Harding; 1993,69) She argues that the
politics of knowledge claims are partially pre-determined by
the location of the objects of study.
Harding discusses the conjunctures between standpoint
and post
-structuralist theory and is sympathetic to the
decentering and anti -essentialist force of post-
structuralism as theory. In fact, she argues that
standpoint theory is a prototype for post-modern theory in
that it historicizes and therefore decenters abstracted
claims about truth and knowledge in the material world.
"Fragmented identities" are richer places to look for
knowledge about the world than abstractly disinterested,
modern knowers . However, she argues it is not yet time to
give up on what she calls the better objectivity of the
"successor sciences" developed from the standpoint of
subjugated subjects. It is fine to theorize the
possibilities of the post-modern historical condition, but
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even if "we" as knowers may be decentered or "multiple" in
our commitments and loyalties, political power and the
making of public policy remains profoundly centralized and
controlled. Harding thinks we should pick and choose from
strands of post-modern thinking in order to find what will
be useful to drive feminist politics forward into more
robust and non-dominative forms of solidarity politics that
can confront that centralized power.
However, her discussion lacks a specific consideration
of power as a relationship constitutive of subject
positions. This is developed in the work of Michel
Foucault. If Harding reflected more specifically on what
post-structuralists said about power, she may find that her
assertions about whether political and material conditions
are "ripe" for a post-modern politics to make sense as
liberatory theory, would disintegrate. This is one example
of the many disjunctures between the theoretical and
political commitments of standpoint epistemology and post-
structuralist theory which make it difficult to argue, as
Harding does, a linear historical movement from one to the
other as respectively appropriate to identifiable,
temporally bounded epochs. Like Hartsock, Harding argues
women (and other subjugated subjects) presently are in a
superior position, vis-a-vis men or other representative
figures of imperialist patriarchy, to make sense of the
world and to see relations of domination from the
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"underside." Women will therefore be more invested in
transforming relations of domination, of all kinds, in the
world. However, this position of better knowledge, while
respecting the presence of different knowers, does not
adequately acknowledge the object (the world) as an active,
agent in the relationship. Harding's work, which reiterates
the primacy of the subject as knower, does not displace the
dualism of traditional theories of knowledge and cannot
avoid reinscribing new hierarchies of privilege among
subjects. The argument remains defined by the question of
rendering subjectivity transparent in knowledge, even in its
fragmented state. Harding thinks about power and its
relationship to knowledge as something to which we, as
subjects, can say yes or no. 3
The disjunctures between post-structuralist theory and
standpoint theory become more sharply apparent in Donna
Haraway' s work because 1) she argues we do exist in post-
modern historical conditions and 2) it is still possible,
indeed necessary, to develop an epistemological perspective
on politics and relations of solidarity with others.
Haraway remains within the standpoint feminist rubric
of analysis, sharing many of their assumptions about women's
oppression, identity and knowledge, even as she makes use of
post-modern historical imagery to frame the possibilities of
what she calls situated knowledges. Haraway argues that
"feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated
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knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject
and object." m this she allies herself with the tradition
of standpoint feminisms. As pointed out above, standpoint
feminism is about the partiality of perspective and
knowledge. it argues that women's knowledges are preferred
because they maP the world from subjugated spaces. For
standpoint theorists, properly feminist knowledge should
involve neither distancing nor the perpetual deferral of
claims to subjective authorship of knowledge claims. One's
perspective is always informed if not determined by where
one is looking from.
Haraway agrees with this general principle but
approaches it through the differentiated pathways of what
she calls an "informatics of domination." Haraway sets up
the terms of a post-modern age in contrast to the terms
through which we understood the world as modern or
Enlightenment subjects. Through this imaging of the
contemporary social world, Haraway displaces the
subject/object hierarchies of traditional epistemology
.
While she does not assert any necessarily emancipatory
quality to her post-modern historical references, it is
clear that she recognizes a potential in them for asserting
an affirmative, inclusive, political project. She critiques
the way some standpoint theorists have characterized
epistemological possibilities as exhausted by the dichotomy,
feminist empiricism vs. the disinterested, God's eye view.
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Each repeats particular assumptions about the subject'
control over the world through their ability to know the
world. Haraway says this polarized debate should not
continue to hold us in thrall. Each argument contains an
implicit positivist commitment to scientific vision which
acts as a conquering gaze, a gaze that properly (even in
some standpoint theories) sustains limited or no
particularity.
Haraway describes the conditions of possibility for a
post-modern "cyborg" feminism which we, as ironically mode
subjects or, "situated knowers," may engage in. She
advances the value of these ironically situated knowledges.
Haraway' s theory of situated knowledges demands attention to
the constitutive nature of the object of knowledge. Because
she diagnoses the world as post-modern, her situated subject
or knower is multiple and not so transparent as Harding
implies. The boundaries of the object are contestable and
unstable. The object is an active agent in Haraway'
s
techno-epistemology
. For example, we cannot reject
technology, nor can we revert to a world of nature untouched
by human subjectivity. Rather, because of the constitutive
nature of the object world, we must reconceptualize the
subj ect \obj ect relationship as one that neither necessitates
human control of nature and technology nor human
victimization by their own creations.
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Haraway suggests a doctrine of embodied objectivity
"We need to learn in our bodies, endowed with primate col
and stereoscopic vision, how to attach the objective to our
theoretical and political scanners in order to name where we
are and are not, in dimensions of mental and physical space
we hardly know how to name." (Haraway, 1991; 190) Her
metaphor of the connection between the knower and the world
is the prosthetic device, the scanner, the eye that does not
have a necessary essence guiding its judgement but is
certainly invested in the world in particular, identifiable
ways. Thus, while sympathetic to post-modern claims about
differencing and the decentered subject, Haraway sustains a
more structured social map than post-modern theorists. She
claims that there does exist something like x the view from
below' as a difference that matters in social analysis. She
therefore argues for an embodied vision, but a vision that
sees its own boundaries and in its reflexive knowledge
production sees a value in its partiality rather than a
limit or a deficit. With other standpoint theorists she
argues that partial knowledge is not somehow less real but
actually a better representation of how the world works,
especially in post-modern historical conditions. For her,
partial connections are always more honest than those that
assume total knowledge.
Haraway argues for the superiority of subjugated
knowledges but not without qualification. " x Subjugated'
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standpoints are preferred because they seem to promise more
adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the
world. But how to see from below is a problem requiring at
least as much skill with bodies and language, with the
mediations of visions, as the x highest' techno-scientif ic
visualizations." (Haraway, 1991; 191) Haraway situates the
actively knowing body in a conflicted, often duplicitous
site of knowledge production. For her better knowledge may
be a goal of feminist objectivity, but truth claims are
better left to those defending hegemonic privilege.
Haraway categorizes her knowers by arguing on the one
hand that subjugated knowers are more likely to reject
identitarian, God's eye knowledge and that the patriarchal,
white male defends abstract, authorial, disembodied
knowledges. She adopts aspects of Hartsock's work to ground
this claim. However, Haraway renders the claim less
foundational as she argues that " [s] ubjugation is not
grounds for an ontology; it might be a visual clue. Vision
requires instruments of vision; an optics is a politics of
positioning. Instruments of vision mediate standpoints;
there is no immediate vision from the standpoints of the
subjugated." (Haraway, 1991:193) Her work has a more
experimental quality to it than that of other standpoint
theorists and thus advances the arguments of standpoint
theory. Her emphasis on the non- innocence of any knower as
they engage with the otherness of the world defeats the
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standpoint feminists' implicit claim that some subjects may
stand outside of participation in or investment in the
relationships of domination whose terms they articulate
through their material existence. However, it remains
unclear whether Haraway' s techno-epistemology and theory of
affinity avoids the questions of representation raised by
any project whose goal is to pull together the subject of
history in the fragmented world.
Haraway' s theory of the subj ect/obj ect relation
explicitly stops short of relying on dialectical theory.
Even as she acknowledges the agency of the object of
knowledge, Haraway rejects dialectical thinking because she
claims that in its Hegelian/Marxian form, it ultimately
posits the v slave' side of the dialectic as unique and
authorial. "Situated knowledges require that the object of
knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, not a screen or
a ground or a resource, never finally as slave to the master
that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and
authorship of 'objective' knowledge." (Haraway, 1991:198)
As she makes this move away from dialectical thinking,
Haraway does not theorize what emerges in the interstices of
the subj ect\obj ect relationship. "A map of tensions and
resonances between the fixed ends of a charged dichotomy
better represents the potent politics and epistemologies of
embodied, therefore accountable objectivity." (Haraway,
1991:194) The image of 'mapping' displaces dialectical,
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relational knowledge production. Haraway leaves us with the
subject and object separated, albeit a separation that
witnesses agency on both ends.
Haraway has been critiqued by post-modern theorists and
by standpoint\socialist feminists. The latter critics point
to her move away from systemic analysis of how the various
subjugated knowers she celebrates come to be as they are.
For example, Rosemarie Hennessey argues that while Haraway
defies modernist commitments to disembodied objectivity, she
disembodies her knowers in a different way in that they
become situated within post-modern plays of difference.
This implies that subjects simply are in the world with no
systemic logics of domination structuring the conditions of
possibility of existence. However, Haraway argues that
"Some differences are playful; some are poles of world
historical systems of domination. x Epistemology' is about
knowing the difference." (Haraway, 1991:161) Haraway' s work
is more closely aligned to the tradition of standpoint
feminism and a materialist perspective than Hennessey
recognizes. She explicitly acknowledges the tension between
standpoint theory which focuses on the situatedness and
limits of identity and post-modern theory which rejects the
project of situating identities and instead finds
difference everywhere (thus locating itself in a theoretical
nowhere)
.
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Joan Scott critiques another aspect of Haraway'
s
argument. (Scott, 1989) She argues that Haraway's example of
'women of color' as an identity which opposes imperialist
markings of otherness repeats the "old/new left's" tendency
to romanticize or reify the struggles of "the most
oppressed" as if they represent something truer than other
struggles. I agree that this reflects a well-worn tendency
to romanticize the given condition of otherness thereby
avoiding responsibility for complicity\participation in
setting the terms of struggle (through action or inaction)
.
However, Haraway's refers to women of color because their
self -identified multiple affinities and multiple loyalties
defeat any notion of the unified political subject of
feminism. Feminism has long relied on the uniformly
gendered subject whose gaze is on the 'horizons of
patriarchy'
. Haraway refers to women of color as a
materialist counter to the essentializing tendencies of
white feminists who forget their multiply situated (at least
partially dominative selves) in favor of assuming the role
of essentially oppressed gendered subjects. So Haraway does
not fetishize 'women of color' in any simple way as unified
subjects (others) in the world who can tell 'us' (subjects
too embedded in imperialist knowledges to see ourselves) the
truth. Instead she invokes the concept to argue against the
unified, always primarily gendered, subject of feminism.
Haraway cites the example of women of color as an identity
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forged through affinity rather than through monocausal
relationships to the material world. ^Women of color'
represents affinity because it is created through multiple
forms of resistance to the othering strategies of the
Eurocentric, patriarchal, capitalist, global order. It is a
non-foundationalist, but no less situated, subjectivity. I
agree with Haraway's discussion of how the notion of women
of color came about, ie. through a series of oppositional
positionings vis-a-vis the differentiated forms systems
dominance assume. However, once it becomes a political
identity or reference for better knowledge claims it is
collapsed into an identity politics which may obscure as
much about the differences among women of color as it
illuminates about their material conditions.
The above developments in standpoint feminisms advance
awareness of the constitutive limits of the situated self
and the horizons of feminist identity, both temporally and
spatially. But these approaches do not adequately explore
the possibilities of the dialectical theory that is the
backdrop to their work. Hartsock assumes a static
relationship between being and knowing which approaches
synthesis, as does Harding. Haraway, on the other hand,
explicitly rejects dialectics. Her critique references the
Hegelian dialectical tradition, but rejects its telos in
favor of the multiplicity of post-modern identity forms. In
addition, her futurist image of the "cyborg feminist"
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collapses the historical tensions between technology and
human creativity. Her theory of situated knowledges
sustains a correspondence between being and knowing and
assumes a relationship between social identity and critical
politics. She assumes an identitarian reconciliation
between (off-shore) workers and the technologies that
condition the possibility of their identities. Yet her
imagery of globalized, post-modern existence presupposes
unlimited possibilities.
Post-modern theory takes an explicit stand against
privileging epistemology as prior to politics. It rejects
the privileging of any knowing subject, even those situated
in a mode of resistance, as rendering the world transparent
to consciousness. This radical questioning of the subject
has been one of the reasons feminists who turn to post-
modern theory are said to be apolitical (lacking normative
grounds for their claims) . Haraway wants to have it both
ways, to critique the unified subject while sustaining a
notion of subjectivity to which critical theory might refer,
The dis juncture between privileging the subject on
epistemological terms and arguing for multiplicity on
political terms is not reconciled in Haraway' s work, though
the delimma is dynamically profiled.
Thinking about the dialectics of experience involves
asking different questions about the relationship between
being and knowledge than do standpoint feminisms. Feminism
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does not need a better science of political life, grounded
in experience, as Sandra Harding argues. This risks
supplying further fodder for the management of politics
instead of encouraging contestation and action. 4 We
cannot render our experience as knowers transparent within
the outcome of our research as Harding's essay about 'strong
objectivity' implies. Trying to approach objectivity by
checking the impact of our material situatedness , or
subjectivity, on each knowledge claim controls the
possibilities for creating meaning in the world rather than
illuminating them. In an essay critiquing Harding's goals
of better objectivity, Kirstie McClure argues, "Although the
v theory' privileged here is a specific * theory of knowledge
rather than a specific v social theory as conventionally
understood, theory is again charged with the task of
providing an authoritative foundation for a unified politics
capable of effective intervention in the operative dynamics
of a social whole." (McClure, 1992:364) McClure is critical
of the authorizing strategies of Harding's work, arguing
they limit political possibilities rather than expanding
them. I agree with McClure in general, but my critique is
more concerned with how standpoint theories ultimately treat
the subject/object relationship of knowledge. The political
problem of closure McClure discusses is immanent in the
epistemological frameworks of standpoint theory.
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While standpoint feminism advances itself as a critical
social theory, these epistemological arguments ultimately
rely on causal explanations for social phenomenon. The
knowing subject remains the manager of the objective world.
Feminist knowledge is therefore not deconstructive of
boundaries and limitations placed on the subject in the
social world, but is ultimately instrumental. While
standpoint theory plays a progressive role in cracking the
hegemony of knowledge claims whose legitimacy depends upon
abstraction from concrete, situated subjects, it sustains a
problematic commitment to identity thinking. This will not
move feminism into the coalitional or affinity politics
invoked by socialist feminists as necessary for the
recognition of difference and the reconfiguration of
self\other relations. Instead it invites a further sorting
of identities into categories determined through given
social relations and hierarchically organized with respect
to whether the participants in each category approach
historical truth. It remains within the parameters of a
politics of representation because the subject in history
becomes a monadic entity for politics rather than a
multiple, conflictual problem of politics.
Feminism can acknowledge its immanent limits as an
interpretive discourse without dissolving into particularism
or relativism. This will require interpreting the political
significance of experiences without relying on materialist
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or scientific conclusions that close down contestation in
the name of collective commitment. Experience is messy,
infinitely complicated and intrinsically resistant to even
the most nuanced of description. Conceptualization reduces
it to categories. Experience is particular and resists
rationalization. Feminism thus needs to be generous with
its interpretive schema, never parsimonious. This is not
merely a question of v more voices' entering into the
cacophonous but liberal (tolerant) crowd of truth-seekers.
And its certainly does not preclude considerations of what
socialist-feminists have argued to be central to feminist
understandings about women's lives, ie. material conditions
of life, sexuality and reproduction. Though it cannot move
beyond the limits I have discussed, feminist standpoint
theory developed out of profound concerns for creating the
terms of a radical form of feminist solidarity that
encorporates from the beginning a respect for the diverse,
experiential knowledge claims of subjugated, marginalized
subjects. But I think it cannot address the present need to
reconfigure the relationship between being and knowledge
which in turn can help us develop new political forms for
interaction with others. Epistemology is embedded in, not
prior to politics. This means rethinking the effort to
theorize the political out of the lived experience of women.
The project itself is critical to developing normative
theories about relations of domination, but the issues that
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arise about experience and knowledge cannot be addressed on
the terms of standpoint theory.
Ideally, standpoint theorists argue, theory should help
us know the world as we act in the world. But this is
clearly impossible. The tensions inherent in the project of
self-knowledge are best elaborated in the work of Theodor
Adorno. We cannot know as we act all the time and, at the
extreme, a world constructed out of such a vision is
totalitarian. Totalizing self
-consciousness is impossible
to complete as a project and can lead to paralysis vis-a-vis
action. In the epigram I chose for this work, Nietzsche
says we cannot and do not know experience as it tolls in our
ears
.
We are always already working on the distortions we
call the truth after the fact. Adorno agrees with and
responds to Nietzsche's radical skepticism about knowledge
and truth. For Adorno, the abstractions that emerge with
the creation of knowledge defeat individuality and
difference. The colonizing relationship of the subject to
the object world in modernity is expressed through systems
of abstract exchange which collapse and obscure difference.
Adorno' s immediate concerns were only occasionally directed
towards women or gender. He was, however, committed to
exploring the possibilities of subjectivity in modernity and
how we come to know ourselves and others in the world. I
appropriate ideas from Adorno 's Negative Dialectics for a
theory of interpretation that works against identity logic
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while sustaining engagement with experience in the social
world
.
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CHAPTER III
ADORNO AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDENTITY
In the last chapter I discussed the political tensions
within feminism resulting from historical and theoretical
challenges to the construction of "woman" or "women" as a
unified political identity. I discussed the limits of the
ways the subject and identity are understood in
socialist\standpoint feminisms. The state of the feminist
subject is put into sharp profile by a discussion of the
developments and the critiques of these theoretical
perspectives. The deconstruction of "identity" has
destabilized the subject (s) and political projects of
feminism. Questions have surfaced about the possibility of
solidarity and collectivity, and indeed about how to sustain
the specificity of a feminist project at all.
Contemporary feminisms' concerns about the subject (s)
of feminism and the potential for collectivity among women
calls for a closer look at the work of Theodor Adorno
.
Contemporary critical theorists have dismissed Adorno as
hopelessly pessimistic, elitist and, perhaps worst of all,
as having neither a positive nor an accessible program for
political practice. However, Adorno' s work can contribute
to feminist theory and politics in two ways. First, his
analysis of the constellational logics and limits of
domination in modernity could contribute to critiquing
feminist identity discourses by exploring their limits and
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exclusionary premises while sustaining feminism as a
critical, self
-reflective project. Second, his theory of
experience simultaneously communicates the fragility and the
potential power of experience as a site of critical,
oppositional knowledge production in modernity. Both of
these areas are central to the politics of identity as they
have developed in feminism. The interpretive theory of
constellations emphasizes the potentially multiple meanings
embedded in any particular practice or experience. It
reconfigures the relationship between knowledge and
experience
.
Adorno's theory of negative dialectics challenges the
limits of modern subjective cognition, encouraging
resistance to closure in identitiarian categories in thought
and practice. This challenge can move us beyond the brittle
and often static limits of feminist identity politics to an
open-ended but more consistently critical and sustainable
politics of knowledge and recognition. In addition,
Adorno's attention to the fragility and temporality of
resistance can offer feminism means to understand its own
multiple and ongoing identity crises and strengthen its
reflexivity as a critical theory and practice. 5
Adorno offers a radical reconceptualization of
relations between the self and other (and the other in one's
self) which needs attention by feminists concerned with the
possibility of collectivist theory and action among subjects
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in conditions of modernity. He does this through a critique
of the principle of identity and a dialectical theory of
experience. He shows how experience, understood
dialectically, is a critical force that works against
identity thinking, even in what he calls the "administered
world." 6 I will show how Adorno's negative dialectics can
help us conceive of a politics of experience, to theorize a
different meaning for the feminist principle that the
personal is political that does not resort to identity
thinking in either universalist or particularist forms. 7
Negative dialectics argues for a non-identitarian
relationship between subject and object, between self and
other, which allows experience to play a critical role in
political relationships.
Before further discussing the positive 8 moments of
Adorno's work, we must look at his critique of the dominant
forms of reason and the demand for identity thinking in
modernity. The dismissal of Adorno as anti-modern misses
the project embedded in his critique. Adorno argued that
the contemporary demand of philosophy must be the
recuperation of modern reason's capacity to reflect upon its
formation in the world, to be immanently critical of its own
forms. He was, therefore, a critic of the forms and
consequences of modern reason, but not ant i -modern. He did
not reject identity thinking as hopelessly dominative. He
considered its terms to be unavoidable and even potentially
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emancipatory. So while he was a theorist of non-identity,
he was neither anti-modern nor a prototypical post-modern
theorist. In addition, he did not consider any particular
subject (working class, national liberationists
,
women, in
fact any marginalized subj ect -
-including himself as
intellectual 9 ) to have immediate or predictable future
access to emancipated forms of reason. It was this latter
claim that has led him to be dismissed by later critical
theorists and feminists who believe one must have a subject
of history to whom one addresses one's theory or exist in a
hopeless, aporetic void as a theorist. (Fraser, 1989;
Benhabib, 1982)
Adorno is most closely associated with the text
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) . This text has recently
received quite a bit of attention by those who would
resuscitate it for critical theory. 10 For that reason and
because my concerns involve how negative dialectics as a
method and a theory contributes to a critique of feminist
identity politics, I will discuss only briefly the
apocalyptic story of modernity set forth in DoE to introduce
Adorno as a theorist centrally concerned with the potential
subversion of the logics of domination in modernity.
In Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer
interpret Homer's Odyssey as a history of the prototypically
patriarchal, bourgeois individual. Their interpretation
shows Odysseus in the process of coming to know (to separate
68
himself through cunning and instrumental reason) and to
dominate nature in order to achieve a strong ego/identity
formation. As Odysseus travels, that which cannot be
captured by him in thought, or controlled by him physically
is eliminated or outwitted in thought and practice as
"other"-- as that which represents desire, the irrational 01
nature. Through this retelling of the Odyssey
, nature is
shown to become (historically) that which inhibits the
movement of instrumental reason whose telos is the rational
society. This makes necessary nature's exclusion as a
threat from the circle of enlightenment.
The cognitive logic of identity, shown in the Odvssev
to be linked to self-preservation which in turn is
understood to be in opposition to the unpredictability or
the unknowability of nature, becomes a necessary and
socially integrative aspect of modern life. Individuals
develop this historical process of identity formation
through separation from and domination of otherness as a
substitution for mimetic relationships to nature and the
external world. 11
Jurgen Habermas argues that Adorno and Horkheimer (but
mostly Adorno) falsely accuse Enlightenment reason of
creating and enforcing the internalization of relations of
domination with the necessary consequence of a totally
administered society. Thus, for Habermas, their authorship
of the Dialectic of Enlightenment constitutes a performative
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contradiction in which modern reason is apparently rejected
but then deployed to critique. This criticism has
encouraged contemporary critical theorists to identify
Adorno with a reductive reading of Dialectic of
Enlightenment which places it in the annals of intellectual
hrstory as an apocalyptic, totalizing critique of modern
reason. This reading and Habermas' alternative view of the
modern life world has achieved a common sense status among
many contemporary critical and some feminist theorists eager
to move on from Adorno' s seeming pessimism and intellectual
mandarinism to theorize a brighter potential for approaching
modern visions of justice, autonomy and freedom through
critical reason. (Benhabib, 1982; Young, 1990; Fraser, 1989)
in the course of his intellectual journey, Habermas
developed a fundamentally different vision of modernity than
did Adorno and Horkheimer. Habermas remains loyal to
Enlightenment's own historiography of its relationship to
myth or tradition: "The process of Enlightenment leads to
the desocialization of nature and to the denaturalization of
the human world." (Habermas, 1982:19) Enlightenment
enriches our understanding of the world; it is a creative
and progressively rational context for understanding life in
its differentiated forms. Adorno and Horkheimer argue that
Enlightenment brings the socialization (domination) of
nature (away from understanding it in its magical immanence)
and the naturalization of the human world (so that reason in
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itself has „o history)
. MornQ ^ meimer^ ^
the Enlightens centers knowledge of the world in the
transcendent or empirical subject, leaving it
undifferentiated and situating it as universal
consciousness-in-itself
.
Habermas argues that »m modern times, traditions
become temporalized; the changing interpretations are
clearly distinguished from the world itself. This external
world divides into the objective world of entities and the
social world of norms (or normatively governed inter-
personal relationships)
: both are in turn silhouetted
against the inner world of subjective experiences."
(Habermas, 1982:19) This gentle image of the world of
objects and the social world of norms being silhouetted
against subjectivity is in contrast to Adorno and
Horkheimer's story of Odysseus as an original modern subject
outwitting and undermining the external world in order to
come into dominance over it. From the above contrasts, one
might get the impression that the difference between
Habermas and his mentors is merely one of emphasis so that
the otherwise parallel directions of their inquiries
diverge. Habermas is consumed with mining the positivity of
modern reason, Adorno and Horkheimer with showing its
treachery. This would make it necessary to choose between
them; do we accept the gentler vision of Enlightenment
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offered by Habermas or do we acmt ^ * uu ccept the harsh vision of
Adorno and Horkheimer?
Habermas goes much further, however, than showing his
disagreement about the possibilities of liberation on the
terms offered by modern reason. He asserts that Adorno and
Horkheimer have engaged in a performative contradiction.
His critique (which he uses against many of his
philosophical adversaries) » moves from presenting an
alternative image of Enlightenment to claiming that Adorno
and Horkheimer are anti-reason even as they deploy reason tc
critique modernity. This renders their work internally
illogical and therefore irrelevant to creating emancipatory
(critical) theory. This in itself, all other disagreements
aside, defeats their claims about the dominative structures
of modern reason. He says they argue that there are no
grounds on which to escape the modern trajectory of
instrumental reason though, according to him, clearly they
have escaped in order to issue a critique.
Contrary to Habermas' reading, however, Adorno and
Horkheimer do not issue a totalizing critique in Dialectic
of Enlightenment and therefore do not engage in a
performative contradiction. Homer's text represents a
journey. The "reason" Adorno and Horkheimer critique in the
Odyssey is instrumental reason that remains blind to its own
historicity. They do not engage in speculation about what
reason that is transparent to itself might look like,
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ts
precisely because they do not ccnsider themselves to have
privileged access to that vision. mstead, they immanently
critique the terms upon which instrumental reason moves in
the world and the consequences of its arrogant belief in i
autonomous self
-formation, its necessary connection to self-
preservation, and participation in cumulative progress
(making the world bettPr.-mnm ~-f^- •3 wj_xu u u er
-more efficient, predictable,
transparent to the self)
.
It is this differentiated form of instrumental reason
that Adorno and Horkheimer take on in the Dialectic nf
Enlightenment
.
Even this reason, in spite of the brutal
historical consequences of its arrogance (the destruction of
otherness through cunning)
, never completes the task of
making what it considers irrational fully rationalized.
Adorno and Horheimer express the incompleteness of the task
through pointing out a moment in Homer's text that appears
coldly dismissive of suffering but actually indicates a
critical reversal in the otherwise seamless narrative of
instrumental reason. They interpret this moment as
sustaining an anti
-rationalist remembrance of suffering.
Adorno and Horkheimer close "Odysseus or Myth and
Enlightenment" with a discussion of Homer's self-
interruption as he describes the hanging of women unfaithful
to their spouses during their absence. "The passage closes
with the information that the feet of the row of suspended
women 'kicked out for a short while, but not for long.'"
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as a
(DOE: 79) The phrase "not for long" could be read
dismissal of the women's suffering. For Adorno and
Horkheimer, however, the phrase signifies an interruption in
an otherwise seamless, inexorable, novel-like account of the
Odyssey. "By cutting short the account, Homer prevents us
from forgetting the victims, and reveals the unutterable
eternal agony of the few seconds in which the women struggle
with death." They further explain the significance of this
moment: "Reticence in narrative (the cutting short of the
text), however, is the sudden break, the transformation of
what is reported into something long past, by means of which
the semblance of freedom glimmers that since then
civilization has not wholly succeeded in putting out."
(DoE:79) In this otherwise apocalyptic interpretation of
Enlightenment through the Odyssey
, which was written during
the years of the Holocaust, Adorno and Horkheimer pull out a
moment in Homer's text as an acknowledgement of the memory
of suffering. This anti-rationalist moment sustains a
memory of freedom that is not extinguished even in the most
rationalized genocide. The rationalization of the murder of
the women for transgressing the patriarchal boundaries of
properly female sexuality is therefore incomplete. This
reversal does not glorify the moment as necessarily adding
meaning to the murder by the patriarch. It is there in the
text as a momentary but critical reversal of the Homeric
narrative history of instrumental reason. Robert Hullot-
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Kentnor explains: "In the possibility of remembering what
has happened, the coldness and impassibilite of the novel's
narration reverses as memory of nature.
...In reflection on
this dialectic at a standstill, the necessity
... of the
world's daring-do dissolves, and enlightenment comes to
terms as the consciousness of the uselessness of sacrifice.
In this consciousness, reason recovers its telos." (Kentor,
1989:26)
Even in DoE Adorno and Horkheimer show instrumental
reason to be neither a transcendental (out of reach of human
thought or agency) nor a seamless totality. It always
remains in a process of becoming a totalizing force as it
consumes\subsumes the particular in the dialectic of
history. Instrumental reason's claims to progress and
rationality are not realized in part because it is
contingent upon the process of conquest, of the double
movement of creating the enemy other and subduing it. It
never finally conquers what lies outside of it. While the
moment of nature is cognitively controlled or excluded by
the individual in order to construct a rational society, it
is never finally conquered as an independent moment in the
dialectical movement of history. 13 In Adorno' s theory, it
comes to represent the non-identical.
So for Adorno, the philosophy of Enlightenment and the
history of modernity is not a closed system. He therefore
did not set up, even in the Dialectic of Enlightenment , an
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inside and outside to which we as subjects might have
immediate access now or in the future. Nor did he think of
nature or of non-identity as necessarily utopic. " claims
to privileged access as a thinker or as a social actor to
radical new forms outside of domination or to the
ontological sources of domination will reflect or repeat
that which they claim to be escaping. "There is no peeping
out. What would lie in the beyond makes its appearance only
in the materials and categories within." (Adorno, 1969:140)
Adorno did not claim that that which is excluded from the
dialectic of enlightenment at any given moment is knowable
on terms that would necessarily offer freedom. The project
of reversing or subverting the terms of instrumental reason
must be immanent to its logic.
Adorno' s particular version of critical theory
developed as a philosophy of resistance or negative
dialectics. Negative dialectics preclude ideas of escape
and encourage an image of constantly pushing and
transfiguring the limits imposed by identity logic on the
self and other while sustaining the tension between theory
and practice, subjectivity and interpretation, subject and
object. 15 it does not offer an escape route from the
hazards of the conditions of the modern social and political
world. It keeps us perpetually aware and critical of how
knowledge creation or conceptualization, while necessary,
potentially disguises, suppresses and even destroys
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qualitative differences or experiences that lie outside the
grasp of that conceptualization. As a contingent and self-
consciously critical world view, negative dialectics helps
us resist the absorption of critically diverse experiences
in identitarian categories.
m Ne^ive_DiaJ^ciic^ Adorno engages in immanent
critique of idealist forms of Enlightenment knowledge. He
critiques the philosophies of the subject which place it
first, as prior to or transcendent over the external world,
or the object. Kantian philosophical idealism, in
particular, naturalizes the subject at the subject's own
expense, sacrificing its spontaneity and the potency of its
experience in the world in exchange for the ideological
certainty of subjective control and stability.
Yet the generality of the transcendental subject is
that of the functional context of society, of a whole
that
_ coalesces from individual spontaneities and
qualities, delimits them in turn by the leveling
exchange principle, and virtually deletes them as
helplessly dependent on the whole. The universal
domination of mankind by the exchange value- -a
domination which a priori keeps the subjects from being
subjects and degrades subjectivitiy itself to a mere
object, makes an untruth of the general principle that
claim to establish the subject's predominance. The
surplus of the transcendental subject is the deficit of
the utterly reduced empirical subject. (Adorno,
1987 : 172)
Kant's idealism, with its uncritical (affirmative or
positive) stance toward the transcendent subject, reflects
the dominance of identity logic in the social world. For
Adorno, in addition to being an economic principle
justifying exploitation, the exchange principle dictates
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social relations on epistemological levels. identity logic
reduces the social world to interchangeable parts; it
reduces or brackets off inconvenient differences,
simultaneously enforcing and justifying the
interchangeability and manipulation of objects. This does
not imply that there is a reality or truth to experience
which, but for epistemic distortions, would shine through.
It is to say that for Adorno, there are always differences
between the specificity of embodied interaction with the
world and the conceptualization of the interaction. in
addition to ctiquing Kantian idealism, Adorno spent a good
deal of time critiquing the claims of neutrality made by
modern positivists who argue they separate themselves from
ideological forms and represent the given world in
knowledge. Adorno shows their very methodology to reflect
the dominance of the identity principle implicated in
exchange relations and commodity culture and therefore to be
deeply ideological and historical in its attempted
absorption of difference.
Adorno' s critique of identity logic and its function in
the social world reflects the influence of Nietzsche and of
Weber in addition to the most obvious influence of Marx.
For Marx, the politics of exchange are related to the
circulation of commodities; the alienating effects are
specific to capitalism. In capitalism, exchange value comes
to rule over use value as simple exchange- -C-M-C becomes M-
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C-M'
.
This heralds the hxstorical creation of profit as a
motive for exchange rather than simple need or social
convention. Exchange-value in capitalism is implicated in
the alienated condition of workers, in the fetishizing of
commodities and in the progressive value of capitalist
development in moving us from a condition of scarcity to the
heights of our productive capacities as humans. For Marx,
the contradiction embedded in the exchange principle lies in
the historical necessity of that principle to develop as
social productivity increases while at the same time it
functions to alienate and immiserate a particular historical
class. This class, according to traditional interpretations
of Marx, will eventually overthrow the very system that
brought it into being. Adorno, following the insights of
Lukacs as to the subordination of production to exchange in
late capitalism, argues the logic of identity to be deeply
embedded in social structures and norms. Adorno understands
the exchange principle as a reductive and ultimately violent
social mechanism not only attached to the formal economy of
capitalism, but to the very question of identity in
modernity. As a critic of late capitalism Adorno found the
exchange principle operative in the reduction of human labor
to waged hours and interchangeable products. But he
broadens the meaning beyond what Lukacs argued about the
commodity form to show how the exchange principle informs
modern methods of constructing knowledge and juridical
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norms. For Adorno, the exchange principle is embedded in
the very substance of social relations among subjects of
modernity.
In the second essay of the Genealogy of Mn^ic,
Nietzsche says that the concepts of measurement, of
valuation, of identity emerge as the basis for conceptions
of justice. Harms done to individuals or the community can
be 'forgiven' in exchange for the punishment which,
particularly in modern criminal justice, is quantitatively
and qualitatively designed to match the harm done. Justice
becomes contingent upon finding equivalencies, so the
creditor, the victim of the crime or society can have
vengeance. (Nietzsche, 1976:72) 16 in other words, justice
is contingent upon the abstraction from the physicality and
experience of suffering and the establishing of
equivalencies through the exchange of which the social world
claims vengeance. For Nietzsche, the process is embedded in
historical relations of power and the enjoyment of cruelty,
not in transcendent knowledges of 'the good' as classical
idealist philosophies would have us think nor in actual
equivalencies as modern scientific positivists would have us
think. This process of abstraction becomes a very concrete
form of violence, done in the name of justice, which reduces
the experience of the self, whether it be the wrongdoer or
the wronged, to abstract equivalencies.
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Using the legal sphere as an example of the violence of
the exchange principle Adorno says
,
ln
W
law 'the^orma/nr"
0™611
?
11
° £ ir"*ional rationality,
norm? everyone Ts t?eated
P ?^ f e"uivalolre bec°™^ the
ine^aStr ^^SS^-^'SSg ^
closed circle, of anything guod non est in actis(Adorno, 1987:309) t" 8.
There has been much contemporary work done on the 'myth of
equal treatment' under the law and how it perpetuates
inequality. The actual day to day functioning of the legal
system is less static than Adorno argues here, but the myth
of ' equal treatment' before the law serves to perpetuate
inequalities in the manner he describes. The myth is still
so powerful that it is commonly noted that even oppositional
(anti-capitalist, anti-racist, or anti-sexist) social and
political actors turn to the courts as the last site of
arbitration for their claims more often than any other
social site. 17 in spite of the increasing integration of
social, political and legal spheres, the law rarely, as it
is structured, takes into consideration the different
bodies, needs and experiences which come to be arbitrated
under its auspices. And when it does, it has contradictory
effects. Adorno, like Nietzsche, argues that the law is
founded in the exchange principle, reducing experience to
manipulable quantities in order to seek 'appropriate'
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vengeance. The 'law- only artificially wipes clean the
slate of conflict.
in addition to drawing on Marx and Nietzsche to
theorize how the exchange principle functions to eradicate
difference in modernity, Adorno's social theory of exchange
recalls Weber's famous "iron cage" of late capitalist
development, within which subject's fate becomes
bureaucratically and functionally determined outside of
their individual agency or subjectivity. The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Camtalisrg is only the most famous
of Weber's discussions of how the dictates of the social
world come to bear on the individual, how social categories
and processes considered to be natural or outside of the
control of the individual deny the ability of subjects to
know others in freedom. in the Protestant Ethic and thP
Spirit of Capitalism
,
Weber shows how an original motivation
of modern economic development, the highly individualized,
spiritual calling to do good works was gradually
transformed, taking on a life of its own and rendering the
individual but a cog in the disenchanted mechanisms of
progress. As the exchange system of late capitalism became
more complex, the motive to work came to be dictated by the
instrumental, functional necessities of the system and was
only apparently individualized. Individuals' activity in
capitalism was mediated not through the meaning offered by
religious commitment but by the instrumental imperatives of
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rules abstracted from their particular lives. This
abstraction of the activity of the self from concrete
experience, is a historical and oppressive phenomenon
implicated in the systems of domination within which modern
individuals live.
Adorno's critique of modernity occupies a unique
position among these thinkers. He follows in the tradition
of Nietzsche and Weber in his historicization of the fate of
the individual in modernity. Like them he looks to the
birth of the individual, of Man, in Enlightenment as holding
potential for freedom. And like them he sees that potential
defeated in the rise of organized, mass society.
For Adorno, Enlightenment epistemologies and social
systems falsely render moments of suffering transparently
knowable. The irrational, desire-
-that which would not
otherwise naturally have an identity in the social world
comes to be identified. It forces them into interchangeable
relationships with other objects in the service of
explanation and regulation. The modern emphasis on the
individual and subjective knowledge denies the critical
limits of the integrative forms of representation and
communication available to the subject at any given time.
As mentioned above, Adorno's historical reference for
the extreme harms of identity thinking is the Holocaust. 18
"Genocide is the absolute integration. It is on its way
wherever men are leveled of f -- 'polished off as the German
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military call pH -it- 1mH ^ iy ned i -until one exterminates them literally as
deviations from the concept of their total nullity.
Auschwitz confirmed the philosophers of pure identity as
death. Even in his formal freedom, the individual is as
fungible and replaceable as he will be under the
liquidators' boots." (Adorno, 1987:362)
That argument has led to Adorno being critiqued,
particularly from the left, for theorizing a social world in
which all resistance or opposition, because it must rely on
the identity principle for articulation, inevitably becomes
complicit with systems of domination. (Habermas, 1982;
Benhabib, 1981,- Piccone, 1973
; Buck-Morss, 1972) it is
argued that for Adorno all social and popular movements are
imbued with bourgeois principles of knowledge and are
therefore incapable of real resistance or of affecting the
social world. (Freedman and Lazarus, 1988) I disagree with
these interpretations.
Adorno' s historical reference points to the path of
knowledge construction in identitarian forms as being so
treacherous as to potentially result in genocide. But this
should not be read as an argument about the inevitability of
the system of abstract exchange in modernity leading to
gendocidal practices. Nor should it be read as arguing the
impossibility of oppositional politics in the administered
world. "It is precisely the insatiable identity principle
that perpetuates antagonism by suppressing contradiction.
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What tolerates nothing that is not like itself thwarts the
reconcilement for which it mistakes itself. The violence of
equality-mongering reproduces the contradiction it
eliminates." (Adorno, 1987 : 142
-143 ) While identity is a
coercive social and political principle, identity and
difference never historically collapse into a reconciled
state. For Adorno, any totality produced by identitarian
thinking (including social movements) is potentially
antagonistic
.
Adorno'
s negative dialectics resuscitates the Hegelian
dialectic but critiques its telos. Identity formation as
understood in the tradition of Hegelian dialectics, involves
the double movement of engaging an other (in the
Phenomenology of Mind this other is internal to mind and
external to self) and conquering it in order to create the
boundaries, or consciousness, of one's self. Adorno argues
through and against Hegel that believing the reconciliation
of identity and difference to have been realized in any
historical form, whether it be the bourgeois individual or
the State, participates in sustaining and naturalizing a
status quo still riven with relations of domination. The
logic of identity, the creation of boundaries for the self
and other, comes to have no history in itself but becomes a
fact of nature. 19 In other words if, following Hegel, we
assume the reconciliation of identity and difference in any
given institution or form of social life, what is actually
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still a moment in history and potentially affected by the
movement of consciousness, becomes naturalized. However,
since nature, including human nature, contradictorily
remains as other vis-a-vis history, we remain in a
relationship to those institutions which is actually
antagonistic (non-identical) but understood (ideologically)
as final and unmoving. The Hegelian reconciliation of
identity and difference, the founding of identity in its
final form in the modern individual and the modern State
apparatus is shown by Adorno to contribute to enforce the
spell or the reification of the given world.
Adorno argues the contradictory nature of social and
epistemological principles of modernity. He does not argue
that these led to an historically inevitable conclusion, nor
did he argue that late capitalism is without space for
critical thought and action. He is not simply arguing that
subjects cannot resist because they are imbued with the
ideological forms of a closed totality, of the administered
world. This would imply the existence of some pure
subjectivity before the laws of modernity or capitalism
enforced their dictates. For Adorno, we are embedded in our
social context through which our sense of self is
continually being constructed. Critique is in the awareness
of the limits of the constitutive nature of the social
world. We cannot return (indeed should not return) to some
happily reconciled state prior to the damage of the modern
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condition, nor whould we assume future access to a
reconciled state given particular positioning of subjects in
the world.- instead, we should recognize that relations
of domination between the self and what is other never quite
absorb the excess of what is other. Adorno's is a limit
philosophy of knowledge. He argues in a lecture on "The
Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," that Hegel
understood "that the limits of knowledge to which its
critical self
-reflection leads are not something external to
knowledge, not something to which it is merely condemned
from the outside; rather, they are inherent in all moments
of knowledge.
" (Adorno, 1993:76-77). Adorno's negative
dialectics recognizes this as a critical principle negating
totalizing or transcendent knowledge. What is outside, what
cannot be known or covered by the concept assigned to a
thing negates any claim to totality or the universality of
that concept
.
This discussion of the identity principle can be used
to consider the emergence and potential of new social
movements. 21 As these historical movements have emerged
as oppositional political identities to imperialist or
patriarchal structures of domination, participants have come
to develop prior forms through which to know one another.
On the one hand these emergent movements challenge
traditional axes of power and domination which denied the
particular subjects involved a political identity or
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relevance in the social world. On the other hand, in
considering those identities to exist in an ontological
relationship of otherness to a particular enemy, such
movements suppress differences in experience and create
rigid structures of belonging. Those differences, as I will
argue later in the context of feminist theory and politics,
could render the political relationships among participants
less rigid as oppositional movements develop into
significant historical forces. Those differences could
prevent identities which are critical and deeply politicized
in one historical context from relying on a priori forms of
knowledge and thus creating new forms of domination in
another. This emphasis on differences presents a problem
when we desire continuous solidarity, reconciliation, safety
in knowing where we stand in relation to the other. The
chaos within solidarity that difference ensures is
unpredictable in its outcomes. 22 However, it is only in
recognizing the lack of finality about those constructions
that we sustain critique in an as yet unreconciled world.
Through critique, through the determinate negation of
positive forms of knowing otherness, and without mapping out
or presuming to plan the outcomes, we can suggest
alternative ways of knowing otherness in the world. The
dialectics of this process, however, the negative dialectics
leave a remainder, something not covered by the concept.
This remainder sustains the possibility for critique and for
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change from a world whose dominant epistemologies and social
forms encourage projects that privilege the subject and thus
a rigid separation between self and other.
Habermas and others dismiss Adorno for ignoring the
potential of modernity and its central concepts of freedom,
autonomy and justice. Adorno does say much more about what
freedom is not than about what freedom could be. He never
says what freedom is because for him it is not yet, in
thought or in practice. It is a potentiality and exists in
moments of becoming. Freedom is not, as it is for Kant,
realization of our private capacity to use reason within the
rationalized framework of public obedience. Neither is it
realized in the abstracted form of the bourgeois individual
or the institution of the modern State as it is for Hegel.
For Adorno, domination, the denial of freedom and just
autonomy to the self and other, is sustained through the
public and private systems of modern life. Against the
bourgeois individualism of Kant, he argued there is no site
of escape, either into individual consciousness or in
privately constituted and publicly sanctioned institutions
like the family or the community. Against the
Marxist/Lukacsian left he argued that theorizing privileged
sites of social identity, whether it be worker, woman or any
other historically subjugated subject obscures non-identity.
For Adorno the potential for freedom and a just form of
autonomy lies in the reconstitution of how we know and
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physically relate to otherness, to what is alien or apart in
ourselves and outside ourselves. This other takes the form
of desire (remember Odysseus' self bondage as he outwitted
the Sirens) of difference, of the strange or unknown.
Freedom is denied in modern paradigms of reconciliation or
final knowledge of historical process.
In a critique of the left's abandonment of Adorno for
his alleged retreat from political theory that can inform
practice, John Lysaker and Michael Sullivan make the
following comment about the aporias of immanent critique:
After successful immanent critique, however, a poignantproblem arises. in the search for new means to achievethe ideals [freedom, autonomy, justice] that prevalentpractices fail to accomplish, it becomes apparent thattheory has no understanding of these ideals apart from
their role in those practices found to be deficient.
. . .
The leaves emancipatory theory between a rock and
no-place: it has neither the ends nor the means with
which to achieve emancipation. (Lysaker and Sullivan,
1992/95)
The authors then go on to explore this aporetic dilemma of
thought and practice in Adorno' s work. They show that
Adorno sustains the program of critical theory as an
exploration of the tensions immanent to the relationship
between thought and practice in modernity. Adorno argues
that the impotence of attempts (of theory and practice) to
radically change the status quo forces dialectical criticism
and reflection on the conditions which make thought what it
is. If reason is not self -legislating, then any thought
must be critiqued in its relationship to the social world.
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Adorno's subtitle to Minima_M0ralia
:
Rfif1^^nB^
'
Damaqed Life expresses his own sense of impotence in the
context of his necessary relationship to the world and his
thought's embeddedness in instrumental, dominative reason,
in Negative Dialectics he says "Dialectics is the consistent
sense of nonidentity. it does not begin by taking a
standpoint. My thought is driven to it by its own
inevitable insufficiency, by my guilt of what I am
thinking." (Adorno, 1987:5)
Adorno never claims to have escaped the aporia critical
theory's critique of reason creates for thought. However,
he does offer a sense of how we can think about the
potentiality to live in freedom with otherness. Lysaker and
Sullivan argue that freedom for Adorno is "...a property of
practices, not persons. Persons become free only though
participation in practices that are themselves free."
(Lysaker and Sullivan, 1992:112)
I will make a slightly different argument about
freedom, not about what it is --even as a property-
-but how
it is as a potential of inter-subjectivity mediated through
the object. Adorno argued that the aesthetic realm is a
place critical theory can look for concrete practices
encorporating freedom. His Aesthetic Theory informs a
radical reconception of relational knowledge production and
relations to otherness. Lysaker and Sullivan point out that
for Adorno, art does not dissolve the tension between
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subject and object so his turn to the aesthetic to find t
potential for an emancipatory politics in modernity is not
regressive move to elitest forms of expression, but an
increasingly radical approach to theorizing within the
tension between theory and practice. They argue against
Martin Jay, who claimed Adorno "denied the possibility of
intersubjective communications in favor of aesthetic
experience" (as cited in Lysaker and Sullivan, 1992:122)
that Adorno'
s aesthetic theory is exactly an exploration of
the possibility of intersubjective communication. I want tc
explore how he understood experience, aesthetic and
otherwise, as holding that potential. In other words I
agree with Lysaker and Sullivan that Adorno remained
committed to working within the necessary aporetic quality
of the critique of reason, but I disagree with their
discussion of freedom which limits it to being a property of
practices. I am interested in looking at how freedom
emerges through practices but with attention to the broader
interpretive concept of experience. Experience is our
relationship to the world but also as a subjective lens
through which we view the world. The question of experience
is embedded in the tension between subject and object that
creates the practices Lysaker and Sullivan describe as
critical, as refusing the illusion of reconciliation in an
unreconciled world.
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The notion of totality is necessary to Adorno<
theory, but I have arqued that- i t- -; o = *y a znat lt: !S a dynamic notion; it
is not static as argued by Habermas and his followers.
^aUve_Malect^ discusses the relationship between the
social whole and particular experience in both philosophical
and h1S torical terms. For Adorno, the meanings of
particular moments (experience) need to be traced critically
within the social whole. it is the politics of this
relationship between the social whole, which Adorno calls
totality or the administered world, and the particulars of
experience with which I am concerned.
Two aspects of Adorno' s approach to experience must be
considered critical to revising contemporary theories of
identity. The first is his historicization of the quality
of individual experience. The second is the potential for
resuscitating experience through knowledge forms that
recognize critical moments of non-identity.
Adorno argues for a theory of experience that does not
posit its ontology, its finality or any sort of authorizing
link to truth. "Spontaneity of experience is neither
continuously maintainable nor downright positive; the truth
is not there. The most subjective, the immediate datum
eludes subjectivity." (Adorno, 1987:39-40) Rather, Adorno
theorizes 1) the historicity of experience and its link to
memory, 2) its increasingly mediated quality in modernity,
and 3) the politics of our efforts to represent experience
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into the world pnr ah^vt-,^u-lxu. to Adorno, recognition of the
fundamentally historical quality of experience shows that it
is a relationship between the self and other and that it
mediates knowledge between the particular and the social
.
In his lecture on "The Experiential Content of Hegel's
Philosophy" Adorno discusses the individual as constituted
by the social world:
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tQd *s a cognitive subject, hence,hat is, the logical universality that governs histhinking, is, as the school of Durkheim in particularhas shown, always also social in nature. (Adorno, 1992-
He goes on:
A mode of thinking that understands the individual as
zoon politikon and the categories of subjective
consciousness as implicitly social will no longer cling
to a notion of experience that hypostatizes the
individual, even involuntarily. Experience's advance
to consciousness of its interdependence with the
experience of all human beings acts as a retroactive
correction to its starting point in mere individual
experience. (Adorno, 1992:64)
Apart from being a response to those who argue he is
nostalgic for a lost, bourgeois individuality, this passage
argues for the advance to an inter-subjective politics of
recognition through the dialectics of experience. With
Hegel and Marx, Adorno believes that it is in the sensuous
world that we create knowledge, that we become cognitive
subjects. This relationship is our experience and in itself
constitutes objects for interpretation by ourselves and
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others. our relationship to otherness then becomes an
object of interpretation, we can thin, of experience as a
prism through which we interpret the world. The pattern of
reflection is mediated by a dynamic totality and by parts of
our lives and the lives of others to which we have no
immediate cognitive access.
Adorno's discussion of experience, however, is
complicated by history; the quality of our experience
changes over time, with the totalities which experience
confronts. Walter Benjamin had a profound and lasting
influence on Adorno's understanding of the changing quality
of experience in late modernity. The notion of experience
in the name of which Adorno mobilizes remembrance is not
measurable or easily described. it refers back to
Benjamin's theory of the relationship between ehrfarung and
erlebnis. In order to better set off the dialectical
quality of Adorno's approach to experience, I will briefly
discuss its relationship to Benjamin's ideas about
experience
.
Benjamin refers specifically to the quality of
experience in modernity in two essays, "The Storyteller" and
"Some Motifs on Beaudelaire" (Benjamin, 1968) . These essays
articulate the difference between the knowledge of
experience elicited through information, and the experience
that develops meaning through the remembrance and passing on
or communicating of experience over time. It is the latter
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which is elicited through the art of storytelling.
Storytelling engages the audience in an active contemplation
of the world.
The auratic quality of the experience related through
the art of storytelling survives through the contemplative
relationship the audience develops to the story. The story
becomes embedded in their lives, as it has been in the life
of the storyteller, rather than merely "jostling the
consciousness" temporarily as pieces of information. It may
be the simplicity of the story, the "dryness" of its terms
and its lack of explanation that makes it live on
historically, gathering meanings. 23 Being in the company
of an audience or fellow listeners makes storytelling about
things in faraway lands different from modern ways of
knowing otherness or strangeness. As with painting, which
entails the looking back and forth of the painter and the
painted and subsequently creates a living relationship
between the audience and the painting, the storyteller and
his audience interact. The reconstruction of experience as
information eliminates that part of communication, making it
instrumentally available to everyone while reducing its
meaning to a brief shock effect. Information, that which
attempts to bring factual experiences of others close to the
listener or reader through explanation, destroys the auratic
content of the experience, fails to enter it into the life
of the listener as anything but a passing moment, easily
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replaced. The story which does not strain to tell all the
verifiable facts or to explain them to a respondent, lives
in the life of the listener.
The difference between erfahrung and erlebnis is
elaborated in Benjamin's essay "On Some Motifs in
Baudelaire"
:
The greater the share of the shock factor in particularimpressions, the more constantly consciousness has tooe alert as a screen against stimuli; the more
efficiently it does so, the less do these impressions
enter experience (Erfahrung)
,
tending to remain in thesphere of a certain hour in one's life (Erlebnis)(Benjamin, 1968 : 162)
in modern conditions of industrial life, the shock defense
becomes a way of experiencing the world and giving it
meaning. it becomes part of Baudelaire's creative energy,
"Thus Baudelaire placed the shock experience at the very
center of his artistic work." (Benjamin, 1968:163) For
Benjamin, Baudelaire expressed the disintegration of auratic
experience subsumed in the turn to information, to the kind
of experience exemplified by the man in the crowd-
-hurrying
and tensely defensive against the momentary shocks of modern
life- -not wanting to look at others for fear of engagement.
Auratic experience invested the object with the ability
to return the gaze.
Experience of the aura thus rests on the transposition
of a response common in human relationships to the
relationship between the inanimate or natural object
and man. The person we look at, or who feels he is
being looked at, looks at us in turn. To perceive the
aura of an object we look at means to invest it with
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S?8*w ty ^ l0°k ^ US in return - (Benjamin,
However, Benjamin describes this experience as always
passing, as unretainable
,
(thus the importance of Baudelaire
who made his art through the passage of auratic experience)
,
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in >The Storyteller' Benjamin writes of the consuming flame
of the story. Experience is only tellable in retrospect,
never in its lived moments. As it is told, the life of the
teller-- he whose experience is being told-- becomes
remembered only through the terms of the story.
His gift is the ability to relate his life,- hisdistinction, to be able to tell his entire life The
storyteller: he is the man who could let the wick ofhis life be consumed completely by the gentle flame ofhis story. This is the basis of the incomparable aura
about the storyteller
...(Benjamin, 1968:109)
Experience evaporates upon contact with deliberative
consciousness. For Benjamin it is the unapproachability of
experience that sustains its non-identity. As it is known
it is consumed. Like the wick of the storyteller's life
which is a source of wisdom, experience can only be known in
retrospect; distance is the key to understanding, the closer
one is the harder it is to see. This is why Benjamin, in
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this essay, privileges the storyteller and the flaneur over
the man of the masses. These characters sustain a kind of
relaxed, contemplative distance to the object which allows
the experience of aura, of the witnessing of history
-at a
standstill' in the object.
Adorno sustained the argument about the quality of
distance that Benjamin said offered access to the aura of
the object, allowing it to live. However, Adorno 's ideas
about experience encourage an intensely political, though
aesthetically styled, existence with otherness in the world.
The dialectical images of Benjamin's theory of experience
become still and then consumed as they are known in the
contemplative life of the knower. History becomes a series
of images seen only in retrospect, not in a dialectical
movement in which subject and object are necessarily
interactive. Benjamin's storyteller only knows experience
as always already past. Adorno' s theory allows for a
sustained engagement with the world in experience.
Adorno' s desire to redeem the qualitative, critical
force of experience in the administered world engaged him in
discussions of individuality. This rendered his theory
suspect to socialists and feminists who have dismissed this
aspect of his work as bourgeois idealism. He is accused of
a nostalgia for an age of individuality which ignores the
potential of popular movements and the rise of collective
consciousness among various groups (students, workers,
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women, anti-colonialist) in the twentieth century. He is
dismissed for romanticizing a past when access to non-
identity was possible on the terms of bourgoeis
individualism itself.
Adorno considered individuality potentially to sustain
resistance to the integrative forces of exchange, but he
argued the (rational) individual of Enlightenment to be a
reified concept that does not exist in freedom either as
subject or object of knowledge.
Similar to Walter Benjamin, Adorno found things
immanent in the quality of individuality in the nineteenth
century that sustained non-identity. Adorno looks to the
19th century to show how the potential for non-identity,
immanent in historical movement, is continually extinguished
by encroaching instrumental reason. He argues that 19th
century bourgeois individualism weakened the objectifying
power of knowledge, contributing to the subversion of
grandly oppressive systems theories of philosophy and
science which privilege the obj ectif ication of the world in
explanation as a path to knowledge. He said the
individual's capacity to be discriminating in his experience
of the object rather than objectifying it through grand
systems was present in early capitalism. In other words,
individuality in the 19th century contained moments of
resistance to the encroaching instrumental forces of
enlightenment. It strengthened the individual's capacity to
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be discriminating in his experience of the object. He
explains the dialectical, negative effects of this
discrimination
:
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The concept of discrimination is a complex blending of a
secularized mimetic element of intuition with the modern
rational approach to knowing the object. This is not an
affirmation or uncritical celebration of 19th century
individualism; it is an effort to articulate how the
capacity to experience the object without instrumentalizing
that experience or flattening it to agree with the terms of
exchange is present even during the historical rise to
hegemony of the most abstract individualism. It is an
effort to redeem non-identity, which never fully disappears,
on terms immanent to historical experience in capitalist
society. The longing for non-identity, of the "groping for
the concordance which the magical delusion used to place
beyond doubt" continues, even in late capitalism.
Calvin Thomas persuasively argues that Adorno does not
argue for a "going back to" but rather for a resuscitation
of experience that is always already there, even in the age
of organization. In "A Knowledge that Would not be Power:
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Adorno, Nostalgia and the Musical Subject" Thomas argues
that Adorno "mobilizes nostalgia." m other words, he
engages it for purposes of critique rather than engaging
himself in an empty yearning for times gone by. Thomas
wonders how accusations of Adorno for engaging in an empty
nostalgia could hold when Adorno' s life work was consumed
with critiquing the regression to or fetishization of any
historical moment or theory of days gone by. Thomas argues.-
Adorno's nostalgia,... is not for a lost object but
the ^ t
Possibility, is not a conservation ofpast bu a move to redeem the hopes of the pastAdorno does not favor a regression but calls for the
reactivation of a fundamental human capacity-
-a
capacity without which the word *human' in the sense
not of * humanist' but of ^humane' could hardly applythe capacity to suffer and to recognize the sufferinq
of others. (Thomas,
: 163)
Thomas goes on to argue that Adorno was attempting to
reactivate this capacity to hear, to experience, to be in
relation of mimesis to the suffering other and the suffering
in ourselves; to hear, to know not through abstract concepts
or totalizing knowledge, but through an elective affinity to
otherness. It is through this relationship of elective
affinity that we might know otherness in a manner which
sustains connection without erasing difference.
The definition of the object in idealist philosophies
has generally been contingent upon presupposed thought forms
and unities of the transcendental subject. This
glorification of consciousness places the subject first,
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thereby putting it in a position of omnipotence over the
object of knowledge. The traditional bias towards the
subject in idealist theory reflects the relations of
domination in society or man over that which is constructed
as Other. Adorno found this bias present particularly in
the Kantian a priori which, in response to the inevitable
contingencies of the tension between reason and desire
(nature)
,
explicitly presupposes how experiences are to be
thought about. For Adorno, this denies the particularity of
experience, and causes the philosophical enterprise to
participate in hypostasizing the social world, or totality,
in a dominative position over the individual.
This contradiction in the separation of subject and
object is imparted to epistemology
. Though they cannotbe thought away, as separated, the pseudos of the
separation is manifested in their being mutually
mediated-
-the object by the subject, and even more, indifferent ways, the subject by the object. The
separation is no sooner established directly, without
mediation, than it becomes ideology, which is indeedits normal form. The mind will then usurp the place of
something absolutely independent-
-which it is not; its
claim of independence heralds the claim of dominance.
Once radically parted from the object in Enlightenment
knowledges, the subject reduces it to its own measure;
the subject swallows the object, forgetting how much it
is an object itself." (Adorno, 1988: 499)
Adorno argues that Enlightenment knowledges assume the mind
to be capable of wrapping around the totality of objects, of
knowing them completely either through prior categories or
through empirical observation. This denies the many-
sidedness of any object and forces it into dimensions of
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total visibility. m denying many-sidedness, idealist
philosophy creates abstract forms in the name of truth-
telling, it argues we can know through knowledge forms that
affirm, prior to engagement, our access to the object. it
signifies a will to identify first and engage only after the
cognitive relationship is in place. This offers a sense of
familiarity with the object, even if it the familiarity is
bred from our prior awareness that something is strange or
alien as opposed to normal and close.
For Adorno, the rise of positivist sciences in the
twentieth century signifies the continuing and increasingly
ideological affirmation of the isolated, reified
consciousness. Idealist philosophies privilege the subject
as transcendent while positivism attempts to remove the
moment of subjectivity from the object as a means of
approaching truth. They have similar functions in the
world. They each represent a longing, in a secular,
disenchanted age, for a sense of autonomy, of place or
centeredness, of certainty about that which lies outside of
our given or immediate consciousness. We rely on these
knowledge forms to ensure that we will be left alone,
separate from the object, or if we are to engage, to be sure
that we can manipulate it successfully to pre-determined
ends. For Adorno, these epistemologies participate in
constructing and reinforcing the will to dominate otherness,
to determine, prior to engagement, the meaning of the
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object. as methods of knowledge production they rely on the
exchange principle; on making unlike things like,
comparable, or conceptual for purposes of analysis. They
are complicit with modern structures of dominance.
Thus, for Adorno, in modernity the separation between
cognition and reality, between subject and object, is
hypostatized, creating truth as that which is detached from
the subject and its experience, or embeddedness in the
world. Looking back at our discussion of the Dialectic of
Enlightenment we can make the connection to the domination
of nature, of the irrational, of desire, of that which does
not fit into given historical categories and concepts. in
idealist philosophies, the subjective understanding of the
object, though constructed through social categories of
thought and practice, dominates the object. Positivist
thought attempts to eradicate the subjective moment from
knowledge. However, Adorno argues that the subject is
dialectically constitutive of the object, so positivism
falsifies the object. It is important to note that Adorno
refers often to the idealisms and postivist tendencies in
Marxian thought as well. He believes that many Marxisms
offer little that is substantially different than bourgeois
theory or traditional theory as they posit the proletariat
as the reconciled subject/object of history (Lukacs) or make
scientific prognoses of the fall of capitalism
(positivist/economistic Marxisms)
.
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Does Adorno thus bring the critique of ideology t,
close, arguing that there is nothing except ideological
forms and concepts dominating the objective world and
constructing individuals' subjective interpretation of their
needs and experience?
For Adorno critique lies in practices of cognition and
recognition among subjects. The moment of non-identity in
the object world defies totalizing knowledge forms and
falsifies claims to truth. Historical experience is non-
identical, a moment of remembrance which resists
subordination to the whole. However, it is not the
immediacy of given experience that offers access to truths.
Negative dialectics critiques the concept without reifying
the object as truthful in its givenness.
Adorno argues that experience is rationalized or
collectivized and loses its particularity in modernity.
This process of constructing knowledge, or historical
meaning, constitutes a political relationship with
experience playing a critical role. For Adorno experience
can be a critical check on these Enlightenment forms of
knowledge, but in itself, or in its immediacy, it is not an
ontological source of knowledge. Our experience is not
transparent to us but always subject to interpretation.
Because experiential cognition is an interpretive process,
we should acknowledge that there is always something more to
that experience than we can name. Adorno argues that the
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objects of cognition (experience) will never fit completely
into constructed concepts -
-the concepts will never be
sufficient for understanding the object.
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The cognitive process always leaves a remainder, a
constitutive outside, a difference. And objects, or
experience, will always resist totalizing abstraction or
conceptualization
.
Experience forbids the resolution in the unity of
consciousness of whatever appears contradictory Forinstance, a contradiction like the one between thedefinition which an individual knows as his own and his
role,' the definition forced upon him by society whenhe would make his living-
-such a contradiction cannotbe brought under any unity without manipulation,
without the insertion of some wretched cover concepts
that will make the crucial differences vanish
(Adorno, 1987:152)
This quotation shows Adorno' s respect for experience and the
subject's potential knowledge of his own defining
differences. Adorno critiqued the concept as a
sociological/scientific tool, but also as a political
process by which the administered world sustains and
integrates itself through social codification. The "cover
concepts" referred to above create what becomes a socially
necessary second nature understanding or definition of what
the worker is. They are as complicit in the systems of
capitalism and the coercion of that subject as he makes his
living. Through them the worker comes to know himself as
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the same as others even aq h-i* «s is experience tells him
something different, tells him about his difference.
However, that telling, that sense of difference, of the
remembrance of otherness within the self, however
inarticulable, will always resist the currently more
powerful, totalizing impulse of identity logic. This
perpetuates the antagonistic totality.
It is not only the knowledge of otherness in ourselves
with which Adorno is concerned. He demands we take
responsibility for the limits of our cognition of many-sided
otherness in others. Like Hegel, Adorno argues that there
is a separation from the object necessary for subjects'
consciousnesses to develop, but because he was committed to
the unending movement of the dialectic, Adorno argues that
this separation should never be hypostatized nor collapsed
in identitarian forms of knowledge.
It is not through the totalizing and distancing effects
of objectivism, or through knowledge stimulated by reliance
on subjectivity and identity that we will come to live in
peace with otherness. Rather, the subject must see its own
power enough to yield to the object without fear of self-
annihilation. It is through a complex process of
recognition, one allowing for the constitutive nature of the
object, that we might come to know ourselves and others.
This "coming to know" implies an endless, iterative and
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reflexive process of understanding which is receptive rathe,
than absorbant of the other's experience.
in "Subject and Object" Adorno argues explicitly for a
subject that recognizes itself also as an object. This is e
subject that rejects the ideology of the transcendent or
always already identified self. m critiquing the
epistemological separation of subject and object, Adorno
does not argue instead for a relationship of identity. As
expressed in the quotation above, what it is to be a worker
is always already complicated by difference among workers.
Working class consciousness that depends upon the subsuming
of those differences becomes yet another cover concept and
systematic devaluation of experience.
In "Subject\Object,
" Adorno argues that the separation
of subject and object in thought expresses the real
dichotomy of the human condition, our alienation from the
object and from our selves. But critical thought must not
hypostasize that separation. If we think only the
separation we collude with relations of dominance created by
the claim to independence by the subject. How might we most
adequately think about the relation between subject and
object? Adorno begins by describing subject and object as
historical terms and critiquing the common usages. He then
argues the absolute necessity to preserve both sides of the
dichotomy, albeit in a transformed relationship.
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Earlier I noted that Adorno did not suggest a going
back to a time gone by in early capitalism when true
individuality existed, at least as a potentiality. His
aversion to this kind of nostalgia is reiterated in
..Subject
and Object." The passage is worth quoting at length because
it expresses Adorno's complicated relationship to the past
and to the question of the subject:
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vengeful gods of which Epicurean materialism and theChristian "fear-not" wanted to relieve mankind The
only way to accomplish this is through the subject ifit were liquidated rather than sublated in a higherform, the effect would be regression-
-not just of
consciousness, but a regression to real barbarism(Adorno, 1988 : 499)
Thus, the subject is absolutely necessary to overcoming the
alienation of the mythical undifferentiated self /other
relationship and of the modern, idealist transcendent self.
Self -reflection is central to Adorno's suggestions as to
what freedom might look like.
However, Adorno limits his conception of the subject
through theorizing the primacy of the object. The subject
must see itself as in the world, as constituted by the
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social world.
-The subject is more the less it is, and it
is less the more it credits itself with objective being."
(Adorno, 1988:509) He continues:
As an element, hoever, it [the subiectl i„
~t iCSle\ Aft6r an ^i-inationeof ] the subjective
~inq stirring COa* dif^Y I ike themeeting rrings and instants of subjective life.
Without the element of subjectivity, of knowing the world,
the tyranny of the particular would reign. Knowledge of the
object would become only self
-referential according to the
"fleeting stirrings and instants" of subjective life.
Subjectivity is reflection on the subject and subjective
reflection. it includes the recognition of the ideological
basis for the self
-legislating individual or subject,
because it means the subject becomes an object, a social
object subject to reflection. "Subjectivity is to be
brought to objectivity; its stirrings are not to be banished
from cognition." (Adorno, 1988:504) Thus, Adorno places the
subject and object in an asymmetrical, non-hierarchical
relationship which recognizes the constitutive nature of the
object without eradicating the subject. It is asymmetrical
because the subject is objectified in thought in a radically
different way than the subject knows the object. The
subject cannot be without the object, without
obj ectif ication, while the object can be (but not be known)
without the subject or the subjective element. However,
without society, without the objective world, the subject
ill
cannot even be. The transcendent or empirical individual is
a construct. The subject cannot be without the sensuous
world or without society.
If he argues that the subject is a thing of the world
and for the primacy of the object how is the relationship
non-heirarchical? »
. . . by primacy Qf fche object . g
that the subject, for its part an object in a qualitatively
different sense, in a sense more radical than the object,
which is not known otherwise than through consciousness, is
as an object also a subject." (Adorno, 1988:502) The
subject must see power in its objective status, not
weakness. it must see that a dominative relationship to the
object is not necessary to exert itself in the world. He
argues that it is in the cognitive relationship to
experience as an object that the subject can do this.
The objective content of individual experience is notproduced by the method of comparative generalization,-
it is produced by dissolving what keeps that
experience, as being biased itself, from yielding to
the object without reservation-
-as Hegel put it: with
the freedom that would relax the cognitive subject
until it truly fades into the object to which it is
akin, on the strength of its own objective being.
(Adorno, 1988:506)
This is Adorno' s version of what others have called unity in
diversity or the problem of sustaining autonomy within a
community of solidarity. But his understanding is more
complex than either of those familiar phrases imply. For
Adorno, in experiencing the other one must yield to the
other 24 without losing one's sense of self. Only then
can one know the other in e„«v, ,l such a way as to resist the
dominative relationship that comes with positivist or
idealist forms of knowledge which demand that the knowing
subject wrap its mind around the known object or the other
and assume total knowledge. For Adorno, this subject/knower
is more powerful, not more resigned, in its contingency. m
addition, this subject would recognize that it too is an
object of knowledge to the other. We should always already
be vulnerable to being seen and transformed in relationships
to others
.
?hoT£hin? kno^led9e of the object is the act in which
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veil ^ is saving around thej . it can do this only where, fearlessly passiveit entrusts itself to its own experience. In placeswhere subjective reason scents subjective contingencythe primacy of the object is shimmering through--
whatever is in the object is not a subjective
admixture. The subject is the object's agent, not its
constituent; this fact has consequences for the
relation of theory and practice. (Adorno, 1988: 506)
For Adorno, the critical issue is not who or which
social identity can know truth, but how truths that always
already exist for us in the social world can be unlocked
through constellations and how that interpretation can be
transformed into new social meanings. "As for the
privileged character which rancor holds against it, truth
will lose that character when men stop pleading the
experiences they owe it to- -when they let it enter instead
into configurations and causal contexts that help to make it
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evident or to convict it of its failings." (Adorno,
1987:42)
As discussed above, Adorno argues for a subject that
recognizes its power of critique in its contingency in
relation to the objects of interpretation. Those include
the various truths that emerge in history which must be
deciphered and critiqued in relationship to the objects they
claim to represent. Constellations provide a metaphor for
this cognitive process that does not deny the necessity to
identify and yet allows non-identity perpetually to take
apart categories in an approach to freedom. As cognitive
beings we must relentlessly place concepts in relationship
to the object in order to decipher it instead of identifying
it. One must not only recognize the historicity of that
object, but remember one's own embeddedness in subjectivity,
that one's own subjectivity is affecting the knowledge
created
.
The history locked in the object can only be delivered
by a knowledge mindful of the historic positional value
of the^ object in its relation to other objects--by the
actualization and concentration of something which is
already known and is transformed by that knowledge.
Cognition of the object in its constellation is
cognition of the process stored in the object. As a
constellation, theoretical thought circles the concept
it would like to unseal, hoping that it may fly open
like the lock of a well-guarded safe-deposit box: in
response, not to a single key or a single number, but
to a combination of numbers. (Adorno, 1987:163)
Adorno' s theory of constellations is not the same as
perspectivism. He is not arguing that there are many
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Afferent approaches to knowing the object nor that there
are competing truth claims about the object. According to
the simple form of this latter theory, competing truth
claims are resolved on the hs> = -i =cn basis of power or instrumentality
which can be rendered transparent through critique. Neither
did constellations imply « form of relativism because ^
Adorno, there are indeed social and historical truths to be
unlocked in objects, objects, hoever, are not stable in
their historical constellation of meanings. Truths lie in
the performative process of interpreting the positioning of
objects in constellations, not in the immediacy of the
object in-itself. Truths are not discovered, but emerge as
one places ideas, objects or moments in juxtaposition to one
another with the intent of interpreting yet another idea
object or moment. *
Truths, for Adorno, are socially constructed, but not
because of materialist interests that become transparent to
a particular class. Truths are complex phenomena of the
social world; they exist but are never final. in his
critique of metaphysics, Adorno makes clear that truths
exist in the world and affect it materially but cannot
represent it totally. "Yet the surplus over the subject,
which a subjective metaphysical experience will not be
talked out of, and the element of truth in reity-
-these two
extremes touch in the idea of truth. For there could no
more be truth without a subject freeing itself from
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delusions than there could be truth without that which is
not the subject, that in which truth has its archetype."
(Adorno, 1987:375) Truths, as the cognitive relationship
between the subject and the object, are in flux and are
permeable
.
If Walter Benjamin was the primary influence on
Adorno'
s theory of constellations » in Negative Dialectic
he looks to Max Weber to concretize the theory. Benjamin
influences Adorno to see the importance of the idiosyncratic
and the unexpected aspects of the object through the process
of interpretation. The element of surprise, as if one were
shocking oneself into a realization about an object, is
critical to Benjamin's method of knowing within the
conditions of modernity. Benjamin juxtaposes the
constructed perspectives of many different, representative,
historical figures such as the flaneur (made famous by
Baudelaire) the whore and the streetsweeper
, to what he
called dialectical images. "Benjamin's images functioned
like switches, arresting the fleeting phenomena and starting
thought in motion or, alternately, shocking through to a
standstill and setting the reified objects in motion by
causing them to lose their second-nature familiarity."
(Buck-Morss, 1977:106) But remember that for Benjamin, the
experiences elicited through this were consumed in telling.
They could not live in the present, but only as the past.
They identify the experience being told through the process
of the story, reconstituting it. Adorno wants experience to
live in the present. He theorizes a manner of telling the
truth that tried to let the particular survive the process
of objectif ication.
Adorno refers to the Weberian "ideal type" to elaborate
his theory of constellations. He argues that the concept
understood as an ideal type could be used in constructing
constellations rather than being def initionally embedded as
models in traditional social scientific arguments about
cause and effect. Rather than being used as static models
or categories in which to plug social phenomena, ideal types
become tools for unlocking the seemingly total integration
of social elements in late modernity. They function as
means to approach knowledge of the object. Ideal types are
devoid of any inherent substantiality and potentially
reliquified at any moment. Adorno' s theory of
constellations is an open-ended process of interpretation,
one in which nothing should be taken for granted and to
which there is not a static development. The element of
shock, of surprise, of being startled out of complacency so
as to avoid resting in second-nature interpretations of
history and of objects, is critical to Benjamin, Weber, and
Adorno. Adorno' s theory, however, is grounded in the
dialectic, the negativity of which prevents any assumed
reconciliation, but the form of which allows for
understanding the lived qualities of particular experience,
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the situatedness of the narHnu^v. •Liie p ticular m a social world
organized through the identity principle.
Adorno understands concepts as historical images,
produced by human beings, which can be placed in
relationship to an object in order to center it and
illuminate its contradictory positioning in a world
characterized by reification, the exchange principle and
identity thinking.
-Authentic philosophic interpretation
does not meet up with a fixed meaning which already lies
behind the question, but lights it up suddenly and
momentarily, and consumes it at the same time." (Adorno,
1977 : 127)
Experience is always in the process of being
objectified. it is not something possessed by a subject, or
had by a group. This offers us a sense of distance from it
which defends against the smothering identity principle and
demands that time be taken, that the many-sidedness of
experience as an object be allowed to emerge and influence
interpretation
.
Contrary to what it has become, both in parody and in
its dogmatic petrification, dialectic does not mean
readiness to replace the meaning of one concept with
another illicitly obtained.
. . . When the concept is
pinned down, that is, when its meaning is confronted
with what is encompassed by it, its nonidentity-
-the
fact that the concept and the thing itself are not one
and the same- -becomes evident within the identity of
concept and thing that is required by the logical form
of definition. The movement of the concept is not a
sophistical manipulation that would insert changing
meanings into it from the outside but rather the ever-
present consciousness of both the identity of and the
inevitable difference between the concept and what it
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is suppoRPri to exnrpqq =>
^^^^ (AdornoTl992T7l7^iy emphasis)
Immanent critique and placing concepts in
constellations in order to decipher the truths in objects
(in experience) precludes thinking in terms of 'escaping'
the totality. Thinking on those terms perpetuates
definitional boundaries between good and bad, between
freedom and bondage, between identity and otherness, which
are the very oppositional categories Adorno successfully
critiques. For Adorno, total breaks, or escapes are
impossible because the social world is not final or thorough
in its ability to define and codify lived experiences.
Attempts to break out or to escape to an outside only serve
to reaffirm the definitional quality of the dominant
structures of exchange. Rather, we must see how knowing the
experience (the object) of others differently could
perpetually defer the collapsing of differences into
identitarian forms. The experience of antagonisms and
irreducible differences, retains a critical function in
spite of the identitarian impulse. These experiences can
create a different kind of social knowledge, one cognizant
of contradictions immanent in all social relationships.
Adorno argues that as cognitive subjects we must live
in the tension filled spaces at the edges of our particular
being in order to live in freedom with others. Persistent
critique of the limits of one's own cognition may keep the
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moment of obj act if ication temporary while sustaining the
distance that defeats the smothering requirements of
sameness. it will help us avoid the reification of
difference as merely the flip side of identity or as a
generic space between self-contained identities.
We need to develop a politics of knowledge that
persistently and militantly critiques the colonizing
tendencies of knowledge construction.
Unbroken and all too human slogans lend themselves to
Mke^Thina" bStWee? the SUbj ^Ct and "hat is not its
subi^aJL 5 congeal as fragments of that which wasbjugated; to rescue it means to love things Wecannot eliminate from the dialectics of the extant whatis experienced in consciousness as an alien thing
negatively, coercion and heteronomy, but also themarred figure of what we should love, and what thespell, the endogamy of consciousness, does not permitus to love. The reconciled condition would not be thephilosophical imperialism of annexing the alienInstead, its happiness would lie in the fact that the
alien, m the proximity it is granted, remains what isdistant and different, beyond the heterogeneous andbeyond that which is one's own. (Adorno, 1987:191)
For Adorno, resistance to the integrative forces of the
world requires distance between self and object or other.
This is not the distance of disinterested objectivity, which
implies that as subjects we can remove the moment of
mediation from our relationship to others. It is the
distance of respect, of identifying with rather than
identifying in the sense of classifying others into
immutable and therefore manipulable categories. It is the
distance encouraged by the method of knowing in
constellations which perpetually illuminate those sides of
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the object, of the other, that traditional means of knowing
disregard as a burden or as insignificant to the conclusions
the knower is obliged to reach.
In a lecture on "The Actuality of Philosophy" Adorno
argues, "For the mind (Geist) is indeed not capable of
producing or grasping the totality of the real, but it may
be possible to penetrate the detail, to explode in miniature
the mass of merely existing reality." (Adorno 1977:133)
Unlike post-modern theory, Adorno does not argue that
reality is something enacted through linguistic
constructions. On the other hand, he does not posit the
truth of reality as prior to historical interpretation and
meaning. He places reality and interpretation in a
dialectical relationship, arguing for the immanence of
thought in reality and also of reality in thought. Adorno 's
thinking functions more like a cipher than like a diagnosis:
He who interprets by searching behind the
phenomenal world for a world-in-itself which forms
its foundation and support, acts mistakenly like
someone who wants to find in the riddle the
reflection of a being which lies behind it, a
being mirrored in the riddle, in which it is
contained. Instead, the function of riddle-
solving is to light up the riddle, gestalt like
lightening and to negate it (auf zuheben) , not to
persist behind the riddle and imitate it. (Adorno,
1977 : 127)
What is it in Adorno 's theory that I would argue makes
politics possible? His theory has helped me see the
importance of the different meanings with which we invest
the objects of political discourse at any given historical
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moment. For example, women's experience becomes
intrinsically political when it illuminates in a broader
sense the integrative function of norms, previously
invisible, which dictate gendered identities and roles.
This makes it impossible for those norms to function in the
same way or with the same legitimacy as they did prior to
the exposure. This politics does not depend upon the
collectivity of women as a monolithic identity, but assumes
the relevance of creating meaning through interpreting
specific experiences as gendered.
For Adorno, experience is interactive with the
constellations of concepts, representational forms, which
shape the possibilities of meaning. As Peter Dews has
argued: "One of the fundamental problems confronting post-
structuralist thought, therefore-
-a problem which accounts
for many of its disinctive features--is how to reject
simultaneously both the repressive rigidities of self-
consciousness and conceptual thought and the available
dialectical alternatives ." (Dews
,
1989) Adorno shows how the
subject exists without hypostasizing it. Post-structuralist
critique does not sustain the relational quality of
experience. Rather than seeing experience as being in a
dialectical relationship to the possible forms of
representation, it comes to rest in a dependent relationship
to those forms in the deconstructive method of
interpretation. (Scott, 1991) Adorno' s conception of
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experience allows for recognition of the qualitative and
critical nature of experience in constructing meaning
without relying on identity logic through reifying
experience as a necessary foundation for truth.
Adorno shows us that delinking historical experience
from claims to truth does not necessitate the eradication of
the subjective moment from politics. Further, arguing that
subjectivity is always already imbued with and reproduced in
webs of power-suffused social relations does not remove the
subject in itself from a politics of contestation. I argue
this essential contestability is a function of the prism of
experience
.
We too often assume a great distance between reality
and representation or narratives about that reality.
However, lived experiences are translated as they are put
into political discourse. They are interpreted in order to
be represented. This process is one that can be intervened
in and struggled with politically.
Building a life together may be contingent upon some
shared meaning, but that does not exhaust the task of
politics. Politics lies in the contestability of those
meanings and the process of producing them. The idea that
we have to impute an essential nature or quality to the
subjects who struggle for recognition reflects dominant
biases about how lives have meaning and which experiences
count . The turn away from ontological standpoints and
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truth-telling subjects does not defeat the possibility of
politics. interpreting experience in their constellations
of meaning is a contemplative, reflexive project of
constructing political meaning. it is political because it
exceeds the terms of the experience and the concepts we
begin with and alters them.
Adorno criticized any privileging of the producing,
knowing subject. On the other hand, he understood the
significance of subjectivity and did not attempt to wipe it
clean of historical effectivity as do some post-modern
critics of essentialism. For Adorno, there are traces of
recognition which offer temporary access to critical
knowledge. He argues that moments found in the uniqueness
of experiential traces and knowledge of difference can
subvert the dominative logics of identity. These traces,
placed in conceptual constellations, are no less significant
for critique for not being foundational.
The relevance of Adorno' s work, and much of Critical
theory, for feminism has been recognized insofar as as
concerns about the relationship between women's oppression
and the domination of nature. Feminists have shown in many
different ways how the repression of "woman" and the
"feminine" represents the denial of nature and the
catastrophe of historical progress. Modern Western thought
consistently looks to woman as representative of what is
necessarily private, natural and pre-rational
. The
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Hegelian-Marxian tradition has been shown to be no less
biased in its perspectives on public and private lives and
the contribution of each to history. Women only become
histories] actors if and when they enter the sphere of
public production; there is nothing specific to gendered
lives that has anything to do with historical change.
Critical theory calls attention to the crises of modern
subjectivity, challenging the concept of Reason as an
emancipatory tool of conquest over necessity by a unified,
self
-knowing subject. Through these theoretical moves, it
contributes to challenges to the notion of the unified
Subject and examines the ego-centric identity development of
the individual as always interrupted by that which is
inaccessible to instrumental reason. Rather than assuming
the suffering of nature as a residual effect of historical
progress, as do many Hegelian-Marxian theories of history,
Adorno argues that the persistence of the dialectic, the
domination of nature in history, defies closure in identity.
I attempt to advance these important insights with an
inquiry into how Adorno might be relevant to urgent
questions raised in contemporary feminist theory and
politics about identity. Adorno' s work did not develop in a
linear fashion; it is difficult to argue that any concept,
including experience, is used consistently across his works.
However, his critical theory of totality in modernity as
legislated by Reason and identity logic, is relevant to
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feminists concerned with politicizing knowledge in a world
apparently fragmented and contingent, yet thoroughly
suffused with relations of domination and power. For
Adorno, i argue, totality is not final. it is not a self-
contained apparatus operating out of the reach of
individuals, it remains in a state of antagonism with its
own terms of existence. It is non-identical with its
objects. Thus, while as subjects we cannot willfully step
outside of the terms of its logic, we can potentially
subvert its terms where its limits become identified as such
through interpretation of experience. There is always a
constitutive outside to any system. The project of critique
is to bear witness to its boundaries, to make them visible
and thus to denaturalize the givenness or common sense
status of subject /object, man/nature, self /other relations
of dominance. This is where experience and the
constellatory quality of Adorno' s thought precludes
reductionist causal or structural analysis in interpreting
the meaning of experience.
Part of the project of feminism must be the creation of
recognized meanings for women's experience in the world.
This is a necessary part of political work, to develop
fields of representation through which the multiplicities of
women's experience can be understood. No singular cause or
structural law exhaustively represents the meaning of any
particular experience. My concern with discussing
experience and interpretation is not to argue that feminism
will render the world transparent to knowing subjects. Nor
is it to reduce diverse, heteronomous experiences to
parsimonious explanations. The point of constellational
interpretation is to open up the field of representation to
possibilities that will enhance self\other understanding and
oppose the enclosure of critique in self-contained
categories or some form of inter-subjective synthesis.
Walter Benjamin argues, "truth is the death of
intention." in other words, no truth claim about an
experience will completely or finally represent the
intention of a teller. The truths we develop in the world
are always larger than the sum of the aggregate parts of
discourse, whether that discourse is conflictual or
consensual. Ideas circulate through the social world, they
are not settled or self -legislating in their meaning. This
is why the image of constellations is so compelling for
thinking about a process of interpretation and the creation
of feminist meaning in the world. It offers more than
liberal theory in that truth is not simply the better
knowledge that emerges through willful challenges and 'open-
ended' discourse. And it offers more than deterministic
theories which search out the underlying structural laws
that drive knowledge claims attached to the interest of a
particular class or social group. "Truths" will not
ultimately be transparently proven to be driven by
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particular (even if ideologically unacknowledged)
intentions. Experience has too often been understood by
feminists to be something one can own, or a substance that
inhabits our consciousness as ontological source material.
Consciousness-raising was premised on the right of the
individual to interpret her experience in a safe setting,
free of judgement and often free of challenge. As Black
feminists and lesbians began to challenge the meanings
applied to women's experience in the world by white,
heterosexual feminists, it was no longer progressive to see
feminism as singularly mapped onto the axis of gender as a
system of domination. Instead, feminist thought has been
emerging and exanding through engagement with internal
differences among women. Feminist theory has become
increasingly situationally grounded and contextual as shown
in the discussion of standpoint epistemology
. We can take
this tendency in a direction that does not lead us into the
aporias of identity thinking through looking again at
Adorno's theory.
How do constellations work as a political theory of
interpretation? Various experiences should be thought about
as events, rather than presumed to represent a collective
experience prior to interpretation. This is not to deny the
collectivity of experience. Women, for example, have the
experience and the fear of sexual violence in common in the
United States. However, the meanings attached to the
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experience, how it is represented to women (never only
autonomously by women) and the fears of being a victim will
not necessarily fall out in common cause. The differences
between white and black women in thinking about rape,
particularly inter-racial rape, may be as significant for
any program of social change as the description of the
experience being held in common at any given time. Rather
than seeing all violence against women as existing on a
continuum and revolving on the limited axis of gender
identity, violences should be pluralized to allow the
multiplicity of meanings to emerge. Finding ways to speak
about rape is critical to ending it. But understanding the
contextual meanings of rape to be plural rather than
dependent upon one causal moment proliferates the
opportunities for intervention and prevention.
Adorno's negative dialectics argues experience to be a
sensuous, interpretive relationship to the world without
essentializing it as a kind of property of the self.
Experience is always already social; it is simultaneously
our contact with the world and the prism through which we
interpret the world. It should therefore hold a place in
feminist thought as an object of dialectical interpretation.
27 It should not be thought of as a subjective as opposed
to objective source of knowledge. Nor should it be
understood to unilaterally determine perspective.
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Adorno's theory of negative dialectics contributes an
incisive social critique of identity thereby challenging it
as a grounds for feminist politics. His dialectical notion
of experience sustains the feminist insights about the
personal and the political without collapsing one into the
other. We should not demand experience be enclosed within
identity logic in order to act politically.
Much of what I have argued about Adorno's work points
us in the direction of post-modern theories of
representation. In order to better situate his work in the
context of feminist debates about identity, I look next at
how feminists have taken up the challenge of post-modern
critique to recast 'the political' and questions about
representation
.
Adorno's critique of epistemology and of the imperative
for identity between subject and object foregrounds the
terms of contemporary debates about identity politics. In
the next chapter, I cast these debates in terms of what
theorists say is necessary for politics to happen given the
fragmented state of the world.
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CHAPTER IV
PERFORMATIVITY AND THE HABITUAL SUBJECT
Post-modern feminists argue that feminist appeals to
reality and experience as a source of truth limit rather
than expand the possibilities of politics. Women, as
political actors, must accept the inevitability of
contingency and interpretation, (see esp
. Scott, 1993 ;
Brown, 1991) Appealing to claims to truth regarding women's
lives empties feminism of political content, leaving it in
the perpetually anachronistic position of arguing over
metanarratives and laws of history rather than taking a
willful stand within the historical present. Max Weber
argued in "Politics as a Vocation" that in conditions of
modernity, politics becomes a "battle among gods on earth,
»
detached from truth, but nonetheless invested with meaning.
(Weber, 1964) For post
-moderns
,
however, once one accepts
that meaning is created by Man on earth, it is reactionary
to take the leap of faith Weber advocated to combat the
devils of contingency and relativism in a disenchanted
world. Politics is defined by those devils now and
feminists need to kick the modern habit of asserting
correspondences between experience and truth. They need to
learn to engage on the always moving battlegrounds produced
through historically contingent power relations. According
to Wendy Brown, "For the political making of a feminist
future, we may need to loosen our historically feminized
131
attaChmSntS S° "^-ctivlty a„d morality, and re(Jress _
historicaHy underdeveloped taste for political argument
we may need to learn public speaking and the pleasures of
public argument, not to overcome our situatedness
, but to
assume responsibility for our situations as well as to
acqurre perspective and aspxre to possibilities that expand
them." (Brown, 1991;81
, This claim Qf post .modern
theory warrants further examination. What does Brown mean
by "assume responsibility" and "aspire to possibilities that
expand [our situations]"?
A common claim of post-modern theory is that textual or
discursive representations of selves has a constitutive
effect on modern subjectivity. Thus, for feminism, the
sexual, racial and gendered imaginings of modernity can be
shown to have importantly differentiated effects on how
women are represented in the world. From this perspective,
the social world is thought of as a weave of texts
constitutive of everyday, normalizing patterns of behavior
and identification. Feminist interpretation can show the
multiplicity of ways in which this weave of social texts
creates gender as a self
-stabilizing effect (rather than
thinking of gender itself as a cause) of certain
power\knowledge regimes
.
The destabilization of these regimes would then
constitute the political project of feminism for post-modern
theorists. As I will discuss, post-modern feminists argue
that in order to engage politically we must find the
fissures in dominative efforts that proscribe the project of
being women in the world. They place the tropes of
"difference.- and "performativity
- in opposition to identity
in order to reconfigure the complexly mediated relationship
between being and forms of resistance. Post-modern theories
of this relationship are radically anti-ontological with
regard to being, and place resistance as always already
within constitutive relations of power. Thus, feminists who
engage with post-modern theory critique discursive regimes
of power\knowledge (particularly those about sex)
. Some
study how representative discursive regimes of power place
the feminine as an object within a phallogocentric hierarchy
that denies the feminine its autonomy or intrinsic value.
(Braidotti, 1991; Jardine, 1986).
For post-modern feminists, identity is thoroughly
contingent; the "concrete-, or "real" self posited by
socialist feminists is political "all the way down"; its
possibilities for being in the world are constituted
through, not in spite of, power relations. Gendered
identity is so deeply embedded in the normalizing axes of
domination and power that the mechanisms of everyday life
are implicated in the sustenance of the social world. Thus,
the association of daily life, sensuous activity, identity
and political empowerment argued by socialist feminists may
actually undermine the goal of exposing how gendered habits
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and .ores are enforced by various systgms Qf ^
arguing women's social positionali ty as the foundation for
political activity, socialist feminism may be rewriting £he
scrrpt of women's subordination. The assertion that ..
knowing self is discoverable if „e remove the distorting
oppressions of patriarchal domination forecloses, for
example, on the possibilities that emerge with inquiry into
women's varied parMcipation (not necessarily a willful
participation) in discursive regimes of sexuality. »
Post-modern feminists attempt to move feminism beyond
ideology critique. The truth of the subject's knowledge or
consciousness is not ideologically distorted or complexly
mediated by the social world; discursive regimes (speech)
actually position the subject as a subject. (Fuss, i 989;
Spivak, 1982) Rather'than engaging in the discovery or
recovery of subjectivity, it is the subject's emergence into
discourse that we must study for political insights into how
relations of power and dominance work.
Thus, a critical theory of the representation of
gendered identities considers how they are produced through
power relations over time and space. Post-modern feminisms
consider how to disidentify from and disrupt the constraints
and habits that reiterate the terms of social domination.
As I will show in a discussion of Judith Butler's theory of
drag as a subversive practice, this is often a process
contingent upon interpretation and perspective rather than
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on an obvious or undated quality of the performance
'
itself. This renders the possibility of prior commitments
to particular political agendas unstable at best and a
reactionary longing at worst.
As I noted earlier, post-modern feminists place
questions about difference at the center of their work. The
value of arguing for the
-we., of feminism is not necessarily
denied, but the political value of the "we" becomes part of
the question rather than a presupposition. (Riley, 1989;
Flax, 1989) will the positing of woman or even women as
knowing subjects only succeed in reiterating the terms of
representation that generated feminist critique in the first
place? (Butler, 1990) Does it unjustly reduce and distort
the textured quality of women's lives and the differences
among them? The historical pursuit of sisterhood and
identification among women on the basis of common
differences from men, has been shown to be untenable for
women of color and working class women whose lived
experiences of oppression are not reducible to a self-
contained gendered analysis. with respect to the question
of the "we", black feminists and third-world feminists
critique the assumptions of white feminists regarding the
significance of racial, ethnic and class differences among
women and among women and men. (Anzaldua, 1993; Mohanty,
1991) For example, black women's history of slavery tells
feminism that the idealized, representative images of
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"woman" as particular kinds of sexual objects or as
particular kinds of mothers holding together the nuclear
family, have little to do with the specific expectations
most women experience in their communities. 29 it is clear
that the grounds for feminist theory and the self-
understanding of white feminists is radically challenged,
not merely altered or expanded by anti-racist and post-
colonialist critiques. The project must be to reconsider
the epistemological\political commitments and interpretive
methods of feminism, not merely to include different women
in feminist theorizing or to expand its explanatory
capacities to Black and third-world women's lives. (Trinh,
1991/ Mohanty, 1991; Spelman, 1989) The project must
challenge the very search for the we. I think many ideas of
post-modern feminisms contribute to this project but will
suggest some ways their approaches come up short
strategically and politically in light of demands for anti-
racist, post-colonialist feminist politics.
The dialogue between post-modern theory and feminism
has contributed to the political project of
reconceptualizing relations of power and domination among
women. Feminist attention to post-modern critiques of the
unified subject and ontological or phenomonological accounts
of domination and power encourages carefully nuanced and
specific discussions of difference and identity. It
furthers the unearthing and denaturalizing of gender
politics as it is imbricated and implicated in the
multiplicity of systems of domination. Theorizing the
subject and gender as political effects rather than as
sources of ontological certainty directs us to theorize
difference as effectively subversive of multiple, dominative
norms rather than as the obverse of identity among priorly
individuated subjects. » m other words, once we are no
longer wedded to stability and unity as subjects we expand
our possibilities for acknowledging the multiplicity of
subversive political practices among differently situated
actors. However, I will argue that if we are to move
politically in conditions of post-modern fragmentation and
uncertainty, we still need to be able to articulate our
reasons to make judgements about differences and how they
matter even if we no longer wish to appeal to modernist
versions of Reason to make those judgements.
"Difference theory" emerged as feminists theorized the
effects of dualist sex\gender systems. 31 But the project
of writing the multiplicity that is women into an
emancipatory or, as Drucilla Cornell (1992) boldly calls it,
Utopian discourse of sexual difference needs a much more
complicated mode of interpretation. Otherwise, one
difference becomes the difference that matters for the
continued life and survival of feminism; the future of
feminism becomes telescoped through sexual difference. The
critique of the subject must not proceed only from the
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assertion that the subject is always already male. All
'
other inquiry into the status of subjectivity, the
complexities of which should be central to feminist work,
will instead be derivative if this is the starting point.
"Others" become, no matter what their particular history,
femininized and chains of equivalency are set up among and
around oppressions. Specific arguments about the effects of
racism in feminist theory and politics become faint shadows
within the discursively overdetermined processes of sexual
differencing. 32
Feminist political theory must theorize the specific
negotiations made necessary within feminism by the multiple
and often immanently contradictory political commitments of
all women. The absorption of feminism under the discursive
symbolics of dualist sexual difference otherwise precludes
attention to very specific and deeply historical tensions in
feminism around women's differences. For women of color,
multiplicity is a historical experience specific to their
condition of subordination and to their terms of resistance.
It is not the result of recently issued invitations to write
themselves into history through the junctures opened up by a
crisis of Western cultural identity vis-a-vis the unified
subject and humanist philosophies. 33 Arguments initiated
by women of color over the terms of feminist struggle
reflect historical, material and symbolic differentials in
privilege among women and persistently prohibit any easy
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answers about the DaramptPrc •p e e s of feminism as a project. My
focus is on the post-modern theory that encourages the
strategic articulation of how and where differences matter
in a constellational process of creating politicized
knowledge about women's lives.
The post
-structuralist theory of Michel Foucault 34
offers insights into power and resistance and the
disciplinary qualities of modern social life which disrupt
historic assumptions in feminism about the politics of the
Subject and differences. Theories that emerged as feminists
took on the challenge Foucault 's work issues vis-a-vis the
subject and power will be the focus of this chapter.
Foucault produced complex genealogies of politically
marginal sites of social life such as the constitution of
madness and criminality. His work attempts the "critical
ontology" of a present he argues is constituted through
multiple power\knowledge regimes that shape the
possibilities of the self and subjectivity. 35 His analyses
of the relationships between power, knowledge and resistance
are meant to expose the historical practices of our present.
Foucault contributes a relational theory of power to
feminism. He does not accept the closures of identity
theory. He builds his critique around the coercive,
disciplinary practices that result from modernity's
insufficiencies vis-a-vis identity and difference. In
addition, his work explicitly calls for the transgressions
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of limits as a necessary quality of resistance. One limit
factor he points to are the limitations of "critical-
inquiries which seek to establish once and for all the most
likely cause or the best explanation for phenomenon. He
displaces the pursuit of cause and effect explanations for
the vagaries of modern subjectivity and social life with
inquiries into how medical, psychoanalytic, scientific and
humanist discourses are constructed and deployed in
modernity. 36
With feminism, Foucault refutes the epistemological
claim that the Truth is made accessible or even that better
truths are accumulated over time through positivist or
humanist sciences and philosophy. However, Foucault, unlike
standpoint feminists, believes the pursuit of truth is never
innocent or outside of the terms of historical relationships
of power. 37 Foucault argues for a relational theory of
power that makes impossible any presumption of the innocence
or ontological purity of any subject. He argues we must
resist the tendency to assume the autonomy or agency of any
particular subject without taking into consideration the
historicity of the very intelligibility of that subject
position. Foucault 's argument implicates the identity
politics of standpoint theory in a politics of
representation that calls subjectivities to order in a
process of normalization. What many feminists have taken
from his work is the seemingly simple, but difficult to
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remember, point that what we assume is true or real should
always be open to the question of how it becomes true or
real. it is through this process of critique that acts
which wil] be transgressive or subversive of the »real'
become intelligible or available to interpretation.
Foucault's genealogical perspective on the subject in
history does not deny the presence of the subject in
modernity; it understands it as a production of discursive,
thoroughly historical, relations of power that allow the
subject to emerge as an intelligible object of inquiry.
I find Foucault's attention to "the event" and his
argument that we must remain locally committed in the social
practice of interpretation particularly valuable. 38 For
example, gender, if assumed as an unquestioned conceptual
starting point, is not local enough. It is too ladened with
differences and is clearly not a seamless social project
across time and cultures. Particular events may become
significant through gender analysis in irreducibly different
ways than they were understood before, but they do not then
accumulate as a final answer to the question of what gender
(or feminism, for that matter) is in itself as a system or
as a phenomenon. Anti-racist and post -colonialist feminisms
have convincingly shown how "gender" understood through
Western eyes is insufficient for interpreting the lives and
experience of non-Western women and coming to terms with
difference in feminism. (Mohanty, et.al. 1991) Thus
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Foucault's work speaks to feminist debates about the
politics of identity and difference and questions about the
status of the authorizing voices of feminism.
Judith Butler's theory of identity as habituated
performances continues Foucault's work to break down
assumptions about authenticity vis-a-vis gender identity and
feminism. Butler's work encourages a spirit of
experimentation. she argues the fragmentary, contingent,
non-innocent qualities of feminist subjects of power in
post
-modernity. with other post-modern feminist theorists,
she argues that we remain in the position of interpreting
meaning, judging what to do, and negotiating over what
differences matter when-
-even as we give up claims to truth
and authentic knowledge about our deep selves. In my
discussion of Adorno's work, I argued that the normative
points of reference for this politics are the somatic
qualities of self\other relations which offer guidance in
assessing practices of resistance and subversion. I
discussed the dialectics of experience and how they move us
forward from the static qualities of standpoint theory.
Here I further situate my critique of feminist identity
theory by considering Judith Butler's use of performativity
as a counter to identity claims in feminism. I examine the
political messages in her texts.
Butler argues that feminist identity politics mirror
rather than subvert the constraints of the politics of
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representation within which feminism (necessarily) operates
Feminist identity claims place women as either powerless in
the context of patriarchy and in need of proper
representation, or powerful because they can escape or
displace from outside its borders patriarchy's terms of
representation. she describes the conundrum of
representation in feminism as follows':
Is the construction of the category of women as acoherent and stable subject an unwitting regulation andreification of gender relations? ... To what extentdoes the category of women achieve stability and
matrix?
Ce
T ?
nly t\^e C°ntSXt of the heterosexual
,
" a stable notion of gender no longer proves
oerhL^
foundatlonal Premise of feminist politics,p rhaps a new sort of feminist politics is now
?S!if??le t0 co*test the very reification of gender andidentity, one that will take the variable constructionof identity as both a methodological and normativeprerequisite, if not a political goal. (Butler, 1989:5)
Judith Butler theorizes performativity as a way of
confronting this politics of identity and representation in
feminism. She argues it moves feminism beyond the time-worn
debate about constructionism vs determinism in identity
theory. These arguments, as developed within feminist
theory, fail to account for the complexity of * subject
positions' as sites of action constructed through discursive
regimes of power. Constructionism implies an otherwise
free, self -determining or at least relatively autonomous
subject. If the female subject is constructed, the feminist
task is to discover the possibilities of a true self that
always already lies beyond the construction. If the subject
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is determined, it is less free, called into being through a
set of prior constraints that are not challenged by any
notion of agency or will. Butler argues that the notion of
performativity better captures the process through which
subjecthood is assumed. She argues:
The ^performative' dimension of construction isprecisely the forced reiteration of norms. In thissense then, it is not only that there are constraintsto performativity; rather, constraint calls to berethought as the very condition of performativityPerformativity is neither free play nor theatrical
self
-presentation; nor can it be simply equated withperformance. Moreover, constraint is not necessarilythat which sets a limit to performativity; constraintis, rather, that which impels and sustains
performativity. (Butler, 1993:94-95)
Thus, performances are ritualized and produced through
constraints, none of which is fully determinant of the shape
of the production. (Butler, 1993:95) Performance is not
the expression of an identity that exists prior to
articulation; it is the appearance which will tell us what
we can know about the subject. We should not hope for any
more truthful identity to be discovered through revelation.
We can, however, search out those practices that expose
identity norms as acts that are delimited in a temporal and
social sense. Practices which disallow the complacency of
identity are more valuable to a radical democratic politics
than practices that reiterate naturalized, always already
gendered qualities of social life.
Butler argues that modernist feminisms participate in
affirming the habits of gender identity through starting
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from the subject positions proscribed by heterosexualist
demands. On the one hand, Butler points out that women's
desire may not be o^oloaically distinct from paternal
power. women's "true" desire will not be discovered in the
imaginary beyond the present or have a pure existence; it is
a product as well as an object of paternal power. On the
other hand, no power, including patriarchy, is capable of
the total interpellation of subjectivity. There are always
fissures and disjunctures between hegemonic power and the
resulting identitarian forms. > Thus, the subversive
quality of any act or principle will exist in relation to
the heterosexualist principle, not prior to it in some
originary state waiting to be recuperated. (Butler , 1990 : 93
)
To clarify this argument, Butler shows how Julia Kristeva's
critique of the paternal law, in which she deploys the
figure of the lesbian, reinstates the perspective of
patriarchy. Kristeva places the figure of the lesbian as
strictly at odds with paternal desire. She projects the
lesbian as "Other to culture, and characterizes lesbian
speech as the psychotic whirl -of -words . " In Butler's
reading, the lesbian is thus ^merely' the psychotic
production of the law of the father and is therefore a
radical identity in itself. 40 "This tactical dismissal
and reduction of lesbian experience performed in the name of
the law positions Kristeva within the orbit of the paternal
-
heterosexual privilege." (Butler, 1990:87) Butler
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continues:
"Significantly, this description of lesbian
experience is affected toa^^ and tells us more
about the fantasies that a fearful heterosexual culture
produces to defend against its own homosexual possibilities
than about lesbian experience itself... (Butler, 1990:8 7, m
other words, for rhh ot. k~ •s t Butler, being a lesbian is not subversive
because heterosexual culturp foare H ,ic e fe s the presence and identity
of lesbians as totally outside the norms of cultural
hegemony. That would imply that lesbians are only what
heterosexualist projections say they are, binding the
qualities of lesbian sexuality to the symbolic
identifications of paternal law. The heterosexualist
duality of sex and gender become final in this formulation,
with heterosexualism on the inside and lesbianism on the
outside as two distinct and mutually exclusive rather than
mutually constitutive possibilities.
Butler goes on to argue what "lesbian experience
itself" represents as a subversive act; she argues how
lesbian sexuality can be read as subversive without
reiterating the terms of heterosexualist dualisms. Lesbian
identification may or may not subvert the limits of
heterosexualist symbolics of desire. Lesbian sexuality does
not exist outside of the terms of constitutive power-
-in
fact, no practice exists totally outside cultural hegemony
or the norms of daily life. "If subversion is possible it
will be a subversion from within the terms of the law,
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through the possibilities that emerge when the law tu
against itself and spawns unexpected permutations of
itself." (Butler, 1990;93) Much of Butler's work is devoted
to theorizing those "unexpected permutations." she relies
on Foucault, but also on phenomenology and post
-Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory to develop the thesis of
performativity which allows the space for unexpected
permutations to emerge and political subversions to be cast
through interpretive action.
In Butler's theory identity and essence are rendered
thoroughly mutable. They are thus potentially more free
than any identity theory allows. In fact, identity theory
or even theory that relies on bodily essence or behaviors as
given preclude the recognition of innumerable radical (and
unpredictable and risky) possibilities for the subversion of
the normalizing demands of power. How does this then
translate into a politics? What are the implications of
thinking of every permutation of identity, even that of the
body, as a potentially subversive, historicized appearance
rather than as a foundational or at least structuring
principle of social life?
Feminists often argue for pragmatic, rationalist and
protective responses to the "real" vulnerability of woman's
body and the oppressive "material" aspects of women's lives.
Butler critiques this, implying it is a retreat from
politics into the truthfulness of "a body that experiences."
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It places that experience outside of the terms of production
« discourse. she argues that the female and male body is
always already encoded by, among other things, the
regulatory constructions of sex. The social world
constructs punitive measures to enforce properly gendered,
heterosexual identities, while agreeing with Foucault about
the discursive construction of identity, Butler shows how
even Foucault privileges the body that experiences as
somehow prior to the cultural imprints that make its sex
intelligible. His use of the diaries of Herculine, the
French androgyne, to express the purity of pleasure of an
ambiguously sexed physical being fails to take into account
the tragic quality of gender enforcement. (Foucault, 1980)
Butler argues that Herculine' s body is what the social world
makes of it, not a pre-social site of pleasure that becomes
other under society's imprints. "She" becomes gendered man
in spite of her desire to live as a woman who loves women.
"She" is not in an unintelligible state of polymorphous
sexuality or merely androgynous, as Foucault says, nor is
her sexuality comfortably ambivalent prior to the social
operations that make her into a man. The gender imperative
is always already there for bodies, it is not imprinted on
otherwise "polymorphous," ambivalent flesh. In light of
this thoroughly enculturated quality of the body, Butler
critiques all appeals to identity as even minimally settled
within the confines of biological or material "realities."
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As pointed out above, Butler is particularly concerned
with reclaiming marginalized sexualities as critically
subversive of heterosexualist systems of power. However,
she rejects the claims of outsider status for these
sexualities made by some feminists. instead Butler argues
that lesbian women may reflect, through the rituals and
practices that constitute their identities as lesbian, the
productive (as opposed to the merely repressive) power of
hegemony. They may or may not, given the circumstance,
represent 'unexpected permutations' of naturalized
heterosexualrst assumptions. In other words, Butler does
not think lesbian existence can remove itself from those
assumptions through claiming either the purity of
identificatory relations among women 42 or practices that
are ontologically out of the reach of heterosexualist
expectations. 43 Butler argues that lesbians should be
self-consciously anti-gender as a systemic constraint on
their identities; but they will not achieve a transcendence
of gender through androgynous combinations of masculine and
feminine traits or by assuming an already freer identity
outside of heterosexualist culture. In other words, they
should not remain ontologically committed to gendered traits
as they are presently written into the world.
"Only from a self-consciously denaturalized position
can we see how the appearance of naturalness is itself
constitutive." (Butler , 1990 : 110) Butler looks for the
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.ze
.nto a
extra-ordinary instances of action t-h^ a1 that de-naturali
everyday gendered life, not to consolidate them i,
-herent political program or blueprint for liberation, but
to interpret them as exposure t-^=- wosures that bear witness to how the
conventional is constituted as natural." Butler asks that
we cease to assume in advance a binary sexed identity and
ask instead, what is at stake in sustaining binary sexed
identities. Through looking at "deviance" from those sexed
identities differentlv ae at- ny, s at least Partially constitutive
of rather than outside the terms of the normal, we can
approach an understanding of what is at stake in holding the
oppositions steady. We may then begin to undermine
commitments to the proper performance of gender and thus to
the prohibitive and repressive constraints that heterosexist
gendered life sustains.
Butler's argument does not render gender any less
effective as a structuring principle of life and experience.
In a critique of Butler's thesis of performativity
,
Christine Distefano rejects the option to understand gender
as performance, arguing that gender is better understood as
a deeply historicized, effectively determining,
generalizable quality of social life. Distefano makes a
normative judgement about the thesis of performativity
representing a playful attitude, one dangerously less
serious about its commitments to social change than
materialist social analysis that assumes its generalizations
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to be recognizable in the world as it is. (Distefano, 1991)
DxStefano implies that Butler's work signifies a retreat
from normative theory about gender. However, Butler never
claims that gender is not a deeply structuring and
generalise quality of social life. Nor does she argue
that it is declining in significance as freely constituted
sexual deviance and gender-bending practices proliferate.
Rather, she wants to interrupt the persistant tendency
toward thinking about gender as determinate and society
(patriarchy) as an immutable object to which options of
resistance are exhausted by assuming an insider or an
outsider status. « She wants to make the demands of any
dualist understanding of gender strange and unfamiliar in
order to expose them to reflection and subversion.
The thesis of performativity is the pivot upon which
Butler turns away from identity theory in constructing a
feminist theory of gender. The argument that gender is
constituted through performance is not original to Butler.
It has been made vis-a-vis the distinct practice of
theatrical performance. Jill Dolan has similarly argued
that gender is performance in that it has no ontological
resting place before the representationalist practices of
social life. Dolan adopts a post -Lacanian critical
perspective on the feminine as represented as the absence of
masculine desire. She argues a feminist interpretation of
theatrical performances should set itself to examine how the
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femxn.ne is configured only in terms of the paternal ^ Qf
symbolic identification. Thus, in the performance that is
gender, we should encourage alternative representations of
women as subjects of dramatic art, rather than merely as
objects of masculinist desire. (Dolan, 1989; Dolan, ed.
1992) Butler expands this thesis beyond the proscenium and
beyond Lacan, making the Shakespearean adage that all the
world is a stage (managed but not determined by paternal
laws of identification) into a theory of politics. Butler's
thesis thus faces the potentiality of aestheticizing
political life, of turning it all into a play of willed
performances. However, she avoids this move, arguing that
the thesis of performativity is not like a staged
"performance". She offers insight into what is at stake in
arguments about "reality" as immutable and "performance" as
merely imitative. In other words, Dolan argues that
representations of the feminine in the theater reflects how
women are expected to "be" in the world. Butler does not
differentiate between the theatre as a site of performance
and the social world as a site of "being." She removes the
prosecnium as a distinct line between performance and
reality and argues the social world to be constituted
through a series of performances. Butler uses the aesthetic
form as a metaphor for rather than as a reflection of how
"reality" works. Realities are constituted as "acts" in
Butler's work. (Butler, 1993) These acts, as in the Acts of
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traditional dramatic forms n i 3 ,0 ,S
'
Place action within constraining
forms, thereby producing meaning and coherence.
Butler argues, against the expressive politics central
to the pract.ces of radical feminism, that there is no truer
or better identity in us waiting to be discovered.
"Women"
for example, may become more visible through political
struggles, as have "lesbians". However, what becomes
visible is not an unchanging truth about woman or even
multiple truths about women. what becomes visible is an
effect of discourse and remains
"essentially" subject to
interpretation. it is subject to the conditions of
possibility which created the terrain of emergence in the
first place. For Butler, there is no essentially gendered
subject prior to the performance of gender. For her, what
emerges and congeals as the truth of identity is thoroughly
contingent upon interpretation. In other words, we identify
in particular ways because of the constraints of
representation. Our identities have no ontology prior to
the acts and modes of representation in which we are
embedded.
Thus, Butler argues that the boundaries of any system
will not become transparent to particular revolutionary
perspectives while remaining opaque to others. In response
to Monique Wittig's theory that revolutionizes lesbian
existence as the ultimate mode of resistance, Butler argues
that it is logically impossible that heterosexuality is
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radically determined, completely compulsory and non-
volitional while lesbian sexuality is somehow more free of
determinant structurpq ^es or norms. Butler does not think
there is this radical disjuncture between compulsory
heterosexuality and homosexuality. m addition, she
critxques the theory of heterosexuality as a compulsory
system developed by lesbian and feminist theorists as
diverse as Adrienne Rich, Monique Wittig and Catharine
MacKinnon. instead, Butler argues there are psychic
affinities that cross the fictive boundary between these
sites of sexual identity. In other words, homosexuality is
ritualized and riven with power relations that also weave
through heterosexuality and constitute the possibilities of
its existence. This does not make it the same as
heterosexuality, it does imply that homosexuality in itself,
as an identity, is always already constructed in part
through the terms of hegemonic heterosexuality. The
political trick is to expose the norms of exclusion that
operate within heterosexuality to degrade homosexuality to
outsider status, not to claim a purity or coherence to
homosexuality in-itself. This poses a threat to the
stability of heterosexualism and therefore potentially opens
up possibilities for movement beyond its dualisms.
Further, Butler does not disagree with the project of
unearthing gay and lesbian historical lives. Because of
certain historical periods when homosexuality has been
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necessary clandestine, and lesbian existence
invisible, the signals put out about idenfcity ^^^^
are consciously ritualized. xhey constitute an
cultural world and make possible claims about a distinct
history o f lesbian culture. « Butler does disagree with
the use of this project to determine the essential truths
about lesbian existence « and the terms of lesbian
identity. « Unlike many lesbian ^
does not think the political value of asserting the
cultural/historical consistency of gay life lies in its
consolidation alongside heterosexuality as a legitimate
identity choice. Habits and rituals of identity formation
take on naturalized qualities as they exist over time. This
is a danger, not necessarily the strength of gay and lesbian
community. » The codification of rituals of sexed
relations begins to reflect the exclusionary qualities of
the heterosexualist system and like that system, to disallow
experimentation and openness to differences as threats to
lesbian existence." The politics of gay identity thus is
in the subversion of gender and the heterosexualist matrix
that enforces its terms, not only in the consolidation of
gayness as an alternative "choice."
The operations of gender are quite effective at
disguising themselves in necessity and in the vicissitudes
of everyday life. Thus, for Butler the subversive exposure
of the actual inessentiality of gendered identity will lie
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« the hyperbolic, self-consciously performative imitation
of the (always fictive) ideological presence of an original
This exaggeration of the terms on which the world makes
itself intelligible to knowing subjects has traditionally
been the territory of the theatrical. As discussed above,
Butler brxngs it into the world, refusing the separateness
between the performance or the expression and the reality.
For example in the case of Queer politics, the public
theatrics of groups like Act Up represent a deliberate
reappropriation and subversion of meaning of terms
ordinarily used to shame, to interpellate the abject social
identity that acts differently from the heterosexualist
norm. Arguing for the performativity of gender changes the
"realities" of gender from behaviors, or immutable facts of
socialization, into a politics which might then be
intervened with.
Contrary to what some critics assert (Distefano, 1991;
Benhabib, 1991), Butler sustains a theory of gender as a
system that gives form to her theory of performativity and
does contribute to a politics of interpretation. For
Butler, gender is a contingent sexual positioning but it is
also constituted through a "tacit collective agreement."
Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals
its genesis; the tacit collective agreement to perform,
produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as
cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of
those productions- -and the punishments that attend not
agreeing to believe in them; the construction * compels'
our belief in its necessity and naturalness. The
historical possibilities materialized through various
Butler makes clear the punitive measures this > tacit
collective agreement' engages in order to properly engender
bodies. However, the circularity of her discussion of
gender as a tacit collective agreement obscured by the
credibility of its productions, recalls liberal social
contract theory. The artifice that is the social contract
of liberalism is sustained precisely through agreement
generated by its self
-legitimating effects (of collective
and individual security)
. Butler drops the rational
individual who exists prior to politics and enters into this
contract, but sustains the social metaphor of agreement,
which begs many questions about social relations. Post-
structuralist theory displaces the opposition between
liberal (rationalist) and deterministic (socially
engineered) theories of social relations with a theory of
constitutive power. This moves theory beyond the notion
that there exist potentially innocent individuals or
identities before the laws of history (or before the social
contract is made)
.
The premise is that we are all complicit
in cultural hegemony, not in the sense of being guilty
rather than innocent, but in the sense of having
participated, and needing to reflect deeply on the forms and
substances of this participation. Thus, changing "tacit
collective agreement" to "tacit, collective participation"
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adjusts the liberal connotations of Butler's phrase and
moves towards a more material and active sense of how social
relations work. « This piece of her analysis, however,
shows why anti-ontological social criticism is often
conflated (by its critics) with a liberal or pluralist
politics. it is quite difficult to see the normative
qualities of anti-ontological critique.
With reference to Monique Wittig's fictional accounts
of lesbian experience and radical potential, Butler writes:
Sese
d
t.v^f°
UrCe
° f Personal and political agency [inthes exts] comes not from within the individual butin and through the complex cultural exchanges among
?n^H ir\ whlct\^entity itself is ever-shifting?
9
indeed, where identity itself is constructed,disintegrated and recirculated only within a context ofa dynamic field of cultural relations(Butler, 1990 : 127)
What are these complex cultural exchanges? How do we assess
the difference between exchanges and appropriations? Butler
does not explain the relationship between culture and
politics or between differentials in social power and
exchange. This is where I think we need to look beyond a
theory of symbolic identity formations, derivative from
psychoanalytic theory, which Butler's thesis of subversive
performativity sustains.
"There is no gender identity behind the expression of
gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the
very expressions' that are said to be its results." (Butler,
1990:25) Butler invokes expression which generally implies
a representation of something enigmatic that lies below the
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surface of appearances. The performance of an identity
ordinarily implies that one is deliberately setting up a
ruse, that one is outside of one's normal self. it is
distinct from expression, but can be expressive.
"Performativity,
»
on the other hand, argues that the
expression is the thino i-h^t- tT«cu cnmg, t at we are not moving in and out
of our selves in ways more or less truthful or authentic.
It implies that there is no distinction between appearance
and reality whereas expression implies a difference and a
relationship between appearance and reality. Post-
structuralist theory deconstructs social relations as
"texts" to show that they do not leave any remainder in
reality, but indeed are constitutive of reality. I think an
expressivist politics implies the sustenance, if not the
essentiality, of a moment that provides a sub (con) text for
the act. One is expressing something that is other than the
appearance. While the correspondence is never exact or
total, I think of the relationship as a stratified,
dialectical layering where expression never exactly
communicates the experience nor the prior intent. The
intentions of the speaker are never exactly met, but there
is something other than the appearance itself to be
considered as a political problem. The notion of
performativity tends to erase this stratified, dialectical
relationship between action and interpretation in social
relations
.
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Post-modern theory refuses dialectical methods for
thinking about society and social relations on the grounds
that traditionally, dialectics assumes a teleological
overcoming. Butler eliminates the consideration of
dialectics in explaining gender identity. In particular she
critiques dialectics' dependence upon the realm of necessity
for explanation of historical change and progress. in
Subjects of DesirP (i 98 7) she examines the tradition of
dialectical theory which argues the historical relationship
between necessity and human will or agency. Butler's work
attempts to move beyond dialectics to the deconstruction of
the moment of "necessity" in itself. As pointed out above,
this necessity includes the body and/or sex. Butler rejects
any normative claim that oppositional movement should be
organized on the basis of identity or "reality". Social
life is always already organized through and around
identity. Appropriating and reinventing categories in the
name of autonomy from prior identifications potentially
constitutes new exclusions that reiterate the political
processes of representation feminism has set itself the task
of critiquing.
Butler is not only suspicious of identity but rejects
outright any notion that identity exists in itself as
anything but a fictive representation of who we think we
have to be. For Butler, we do not need identity to be
critical actors. Instead we need to expose, persistently
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disidentify from and actively disrupt the naturalized
identity demands placed on us. As I have discussed, Adorno
thinks of identity as a necessary moment of cognition and of
recognition, but one that needs always to be recognized as
incomplete, as not covering the excess, and as coercive in
its defensiveness against that excess. Butler thinks of
identity as constitutive habituation. There is no somatic
moment, no going through the object or anchoring of
knowledge in the normative qualities of self\other
understanding. This becomes particularly apparent in her
discussion of the politics of drag. it is here, where she
advocates a practice that exposes the inessentiality of
gender that the normative potentialities of her work come
through most clearly. However, her theory of identity as
performative is not sufficient as a basis for interpreting
the always only potentially critical qualities or the
politics of drag.
Butler's discussion of gay and lesbian drag as
performatively subversive of heterosexualism has been highly
controversial among feminists. She argues that the
performance of drag is intrinsically deconstructive and
therefore constitutes an oppositional movement vis-a-vis
oppressive gender identity. This rubs against the grain of
feminist critique of gay male drag as a classic expression
of misogynist, masculinist appropriations of the feminine or
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lesbian drag as a glorification of male-centered
heterosexualist values. (Frye, 1983)
Butler rejects this critique of drag as a homophobic
reversal of the claim that lesbians are 'really' women who
cannot find a man. she argues that this critique of gay
male drag engages in a homophobic logic-
-that gay men create
themselves only with reference to the absent woman. That is
an astute reversal of feminist critiques. However, Butler's
reclamation of drag as subversive does not take into account
how it is constituted through a complex of meanings.
Instead she defines it only in terms of resisting
heterosexualist desire. Her discussion implies that the
meanings of being sexed male in this society are somehow
detached from gay men in drag. Many gay men are actively
misogynistic. This is not intrinsic to or a necessary
determinant of gay male identity; rather it is related to
being male in a misogynist culture. Homosexual men are not
always only homosexual men defying the rules of
heterosexuality
.
Even as men who love other men are
abjected through heterosexualist identity norms they have
access to other social identifications that lesbians, for
example, do not. If Butler is going to argue, along with
Denise Riley (1989) , that women are not always only "women,
"
but move in and out of that identity in complicated and
often unpredictable ways, she should apply the same insight
to any identificatory system. Otherwise she approaches the
reification of gayness or sexual difference as intrinsically
subversive of gender oppression.
in a later discussion, Butler argues that she was not
arguing that drag is universally subversive. instead she
was theorizing the ambivalence of drag within the
heterosexist matrix in which it stands. However, her
qualifications of the theory and caveats about how drag
performances work their subversions do not adequately
respond to the criticism that all performances are layered
with multiple meanings, not only embedded in singular
contexts. Practices subversive of social demands for proper
performances are immanent ly ambiguous and contradictory.
They may not be subversive of sexism or of racism-
-even if
they call naturalized heterosexuality to account for its
fictional status.
Gay men "participate" in complicated ways in sustaining
patriarchal hegemony that offers them privileges as men and
constructs opportunities depending upon what race and
ethnicity they are. These aspects of how homosexuals are,
whether we think of the self as a performer or as essential
identity, should not be bracketed off from their
performances as gay men. This would collapse gender into
sexuality, avoiding the different implications for politics
of their distinct terms of reference. Drag queens may need
additional performances to be convincing to women who have
experienced the effects of misogyny and sexism of men
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generally and interpret drag through that lens. The
subsequent implications for the appropriation of the
feminine may or may not be negative for women, but they
should not be dismissed as irrelevant in a society drenched
with differential power linked to gender identity norms.
Feminism should look at gay male drag with an eye towards
the potential disidentif ications they make from
heterosexualist culture. But this will not eradicate the
speculative gaze it should sustain in relationship to the
way the performer sets off the glories of male gayness from
lesser identities represented by womanness. The quality of
the self\other relationship upon which the politics of the
performance rests will speak to the normative value of drag
for women and feminism (and indeed of "women" and feminism
for drag)
.
On the other hand, drag can and should be read as a
parody of gender essentialism and as potentially subversive.
As mentioned, Butler argues the ambivalent quality of drag.
However, she interprets the ambivalence with reference to
whether particular queens perform on the terms of parody, or
whether they are merely reasserting the value of real
gendered identities and then placing value on those
identities through performance. In other words, the
critical quality of drag depends upon its immanent belief in
itself as representation rather than its embeddedness in
particular social relations or material life. This point
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can be illustrated by considering Butler's discussion of the
ambivalence of drag as a subversive act in an essay about
the film *Paris is Burning' entitled "Gender is Burning."
in this essay she argues that drag is subversive if the
desire of the performer does not lead her to want to
finalize or really "be" the other gender because of a final
value placed on that otherness. "Paris is Burning" shows us
that performing drag can be deadly, not subversive, if the
performer wants to become other. This is the desire of
Venus. Venus Xtravaganza is a Latina, transexual man,
becoming a woman who says to the camera that she "really
wants to have a house in the suburbs to clean and a man to
take care of her." m other words, Venus really wants to be
a woman. When the previously fooled man who she hopes will
bring her to his house in the suburbs finds out the "truth"
of her gender, he kills her because of her left-over organ.
There are several messages to be read out of Venus'
life and death. One implication of Butler's discussion is
that Venus was trying to be too real and paid the price.
Venus should have realized that drag could only go so far,
that drag is drag- She suffered in life and died from her
desire for the real thing. Her left-over organ signifies
the excess, that which was unaccounted for in the
calculation of the man who murdered her, who refused to
forgive that she could not really be the woman, no matter
how powerful her performance. Either way, the desire for
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the real becomes deadly. what message do we address to
Venus and the man who murdered her? Butler might say, given
her discussion,
"Recognize the limits of your performance,
not in mourning over an inaccessible real thing, but in
recognition that no one's life is defined by the real thing,
only by symbolic identifications." Butler would warn Venus
about thinking fulfillment was possible through being a real
woman and instruct her on the constitutive partiality of all
identities. I think this shows that Butler's argument about
drag is not "playful". Rather she succeeds in showing how
dangerously invested we are in enforcing the real. Given
present social conditions, living with the ambivalence of
her condition may have kept Venus in the underground,
impoverished world she thought she could escape through
becoming a complete woman. But her yearning for escape
through becoming totally other (white and female) is fatal.
Venus' yearning for completion in nature of a socially
constructed and socially valued identity is tragic.
The other queens in the film, who do not try to be too
real, but allow the audience to 'see' the parody, survive.
The audience knows the parody and participates fully in it.
Is this then subversive? For Butler it is because the
parodic quality of the practice of voguing creates a
culture, a community, which she argues is a valuable counter
to heterosexualist assumptions about sexual "deviants" and
their capacity to live affirmative, empowering lives. She
refutes interpretations of the film that argue the queens
only live lives of despair and unfulfilled longing to be the
dominant other." The representation of the Queens in the
film radically subverts the terms of hegemonic
heterosexualist assumptions about how particular kinds of
family and sex are necessary to sustain community.
Butler takes note of the punishments that await those
who insist on not doing their gender right or who refuse the
"reality or "essentiality" of their gender identity.
Social marginalization is viscerally painful and Butler does
not romatnicize the community as being immune from these
effects. However, for Butler the critical move is not to
discuss the oppression of deviants but to rewrite the script
through which dominant culture understands their lives.
This means breaking down the assumptions that Black Drag
Queens in Harlem are only oppressed and kept down by their
delusional desire to be white and female. The various acts
of gender create the idea of gender, and as gender is
considered to be a matter of cultural survival, there is
much at stake in participating in the writing of those acts.
Butler shows the queens to be participants in subverting the
script of gender, to be subjects and not only passive
objects of oppression.
It is thus clear what Butler means by subverting
gender. However it is less clear what she means by "doing
gender right" and whether women can or do submissively
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participate in the heterosexualist structures that shape our
gendered lives. Generally, even participating in
heterosexual
..normalcy i s contingent upon unpredictable and
often unstructured expectations. For example, the
unpredictability of heterosPvnaHefy n c rosexualist, male expectations of
women from one moment to the next is dangerous. Women who
live their lives "doing their gender right" are as likely to
be beaten or raped as often as women who violate the current
rules or ideals for proper gendered behavior. To talk to
women who have survived battering relationships is to hear a
litany of attempts to get their gendered role right in order
to stop or control the violence. In these situations, even
heterosexual women cannot "do gender right." Many "proper"
performances never lead to the rewards Butler implies women
are receiving who do gender right. I make that point to
suggest that Butler's work creates too stark a difference
between the ability or willingness to do gender right and
sexual subversions as if the former is easily accessible to
men and women and the latter more dangerous to men and women
alike. It should be acknowledged that there is no symmetry
between (or among) the sexes vis-a-vis the dangers of acting
outside of gendered norms.
Judith Butler has developed a compelling argument for
dispelling identitarian myths about gender and essentialist
reinscriptions of heterosexist dualisms. I find, however,
that she places too much faith in the immediacy of
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appearances and too much emphasis on representation as a
site of subversion. This leaves little room for discussions
of history as structuring the political potential of
subversive acts and the political significance of loyal
acts
-C
:o
Butler argues the denaturalizing performances of drag
to be intrinsically subversive of the myth of the original
or essential relationship between biologically sexed and
gendered identity. Inspiring gender trouble with parodi,
performance causes the construction of gender identity t,
lose its foundational source of stability which is
constitutive of heterosexual and heterosexist gender
identity. Butler analyzes gender as the result of the
experience of desire emergent from differentiation from an
other (gender) in the framework of institutionalized
heterosexuality. She argues that this relationship
constitutes and reinforces heterosexual gender construction.
Butler sees gender as an experience of desire constituted
through the heterosexualist opposition of male\female. The
performances she argues subvert dualist hetero-genders
therefore are linked specifically to gender understood only
through its constitution as heterosexual desire, as male and
female. But gender is never completed through its
constitution into male and female as sexes. Gender is
dependent upon a grid of identificatory mechanisms,
including but not limited to class, race and ethnicity, that
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add up to be larger than the mere sum of their parts. We
cannot linguistically represent the entirety of the effects
of gendered experience. Gender is not only the aggregate of
performances and habits; social identity is more than the
sum of the parts of the performances in which subjects
engage. Being a black woman or a white woman is not equal
to the sum of performances of racial and gendered
identities. One of the key issues of black feminism is the
inarticulable qualities of being black women in a social
world that has historically coded black as male and gender
as white. » Black feminists have struggled not to use
additive language for a quality of life that is different
and more than the sum of those two parts. As a social
identity "black womanness" exists in tension with the
conceptual forms of representation available to them as
subjects of experience at any given time in history. White
feminists have begun to struggle with this question as well,
though clearly for very different political reasons.
Butler argues that radical politics lie in particular
subversive practices through which any claim to gender
identity is exposed or denaturalized. While I am clearly in
agreement with aspects of this critique, I do not think it
adequately addresses the question embedded in all
discussions of identity: that of self\other relations forged
through differences. Other post-structuralist feminists
who critique essentialism in feminism articulate the
[as
complexities of struggling within multiple or webbed (,
opposed to bilateral) relationships of power and
domination. (Flax, 1993) Gender is a relationship and a
concept which intersects other relationships and concepts in
the social world, including but not limited to race and
class, to sustain particular norms of behavior. However, in
a radical reaction to the "exclusions" Butler argues are
embedded in feminist identity politics, her interpretation
abstracts the moment of parody as subversive without linking
it up with the historical meanings which all performances
carry with them. The cultural form Butler is politicizing
always does more than subvert naturalized gender. To
isolate that moment is reductive. There is a social world
of perception which must be considered in relationship to
particular moments. Within that world the meanings of
particular moments need to be critically traced along
various axes of domination and exclusionary practices.
Thinking about women's experiences as localized events
embedded in identity forms that simultaneously render them
intelligible and limit them can avoid assuming in advance
that "womanness" and modes of sexuality are defined
primarily through heterosexualist interpellations rather
than through race, class and other politically intertwined
strategies of othering.
It is clear from the heated quality of the arguments
"for and against" that there is much at stake in feminist
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discussions of post-modern theory. some have argued that
post-modern feminists are in fact using alternative
metanarratives (that all resistance is a discursive effect)
.
Other feminists critical of the turn away from
philosophical reflections on subjectivity and materiality
follow Lukacs in claiming that while the world may be a
fragmented mess of interests and relative claims to power,
critical theory should not fall into acceptance of that
state. According to this reading, post-modern feminist
theorists are merely making the best of a bad situation in
embracing fragmentation and indeterminacy in their
rearticulations of politics. Women have been denied Subject
status or a positioning as historical actors for too long;
the triumphs of feminism are too fragile to move away from
the theoretical resources that positively affirm
subjectivity. In this vein, Nancy Hartsock argues that it
is no accident that just as oppressed, colonized subjects
are fighting their way onto the historical stage, white,
European, mostly male theorists are proclaiming the Death of
the Subject. (Hartsock, 1992) And Seyla Benhabib states in
"Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance":
What follows from this Nietzschean position is a vision
of the self as a masquerading performer, except of
course, we are now asked to believe that there is no
self behind the mask. Given how fragile and tenuous
women's sense of selfhood is in many cases, how much of
a hit and miss affair their struggles for autonomy are,
this reduction of female agency to a 'doing without the
doer' at best appears to me to be making a virtue out
of necessity. (Benhabib, 1991:140)
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In other words thp mi o ^-f • •s, ne role of feminism is to buttress woman's
selfhood and subject stai-na.L tus, to accept the contingencies and
vagaries of (masculinist
) political lifp ac „/ u_L_Lcicai te as necessary is to
give up ground barely even won.
However, for feminists sympathetic to post-modern
theory, the crux of the political argument has to do with
whether feminists are clinging to the very modalities of
Enlightenment principles of the self and identity that have
buttressed the historical marginalization of women and the
feminine principle. Most feminists who have turned to post-
modern thinking argue that we cannot create a politically
and ethically effective feminism without sacrificing our
search for the determinate subj ect\obj ect or the immanent
values of womanness. Jane Flax and Wendy Brown respond
sharply to feminist hesitations in the cold light of the
post-modern crisis of epistemological certainty. They argue
that the commitments to truth and epistemological
foundations professed by some feminists are a reactionary
response to the fragmented course of the world. (Flax, 1993 ;
Brown, 1991) Rosi Braidotti goes somewhat further with a
historical argument that feminism itself is a part of the
crisis of the Subject in modernity because the emergence of
women as subjects necessarily deconstructs the
phallogocentric norms that situated the Enlightenment
subject of Reason and History. For Braidotti, post-
modernity should be treated by feminists as an opportunity
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rather than as a process of dissolution or a reason for
despair. i t is only reasQn fQr ^^ ^ ^
power on the terms of Enlightenment political orders.
(Braidotti, 1991) z think Brown and Qther fem . n . sts aii . ed
with post-modern theory are right; possibilities for the
future lie in work done on the agonistic, conflictual,
unstable sites of coalition and not on the situated, settled
grounds of identitv Rni- t v,^,Cl y
-
But 1 have reservations traceable to
their treatment of experience and history.
For example, the parodic performance may subvert
essentialist commitments to particularly coded, gendered
identities, but the social meanings evoked will alter the
politics of the parody, even as an act. Thus, for example,
white men cannot engage in performances of black women as if
the differences between them are merely phenomenal or
apparitional rather than historically defined. The old
television show, "Amos and Andy" in which white men in black
face played black men and black women, representing them
through the images white America imposed on blackness, can
hardly be said to be subversive of racial meanings. Rather,
it reinforced them through representation. It is not only
the parodic quality of the act that matters politically but
the social relations as a backdrop that makes the act
intelligible to an audience. 55
If understood as social relationships rather than
ontological sites or ahistorical concepts, modern identities
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can be understood to be invent- „4i-uo vested with meaning in a process
that does, as post-modern theory argues, defy the
traditional essence\appearance dichotomy of dialectics.
Butler argues for the politics of appearances that parody
and subvert the very idea of essences. The limit of this
argument is that it does not account for the (always
relational) differences between, for example, white men and
black women that render the performance possible in the
first place as an intelligible event. This is what I
believe to be the politics of identity.
Through our critiques of the logics of organizing
principles of social life, we begin to break the habits of
identity thinking. As I will explain, this does not mean
giving up the specificity of feminist criticism. it does
mean interpreting different women's experiences as
intelligible through constellational forms rather than as
only other than the masculine or as fully determined by
patriarchal\phallogocentric hierarchies of symbolic
representation and organization of material life.
After reviewing the defenses of and attacks on identity
and identity politics that have emerged over the last ten
years in feminism, I have come to think that identity is too
loaded, too "heavily imprinted with the footprints of
metaphysics" (Caraway, 1991) to continue to be held up as a
paradigmatic foundation for feminist praxis. On the other
hand, I am not so optimistic as post-modern theorists about
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the politics of breaking down the identitarian forras that
renders the very way we speak and act in the world
intelligible.
The meaning of moments of resistance like the ones
Butler describes should not be separated from their
historical and socxal context. Meanrng emerges through a
dialectical tension which prevents stasis on either the
particular (the performance) or the social (the contextual)
level. we can see a connection between the critique of
identity (and therefore of standpoint feminisms that start
from identity)
,
offered by Butler and Adorno. Both
recognize the dangers of reifying the
-given- or the "real."
And both offer ways of re-presenting critical differences
among gendered experiences seen as politically loaded events
rather than as necessary or inevitable realities. Butler's
approach to identity as an act argues for the subversion of
identity using the logics of its own self
-legitimating
effects, ie. if gender is said to be essential and final,
let us do our politics through practices and/or acts that
parody the very idea of gender as essential and final.
Adorno' s critical theory anticipates post-modern
feminist critiques of identity. More than any other
modernist theorist, he shows the danger of identity thinking
and refuses to capitulate to any reconciled vision of the
world. But unlike post-modern thinkers, even in their most
political, post -structuralist incarnations, he locates the
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operatives of critical philosophy in ^ politicize(J
self\ other relation. Morno , s theory Qf ^ ^
always already relational quality of experience allows the
subject to re-cognize itself tfeaj its experience with an
other
.
Feminism should not retreat from the fragmentary and
contingent conditions of politics. But this places all the
more weight on the constellatory interpretation-on
localized, immanent philosophical inquiry. The different
interpretations that emerge among women about an experience
apparently held in common reflect the changing shape of that
moment (of the experience) that was other in its own
present. We must not continue to think we "own- our
experience or that we can ultimately control how they will
be read or represented by other in political contests over
meaning. We cannot decide in advance which events will be
emancipatory, especially not if we are truly engaged in
coalitional politics; but we can and should, nonetheless,
strategize and plan and struggle over the terms of
representation of experience and social relations. We are
not expressing a settled reality when we talk about
experiences; we are participating in the reconstitution and
transformation of that reality.
The post-modern turn in feminist theory has shown that
many of the foundational concepts of feminism repeat the
epistemological and identitarian strategies that create the
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terms of dominance and exclusion against which femini-
claims to be struggling
. For example; ±f ^
claims about representing all
..women- as an abstract
category, they may be reinscribing the juridical practices
that disallow difference, deviance or disobediance from
established norms of political life. Abstract
representation of others carries with it the danger of
obscuring difference and particularity. Thus feminism needs
to locate itself on the discursive edges of otherwise
naturalized systems of dominance like heterosexualism.
Performative strategies can expose gender as a historical
effect undermining its naturalized claims.
Judith Butler repeatedly admonishes feminism to be
aware of its own exclusions and the paradoxes of
representation. she describes the deconstructive
contribution to feminist politics as follows:
I would argue that the rifts among women over the
?S !r
h
fu
term [woman J ou9ht to be safeguarded andprized that this constant rifting (sic) ought to beattirmed as the ungrounded ground of feminist theoryTo deconstruct the subject of feminism is not, then tocensure its usage, but, on the contrary, to release theterm into a future of multiple significations, to
emancipate it from the maternalist and racialist
ontologies to which it has been restricted, and to giveit play as a site where unanticipated meanings might
come to bear. (Butler, 1993:16)
In Bodies That Matter, in place of feminine embodiment as
ontology, Butler argues for a radical performativity that
will deconstruct the foundationalist biases of feminism
toward the 'reality' of women's lives. Butler relies on
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Lacanian notions of the syndics of identity and the
habituated performance that is gender. Thus the body
becomes relevant to politics through strategies of
representation.
For example, Butler says that appeals to materiality as
a grounds for feminist struggle ignore the always already
historically inscribed "sex of materiality." (Butler,
1993:54-55) m other words, Butler textualizes the notion
of "matter" in order to challenge feminists who would claim
that the vulnerability of women's bodies and the materiality
of injury determine a common political or epistemological
foundation
.
These challenges inspire reconsiderations of experience
as a foundational concept for feminist theorizing and
practice. I have argued that while we must challenge any
notion of an unmediated relationship between experience and
identity, we should sustain that relationship as relevant to
feminist inquiry and transformative strategies. I have
argued that difference is historical and relational, not
textual. My arguments with Judith Butler revolve around her
dismissal of experience as a qualitative moment that informs
discursive (social) understanding. I discussed in chapter
two an alternative way of thinking about experience that
loosens its association with identity thinking while
sustaining the material stakes of political struggle.
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For Butler the insistence upon difference each time
representationalist discourses claim to have settled
identity claims is the life-hl^n * • •re blood of feminism. For Adorno,
the materiality qualities of experience that defy the
colonizing terms of representation are what make those
differences Butler refpr-Q „ „ . -
.
x ters to significant. The excessive
quality of experience, the moment of non-identity that
confronts an oppressively organized object world, drives
Adorno'
s critique. it prevents him from settling for an
identity between theory and practice as it engages him in a
persistent critique of dominative forms that deny extra-
conceptual differences. For Adorno, identity is not a
habit, it is a requirement of a world organized through
abstract exchange and equivalencies. Adorno abandons the
modern quest to identify the revolutionary subject of
knowledge as he critiques dominative forms naturalized
through the object world, or the world external to the self.
However, he remains concerned with self-other relations as
they are constituted through the object world, the world of
creation and historical change. Adorno spends most of
Negative Dialectics critiquing those philosophies that
settle the subject in place prior to engagement with the
object. He and Butler may agree that freedom or liberation
depends upon the exposure of the constraints of identity,
but Butler's thesis of performativity renders social
relations, ie. how we are in the world as social beings,
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ins lgnifi cant
. Adorno remains a ch . nker ^^^^ ^
sustains the premise that inter-subjectivity is organized
through the object world. To struggle ^^ ^
identity means to engage in a critique of the object world
as a shared space of artifice but also of social
relationships
.
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CHAPTER V
TXTnT^c" "M™ WH° 13 SPEAKING? -HE POLITICS OF RE
-PRESENTING EXPERIENCE
in this chapter I consider contemporary feminist
political strategies and practices against sexual viol,
in the light of some of the arguments about the politics of
identity I made in earlier chapters. Sexuality has attained
its ideological influence in modernity by virtue of its
private and individuated status; feminism has made public
the terms on which sexuality and sexual relationships
actually work to sustain particular forms of male dominance.
The experience and the threat of sexual violence disciplines
and controls women's bodies (or those bodies marked as
feminine)
,
placing severe and often unpredictable limits on
the feminine subject's action and agency. Feminism exposes
those forms of private violence previously protected by
ideological commitments to social non-interventionism into
the (heterosexual) domestic and/or sexual sphere. 56
However, identity thinking informs feminist theorizing
about sexuality and inhibits feminist strategizing against
sexual violence. As I will discuss, with particular
reference to arguments articulated by Catharine MacKinnon,
in exposing to public scrutiny what had been hidden as
private suffering, feminists claim to have discovered an
immutable reality of gender relations. Radical feminists
generally argue that the cultural assumptions about and
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practices of sexuality offer men the socially sanctioned
choice of whether to be violent or not and strip women of
their sexual autonomy and physical freedoms. 57 The
foundations of sexual politics are thus created by mens'
ability to rape, to control and to exploit women's
sexuality-
-that which is most private and her own. The
"anti-violence against women movement," as inspired by
radical feminists, has set up sexual violence as a
fundamental and apparently immutable source of male power.
They have exaggerated the agreement dominant culture
sustains in reinforcing the rules of gender. Political
frameworks that explain sexual violence as a naturalized
aspect of the totality that is patriarchy cannot take
advantage of the complex and contradictory quality of the
practices that enforce "proper" gender identity in the
context of sexual politics.
How might we avoid organizing our thinking around the
impermeable reality of sexual violence as a defining
experience of gendered life? I will suggest that the
various practices of sexual violence against women indicate
the mutability of gendered identity and can be understood as
moments of non- identity in an otherwise apparently stable
system. Rather than arguing that sexual violence defines
and proscribes women's possibilities, we ought to shift our
emphasis to show how sexual violence indicates the
instability of patriarchal dominance generally. At the
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particular and strategic level, we can then understand
feminist opposition to sexual violence not only as a defense
against systemic aggression, but also as a means to expose
the fissures and contradictions of gendered norms. I will
argue that sexual violence demonstrates the historical
mutability of patriarchal desires and heterosexualist
dominance; it thus represents a moment of non-identity in
gender even as it acts to enforce its rules.
In the last chapter I discussed how the desire for the
real or the natural as a referent for a stable sense of
gendered identity can provoke extraordinary violence.
Judith Butler argues that drag as a performance is not a
misogynist attack on or appropriation of women's true
identity but instead is parodying the concept of the real
dualities of gender. Instead of participating in the
reification of the dualisms of gender by attacking drag as a
violation of a true identity, feminism might reconsider its
effect as a deconstructive act parodying the naturalized
assumptions of gender upon which patriarchy relies. More
generally, post -structuralist feminism and queer theory have
argued that punitive measures against sexual deviance and
the moral outcry against homosexuality indicate the
historically unstable quality of heterosexualist norms --that
they are not natural or immutable, but actually in need of
enforcement. Similarly, sexual violence against women, in
its many variations, may indicate the historically
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unpredictable and unstable quality of gender identity. Ho„
might the movement against sexual violence against women
take advantage of this shift in emphasis from theorizing the
immutable qualities of gender to exposing the historical
instability of gender identity?
in what follows, I consider the relationship between
violence and power in order to better understand how sexual
violence as a practice serves a political rather than a
private purpose. Sexual violence is a means of social
control, it enforces the norms of gender determined by
variable historical contexts. Elaine Scarry's study of the
relationship between subjective pain and objective social
power informs my thinking about how sexual violence produces
its social effects. In light of those considerations, I
discuss whether some trends in the movement against sexual
violence, and the theory that inspires it, reinscribe
normative assumptions about gender identity which make
sexual violence possible in the first place and limit the
potential range of political responses.
The political imperative to give a voice to the silence
of suffering drives the movement against violence against
women. This process of naming and describing the experience
of sexual violence from women's perspective has forced the
acknowledgment of their suffering, but it also has the
negative effect of further identifying women as victims who
need protection and services. I agree that sexual violence
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serves to enforce the dominative rules of gender identity;
yet, I will argue that, as an experience, it does not off
a common reality or foundation for feminist identity.
Feminism must experiment with taking the presumed realiti
of sexual violence apart in order to interrupt its
apparently seamless effects on women's lives. Otherwi
risk reinscribing typical conceptions of femininity always
already imposed on women's lives, rather than challenging
and changing the various hegemonic narratives about gender
which create the terrain on which sexual violence works. To
be gendered female becomes a form defined by its imminent
vulnerability; important variations in representations of
masculine and feminine sexuality that inform the different
practices of sexual violence go unmarked. Sexual violence
has historically differentiated effects even as it serves to
enforce masculinist dominance. Beginning our analysis
cognizant of these effects, as illuminated by women's actual
experiences of both victimization and resistance, may help
us better envision the demobilization of masculinist
dominance, rather than proceeding from an assumption of its
universal effectiveness.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND MALE POWER
For the last ten years the arguments of Catharine
MacKinnon have provoked intense debate about sexuality and
sexual violence within feminist circles and beyond. 58 Her
particular feminism is a necessary referent for any
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discussion of sexual violence, because for MacKinnon, as for
other radical feminists, the struggle against sexual
violence is at the heart of feminist politics. MacKinnon'
work attacks gender inequality under the terms of the
liberal state and argues the significance of sexual viol
in upholding that inequality. However, because she argues
sexual violence to be both a cause and a symptom of women's
sexual powerlessness her theory cannot account for the
contradictory sexual messages that inform sexual behavior
and desires.
"As marxist method is dialectical materialism, feminist
method is consciousness raising: the collective, critical
reconstitution of the meaning of women's social experience,
as women live through it." (MacKinnon, 198 7:83) Thus,
MacKinnon introduces a discussion of consciousness-raising
(CR) as the origin of feminist theory. For MacKinnon, CR is
a practice that creates theory through interpreting women's
experience. As a method it emphasizes discussion of the
intricate patterns of the dominative social relations that
women negotiate daily as gendered subjects. MacKinnon
follows in the Marxist epistemological tradition of arguing
that women were uncovering or revealing a reality that is
otherwise distorted by the ideological forms and
institutional structures created by and for the interests of
men. However, the reality MacKinnon concludes women
discover has not inspired an unencumbered sisterhood as it
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developed social currency. The experiences that count for
feminism are of suffering, of exclusion and oppression.
There is scarce mention of how diverse women live their
daily lives or how they negotiate sexuality and find
pleasure through their sexual lives. For MacKinnon, these
questions are not meaningful for feminism; in fact, she
argues that the very language of negotiation is a telling
sign that women are in bondage
. (MacKinnon, 1987:135)
MacKinnon maintains that the realities of women's sexual
suffering prove that any indication of power in their lives
is created by and for men who are invested with the choice
to give or take away power. As a consequence, her feminism
unnecessarily limits feminist strategies to a narrow,
reactive terrain populated by generic and fearful women.
MacKinnon argues that the totality of sexuality is
defined by male dominance in patriarchy. The violences
perpetrated by men against women govern sexual politics.
For MacKinnon, under patriarchy (gender hierarchy with men
on top) sex is violence and women's agency in sexual
relationships goes only so far as the need for survival in
the face of potential rape or coercion dictates. Sexual
violence defines the possibilities of women's lives and
holds male power in place. Sexual suffering will therefore
create the grounds from which feminism emerges as
simultaneously a collective and a collectivizing critique of
the social order
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Thus, in MacKinnon's analysis, feminism is what we kno.
when we bear witness to the sexualized powerlessness of
women. "The substantive principle governing the authentic
politics of women's personal lives is pervasive
powerlessness to men, expressed and reconstituted daily as
sexuality." (MacKinnon, 1987:120) Women's sexual
powerlessness identifies her as woman. she is the object of
desire, never the objectifier. she is literally the prey of
the forces of objectif ication.
For MacKinnon, then, sexual experiences are something
given to women at the hands of men. if projected into the
world by women, sexual politics reflect a singular reality
or truth, which is that women are powerless in relationship
to men and are always potentially victims of male power.
MacKinnon's version of' consciousness-raising as a feminist
method does not reconfigure self -other relations through the
philosophical or analytical examination of experience.
Rather, it engages in that project in the service of
% discovering' the truth of women's powerlessness, which is
always already there in spite of who might be in the room
and in spite of power relations that may in fact be
determining the shape of discourse as it emerges in the
group. Thus, consciousness-raising groups, or feminist
methods as theorized by MacKinnon, do not hold potential as
counter-hegemonic sources of knowledge about the world or
power; they are, rather, merely places from which to
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discover women's lack of power, she does not take power
relations within the group into account as a central concern
of feminism. The truth of sexual suffering is waiting to be
revealed as common to all women.
How is sexual suffering the reality of female
sexuality? MacKinnon argues that sexuality is not pre-
social or pre-political
.
it is in the world at the behest
of the patriarchal order. Thus, feminists who argue that
women must experiment or rediscover the sex that has been
denied them by a repressive society, or who argue that
pornography and rape is ^violence' but not necessarily sex,
are wrongly assuming that there is something called female
sexuality in the world, even if it is alienated or
repressed. 59 For MacKinnon, that phrase expresses an
impossibility. Sexuality is what masculinist culture wants
and has the power to unilaterally create, therefore, x female
sexuality is what men want. The violence that is rape and
pornography is female sexuality. To argue otherwise is to
not see the reality that confronts women everyday as victims
of the pervasive threat of sexual violence. Sexuality is
made, not given, but it is made through masculinist
violence, (cf. Brownmiller, 1976)
Sexuality, in feminist light, is not a discrete sphere
of interaction or feeling or sensation or behavior in
which preexisting social divisions may or may not be
played out. It is a pervasive dimension of social
life, one that permeates the whole. . . Dominance
eroticized defines the imperative of its masculinity,
submission eroticized defines its femininity. . . sexual
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^tTenCe iS a function of sexual dominance(MacKinnon, 1987:130) wuuuou .
in this analysis, sexuality (as a practice but also
a constitutive difference among women) as a realm of
possibility is obscured by its reduction to male desire.
Sex is gendered dominance, and race and class relations are
insignificant in the context of feminist politics. None of
these historical moments of experience and difference matter
for MacKinnon's ^unmodified' feminism.
While she places women's experience at the center of
what feminist theory should be, MacKinnon argues it is in
the world only at the whim of all-powerful men. In her
feminism, women become the objects of male desire.
MacKinnon's feminism hands reality over to male power,
placing feminism in the outsider position of bearing witness
to a male standard. 60 How feminism is to engage in the
reconstitution of this x reality' witnessed through critique
is never made clear but confused by the leap from the
particularity of women's experience to the universality of
women's lives, as defined by a monolithic male power.
MacKinnon thus presents us with the paradox that, on
the one hand, feminism as a political theory should be
immanent to women's experience, while on the other hand,
feminism only emerges when the qualities of the monolithic
reality that is gender dominance have been established and
fundamentally agreed upon. MacKinnon assumes that women's
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lives are only perceived as different until they engage i
consciousness-raising, when the similarities will become
apparent. she assumes a pre-discursive reality which
must discover, that of sexual suffering, but fails t
acknowledge the meaning of that sentient experience
contested-
-even among women. 61
I argue that we should not displace the quality of
sexuality in itself, including sexual suffering, from the
contested space it occupies among women. Deciding once and
for all what the 'reality' of sex is turns it inward as a
site of » truth' rather than projecting its claims outward to
be contested and politically significant. The social
significance of female sexuality is thus rendered through
its vulnerability and dependence on male power rather than
through its potential for constitutive public power. in
MacKinnon's epistemological framework, we have to 'know'
sexuality in a form determined by patriarchy in order to
'be' feminist. She describes sexuality as "that which is
most her (a woman's) own," comparing it to the creative
practice of work in Marxian theory as that which is most
essential to the being of the worker. For MacKinnon
" [w] omen's sexuality is, socially, a thing to be stolen,
sold, bought, bartered, or exchanged by others. The moment
women 'have' it-- 'have sex' in the dual gender/sexuality
sense- -it is lost as theirs. To have it is to have it taken
away." (MacKinnon, 1987:172) In other words, MacKinnon
smakes sexuality the defining moment of woman's life then
tells her she never had it. She says men respond to women'
sexual pain only to eroticize it. Putting women in pain
defines the terms on which male sexuality thrives.
MacKinnon then 'proves' her point by pointing to the
empirical reality that is the prevalence of sexual violence
against women. in other words, violence is sex for men
because sexual violence is so prevalent. And, when men are
not violent in sex, it is only because the woman is saving
herself through
' consenting'
. That consent cannot be 'real'
in MacKinnon's world. The barrier that is gender dominance
is unidimensional and impermeable. Sexual violence is both
a cause and a symptom of women's sexual powerlessness
.
To effectively confront sexual violence, feminism
requires a less systemic theory that can take differences
among women into account as it argues the logic of sexual
violence. We should theorize sexual violence in such a way
that encourages us to see in it the particularities of a
constellation of concrete effects, none of which should be
placed as the determinant moment, but each of which is
critical to understanding the experience. In what follows,
I outline an approach that contributes to an oppositional
sexual politics but does not rely on the universal agreement
among women about the social meaning of their common
victimization at the hands of men as a pre-condition of
feminist politics.
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Setting up the pain of sexual violence as the reality
of women's lives renders MacKinnon's feminism complicit in
the reification 62 of that rpal-ihv t«-undc e ity. it offers patriarchy
the status of reality; it sacrifices the significance of
womens' experience as it collapses their differences into
sameness for theoretical and political efficiency. Maleness
also has no differences in MacKinnon's theory. Maleness
becomes the undifferentiated
* reality' against which
feminism can be. (Tong, 1991) This logic thrives as the
4 truth' of sexuality rendering irrelevant any possibility of
difference. This theory conflates sexual dominance with
gender and the resulting totality with the impossibility of
female sexuality. This causes feminism to abandon strategic
thinking about experience in favor of identity politics. It
implies an eventual withdrawal into a politics of
protectionism (of the feminized body) when the social world
does not adequately respond to the articulations of
suffering
.
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Setting up the fact of sexual violence and the
experience of sexual suffering as essential limits on
women's possibilities for being in the world participates in
the reification of an undifferentiated masculinist
dominance. Empathic responses to women's suffering and
insistence on the solidarity generated by the claim that 'it
could happen to any of us' participate in conferring a
monolithic reality onto what I will argue is better
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understood as a contested, fragile
, even phantasmatic
edifice of masculinist dominance. Patriarchy is not
univocal or monolithic in its project of dominance as
MacKinnon implies. it reinvents itself and the
(contradictory) terms of its legitimating cultural scripts
in the face of historical shifts in gender relations.
Can we rethink the relationship between violence and
power in such a way that recognizes the immanent
contradictions and differentiated forms of masculinist
dominance without abstracting from the actual experience and
pain of sexual violence? Elaine Scarry's discussion of the
underlying structures of torture inspired my exploration of
this possibility. 64 Her analysis of the relationship
between the infliction of physical pain and the substantive
reality of political power suggests a critical perspective
on the practices of sexual violence. I conceptualize sexual
violence as a practice deployed in the name of stabilizing
the otherwise fragile edifice of masculinist power-
-creating
its fictions but also perpetuating its material effects in
the world. Scarry offers a materialist perspective on
the matter of physical pain and power. Materialist
philosophy has taken many different forms often indebted to
but not necessarily identical with Marxist versions. Some
materialist thinking invokes determinist theories that say
consciousness is determined by our situatedness vis-a-vis
production in the social world. It often disallows thinking
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about consciousness separately from historical conditions of
production. m feminism, materialist theory has moved far
beyond these limits. Previously, i discussed the
materialist grounding of 'standpoint feminisms.' That area
of feminism has sustained a link between theory and the
material conditions of everyday life as necessary to
politics. For example, Donna Haraway negotiates a complex
theoretical path between determinist theory that says our
material circumstance forms our potential for consciousness
and post-modern rejections of any correspondence between
social conditions of production and radical subjectivity.
Her
* Cyborg feminist' suggests the possibility of a feminism
in spite of the contradictory and substantively material
effects of modern epistemic demands on subjectivity.
(Haraway, 1991) Rosemarie Hennessey's work describes the
potential for understanding feminism as a concrete
intervention into the * interdiscourses ' that weave the
material lives of women into particular forms in the service
of patriarchal desire. (Hennessey, 1993) Other contemporary
materialist theories have invoked the materiality of
cultural forms in arguing for the 'concrete effects' of
discursive and semiotic constructions on social life.
(DeLauretis, 1987)
Scarry is a materialist in that she argues the social
world is constituted through objects. 65 She reads the
social world through reading its relationship to material
:or
on
.
o
objects. Her discussions of those moments we take f
granted on a daily basis (the reliance on a chair to hold us
upright and our responses when it bails' in its task) bring
the object world to life as it signifies the creativity
immanent in social relations. (Scarry, 1985:296) she does
not argue that objects structures and conditions form
consciousness but discusses in a more limited fashion how
they signify the necessary sociality of the human conditi
She argues that assuming a shared object world allows us t
*work on' the shared problem of sentience and human
experience, (ibid. 291)
For Scarry, human beings require the object world as a
space of mediation in order to share experience. if a
feeling (an experience) has no object that is other to
itself, it is intrinsically non-social. It cannot simply
emerge into the social world through language but will
resist linguistic representation. Pain is such a feeling.
Thus it is implicated in her work for its potential to
y unmake' the human world. We tend to think of pain as
something inward and subjective; as apolitical in-itself but
perhaps useful for obtaining political ends. Putting others
in pain or enduring pain is sometimes used as a means to a
political end. But the pain in itself rarely sustains
scrutiny except as a means to an end such as a confession in
torture sessions, a victory in warfare, or getting another
person to do what you want them to do. Scarry, however,
through considering the quality of pain in itself, shows how
it is in_itself related to the sustenance of power. it is
not only a means to an end but through its intrinsic
qualities can be translated into power when put to political
purposes. Scarry's discussions of the structure of torture
and of war offer insight into why the infliction of injury
has not withered as a tool of political dominance even as
modern forms of power become more sophisticated. 66
Scarry argues that pain has a unique relationship to
power. The infliction of pain is not the result of the
x failure' of politics or of negotiations between or among
parties; while not necessary to power, pain has a logic unto
itself which may be useful to power. 67 Unlike every other
experience we associate with feeling desire, love,
distaste pain has no object to which it refers. It
therefore resists obj ectif ication in description or in
explanation. Scarry asserts that pain may be the one
instance where one person, she who is in pain, experiences
something like absolute certainty and another, she who
listens and even tries to empathize, experiences something
like absolute doubt. Sentient beings may all experience
pain, but it resists representation because it has no object
external to the self. 68
Physical pain not only resists representation but
actively works to destroy language. It exists in a
destructive tension with our ability to communicate. In
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we
spite of countless historical examples to the contrary,
often assume that if we tell the world of pain it will
respond to the truth or the fact of the experience and
progressively eliminate pain. Scarry argues that the
resistance of pain to representation in language renders
that representation all the more significant for politics.
Specifically, Scarry discusses torture as a ritualized,
political use of pain in light of her thesis about the
radical subjectivity and inwardness of the experience of
pain
.
Scarry asserts the radical subjectivity of pain and
hence its absolute incompatibility with the object world.
Pain destroys the object world as it has existed in its
normal social forms for the victim. In torture, when
objects are transformed as instruments to inflict pain, the
prisoner's world is systematically and ritualistically
destroyed; she is separated from the objects in the world,
material and ideological, as their comforting normalcy is
subverted through the use of them as torture weapons. Her
contact with objects and ideas is no longer sure or safe.
Her inner world of pain removes her from them. The prisoner
not only loses her sense of place and/or identity, but as
she speaks the words of the torturer in confession as an
effect of her pain, the world sees her as split off from
what made her real outside the torture chamber. Those who
confess are identified as betrayors, as weak. Even those
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with a strong sense of empathy may not avoid having a sense
of disappointment in the prisoner for speaking. This
tendency conspires to enlarge the world of the torturer and
thus the power of the regime he represents. (Scarry,
1985 : 29-32)
There is a different kind of politics attached to the
body in Scarry's work. with the body as referent, she
suggests a humanistic thesis. The body comes to matter in
its complex sentient relationship to the world, not as an
object of pity (as victim) nor as an object of pure
sentience, but as an object of political inscription as we
confront what she calls *the problems of sentience.' The
body is a potential site of creativity and pleasure in
relation to the object world, or of unmaking and suffering
as that relationship is distorted through the infliction of
injury. Torture distorts the bodily relationship to the
object world, dissolving the boundary between inside and
outside the body through using the victim's body against
them as a weapon. It becomes a weapon, separate from the
self:
Each source of strength and delight, each means of
moving out into the world or moving the world in to
oneself, becomes a means of turning the body back in on
itself, forcing the body to feed on the body: the eyes
are only access points for scorching light, the ears
for brutal noises; eating, the act at once so
incredible and so simple in which the world is
literally taken into the body, is replaced by rituals
of starvation ...The prisoner's body- -in its physical
strengths, in its sensory powers, in its needs and
wants, in its ways of self -delight , and finally even,
as here, in its small and moving gestures of friendship
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toward itself--iq
weapon against nim ™h p ^ Pr"oner; s voice, made a
enemy, made to be the enemv
hlm
°n behalf of theLn y. (Scarry, 1985:48)
The victim's pain defines her in relationship to the
torturer. She is intensely alone without the safety of
solitude. She is simultaneously intensely exposed, but
denied the comraderie associated with being in public. «
It is through the falsifiation and denial of the victim's
pain that torturers work to translate pain into an emblem of
a regime's strength. The enlarged map of human suffering
(the extension through objects of torture and proclaimed
motivations for torture) becomes the insignia of power. The
totalizing pain inflicted by a torturer resists
representation, destroying the victim's language and
radically altering their relationship to the object world,
or their former reality. Thus Scarry acknowledges the
x reality of pain as it works to defeat language and
therefore the terms on which objective social power can be
sustained
.
Scarry's immediate moral and political concern is with
pain as it is deployed to reinforce the reality of otherwise
illegitimate and even phantasmatic power. She describes how
torturers use ritualized practices to inflict pain that in
destroying the world of the prisoner virtually create the
world of the state. The quality of an 'incontestable
reality' of the physical pain inflicted upon the victim is
conferred upon the regime as an incontestable proof of its
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stability and reality. m addition, the fear of others
about the threat of real pain confers a reality onto state
power. if we think of states and SQcieties as existing . r
a relationship of negotiated power, torture becomes a weapon
of the state with very specific and rationalized effects.
Torture engages in "the conversion of absolute pain into the
fiction of absolute power..." (Scarry
, 1985 : 27) That is,
torture may be understood to signify the weakness of the
regime while, at the same time, it is used as a means to
confer reality on the power of the regime.
Torture is thus simultaneously at the extreme edges of
the negotiation that is politics and central to state power
in modernity. Rather than talking about torture only as an
arbitrary instrument of barbaric or irrational regimes,
Scarry talks about it as a ritualized process by which
regimes confer an incontestable 'reality' onto their
presence in people's lives.
In the very processes it uses to produce pain within
the body of the prisoner, it bestows visibility on the
structure and enormity of what is usually private and
incommuniccable, contained within the boundaries of the
sufferer's body. It then goes on to deny, to falsify,
the reality of the very thing it has itself objectified
by a perceptual shift which converts the visions of
suffering into the wholly illusory but, to the
torturers and the regime they represent, wholly
convincing spectacle of power. The physical pain is so
incontestably real that it seems to confer its quality
of 'incontestable reality' on that power that has
brought it into being. It is, of course, precisely
because the reality of that power is so highly
contestable, the regime so unstable, that torture is
being used. (Scarry, 1985:27)
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The argument that pain resists and even destroys the
normalcy of expressing feeling to the world is important
to feminist arguments and struggles around sexual violence.
Scarry's discussion of torture resonates in women's
testimonies of life with male batterers where every object
in the home becomes a potential weapon and the home spaces
that should offer safety become associated with danger and
prolonged punishment. It also speaks to the stories rape
victims tell of alienation from their own bodies after their
bodies are turned into objects as sexual weapons against
themselves. For Scarry, the underlying structure of the
infliction of injury, which renders a victim's pain as a
perpetrator's power, illuminates the solipsistic
relationship between sexual violence and masculinist power.
Scarry's discussion of the silence of pain faintly
echoes Adorno's critique of representation. For Adorno,
suffering in-itself resists representation. As we struggle
to represent it, we risk reducing its specificity to prior
social understandings, thereby normalizing suffering or even
rendering it falsely heroic as a signifier of what it means
to be a victim. The impulse to impose externally derived
meaning on the radically subjective experience of suffering
reduces the memory of experience by controlling it for
purposes of collective representation. The non-identity of
the event, the moment of suffering that resists
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representation, the irrational otherness of experience, is
repressed, forgotten or actively ignored. in other words,
we rrsk the rationalization of suffering as we objectify
experience. Scarry does not condemn this impulse to
represent suffering as does Adorno; instead she makes the
connection between the silence of pain and the
institutionalization of torture in modernity and tries to
capture the politics embedded in efforts to represent pain.
The absence of language for pain allows pain to be
transferred from its originary site in the body and
reappropriated to substantiate fictions of power.
Scarry's analysis suggests that we might understand the
practices of sexual violence as a systemic response to the
limits of patriarchy and to the fact that it can never
establish its power once and for all. Its constitutive
limits require the violent disciplining of women's bodies.
Sexual violence thus signifies the limits of patriarchal
power, rather than its real authority or totalizing power
over women as a system. Its prevalence shows just how much
is invested by masculinist culture in sustaining the reality
of sexual violence as a threat against women and in
constituting its devastating effects on women's bodies as
absolute. 70 It has been argued that sexual violence is the
means by which men can control the sexual 'otherness' and
potentially threatening powers of women; that men live in
fear of the feminine principle as something that undermines
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their sense of place in the world and use sexual violence to
undermine the power of the feminine. But my discussion does
not assume in advance the immanent or essential power of
women as women. it is limited to arguing the relationship
between the infliction of sexual suffering and the social
power wielded by men.
As I discussed above, the expectation that the
experience of sexual suffering is transparently accessible
to representation and that there are gains to be had in the
articulation of that experience has been central to the
politics of radical feminist struggles against sexual
violence. This runs the very real risk of undermining the
efforts of feminism to reinvent women as differentiated
sexual subjects through setting them up as sexual sufferers
in the public contest over sexual practices. Radical
feminist assertions about the univocal truth of sexual
violence focuses our attention on arguing about the truth of
radically subjective experience which in itself resists
representation, while ignoring the historically specific
qualities of the practice itself. This argument does not
elide men's responsibility for hearing and responding to
women's experiences; rather, it suggests that there are
cognitive limits embedded in the (political) process of
representing experience, particularly the experience of
other-inflicted pain, even when that pain is related to or
contrasted to sexual pleasure and desire. 71 If, as we
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struggle to give voice to the otherwise invisible pain of
sexual violence, we identify the inarticulable specificity
of sexual pain with male power, we risk collusion with that
power. Radical feminists rightly argue that sexual
violence is systemic and political and must be named as
such. However, they take the further step of arguing that
sexual violence represents the totality of male power. This
move is offered to counter liberal/individualist
perspectives that say sexual violence is an aberration from
the norm and who place the burden of proof on the individual
victim to show that she did not ^want it.' The importance
of Scarry's discussion of the structure of torture and the
relationship between pain and power is to show that we do
not have to reverse the terms of the dominant understanding
(sexual violence is not a sign of an aberrant sexuality but
a totalizing condition of sexuality) in order to argue that
it is political. For Scarry, the experience of pain
undermines a victim's objective social power; similarly, the
experience of sexual violence has undermined women's
objective social power. I have imported Scarry's ideas
about the relationship between pain and power to argue that
sexual violence simultaneously indicates and disguises the
limits of masculinist power. However, I push her analysis
beyond its original framework to argue that sexual violence
can become a politicized site of potential reversal and
subversion of patriarchal fictions about power rather than
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an inevitability' which signifies ^ powerlessness Qf
women as objects of male desire and violence.-
REFLECTION ON OPPOSITIONAL STRATEGIES
Movements against sexual violence have become visible
and, to a limited extent, legitimate in the United States.
The pervasiveness of sexual violence, and its status as a
public rather than a private problem, has been recognized
through the feminist struggle to place women's perspectives
on, and concrete claims about sexual violence in front of
the public by litigation, academic research and grassroots
education. However, the present character of the
increasingly institutionalized anti
-violence movement offers
a complex field on which to continue to struggle against
sexual violence. Women are still put in the position of
proving on individual grounds that they are indeed ^proper'
victims (Estrich, 1982) and of proving themselves worthy of
the
' justice' and related services the state has to offer.
Legal, pyschological and therapeutic discourses have
displaced feminist critique as general frameworks through
which sexual violence is understood. (Fraser, 1989) The
particular social and political logic of sexual violence is
underestimated even while legal and psychological remedies
proliferate. This is in part due to the emphasis of these
social scientific strategies which tends to be on
understanding the victim's responses. This, in itself,
Id not be a problem, but for the fact that it focuseswou
207
attention on establishing the truth of the victim's
subjective experience of suffering at the expense of
studying and arguing about the history and politics of
sexual violence as a social phenomenon.
in other words, society has figured out different ways
to treat women as victims-to react to sexual violence-but
there has not been an adequate focus on meaningful
strategies of prevention. Andrea Benton Rushing supports
this insight in her personal account of her survival
strategies in the aftermath of rape. she describes tactful
doctors, helpful rape counsellors and non- judgemental
police. She reports that in the South, in a case of a black
man raping a black woman, the police and doctors were all
quite sensitive and treated her as a 'proper' victim rather
than as a participant in the act. She comes to the
conclusion, however, that while this may indicate systematic
improvement in the institutionalized treatment of victims,
it does not indicate any ideas about how to stop rape.
(Rushing, 1994 : 130) Rushing also speaks to the contradictory
ways the experience of rape continued to define her life in
the aftermath. The experience was something she could
neither heal from through x rationally' reconstructing her
daily life nor something she could transcend through drawing
on the significant resources her community had to offer.
While her narrative is inconclusive, her story is not of a
woman who becomes a victim, but of an event that sets in
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motion a process that inexorably and unpredictably chang (
the terms on which she can live her life.
Matters are further complicated by the fact that sexual
violence as a practice is subject to historical and
contextual shifts in meaning. As I discussed above, it is
not an experience to which feminism can safely refer as a
common reality binding women into a politicized group across
or in spite of time, race, class and other differences. We
should approach theorizing about sexual violence with the
same suspicions about ontology and identity thinking as we
have other questions about women's lives. This will further
theory that starts feminist critique from differences among
women rather than » including' difference as relevant but not
fundamentally constitutive of feminism. I have argued that
feminists should remain consistently aware of the costs of
any struggle organized around the singularity of 'woman' as
an identity. In the context of sexual violence, it ignores
the ways race and class relations change the stakes and
outcomes of speaking out about experience. The politics of
struggle against sexual violence are not self-contained in
gender but intersected by race, class and sexual
relationships and meanings, which must be taken into account
at the start. 73 Thinking about the practices of sexual
violence as signifying the limits of an internally
contradictory and historically differentiated patriarchal
system moves us in this direction. For example, the
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totalizing theory of gender dominance suggested by MacKinnon
as an explanation for sexual violence does not adequately
account for the multiple
'realities' of women lives as they
negotiate sexual politics.
Further, the politics of representation persistently
interferes with any effort to comprehend the experiential
* truth' of sexual violence. Feminists have often assumed
the courtroom to be a conflictual but nonetheless effective
place to communicate and educate the social world about
sexual violence. However, as Kristen Bumiller shows in her
analysis of the trial of several men who committed a gang
rape in a public bar, legal discourse tends to have the
contradictory effect of rendering the experience of sexual
assault as an individual tragedy without illuminating the
social truths about power embedded in the particular
experience of sexual violence. (Bumiller, 1989) Therapeutic
discourse focuses on the response of the victims rather than
shifting our attention to the social pathologies of sexual
violence. It focuses on patterns in women's responses and
while valuable in helping society recognize the post-
traumatic stress associated with sexual assault, renders it
an illness that must be healed rather than an injustice that
must be prevented.
Psychological and legal discourses about domestic
violence represent women's responses to violence as
irrational. 74 The woman herself is therefore not
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considered an authoritative source for the interpretation of
her own experience. (Schneider, 1986) The meaning of her
experience is left to experts as they dissect her responses.
This tends to further mystify the Realities' of the
violence perpetrated against her. Expert testimony' in the
trials of battered women who kill or attack their abusers
may help to educate the public as to the prevalence and
patterns of sexual violence. However, the terms of its
admissibility in court have been shown to be organized
around the imperative to prove the woman psychologically
incapable of 'normal' actions and therefore less than
rational in her response to violence. (Schneider, 1986)
Historically, rape had been assumed, legally, to be
intercourse until the woman successfully could prove she
resisted. Similarly, domestic violence is assumed to be a
private and gender neutral affair until it is successfully
proven that women are made (temporarily) crazy by abuse. 75
In a strange twist, the woman's illness is necessary to
prove the prolonged character of the violence.
These discourses obscure women's experiences as they
limit political strategies to the terms offered by the
liberal state. 76 The struggle over whose experience counts
in the legal and psychological discussions has brought
women's experience of sexual violence into the public sphere
as a recognizable phenomenon. Women now have an expanded
language to describe what has happened to them, which the
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police, courts and social service system must respond to
Mandatory arrest statutes for batterers, the general
admissability of 'expert testimony- and increased shelter
space for women escaping violence are all significant
changes. As Andrea Benton-Rushing describes, rape victims,
particularly in the context of stranger rape, are often
treated with more respect and have a language with which to
demand attention to i-h*= r^nLO tne aPe as a crime. However, as I have
pointed out, these changes do not necessarily shift the
assumptions about gendered identity that organize the terms
on which men continue to commit sexual violence. 77 The
research assumes a binary model of gender identity without
taking into account differences in cultural and historical
contexts
.
I would argue that feminists need to look more
carefully at the particulars of gender identity in the
context of race, class and sexual differences and make
connections through those considerations to the phenomenon
of sexual violence. Otherwise, as the social scripts of
gender relations are rewritten in efforts against sexual
violence, the actual women who are raped and battered will
continue to be excluded as interpretive subjects of their
own experience.
Elaine Scarry's argument about the relationship between
physical violence and social power suggests that we
conceptualize the practice of sexual violence as signifying
the limits rather than the source of male power. Can we
then take this shift in emphasis to suggest strategies that
demobilize rather than respond to the social forces that
engender sexual violence? Asserting the * reality* of
suffering does not make the representations of it any less
problematic in a social world organized through abstract
systems of identity and exchange. m fact, as I argued
above, it risks collusion with masculinist power.
Shifting our focus away from the totalizing logic of
patriarchy means paying attention to women's varied means of
resisting, negotiating and finding pleasure in sexual
politics as well as to her victimization. Women are never
only passive objects of sexualized violence. How might we
begin to break down the forms of gender identity which
create the terms on which sexual violence does its damage?
How might we avoid the therapeutic inscription of women as
less than rational actors, or the legal inscription of women
as victims, in fighting sexual violence? It is necessary,
although not sufficient, to ' include' women in the courtroom
battles and the social service systems as authoritative
sources of the truth about their experiences. We have to
take a step away from our focus on remedying the effects of
violence and look at strategies of prevention. *
It is important to note here that the discussion
that follows is specifically about rape, not about intimate
violence or about sexual harrassment in the workplace. Some
of the insights about the discursive constructions of
women's bodies may be helpful to developing a similar
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Scarry's argument about the relationship between pain
and power suggests the risks feminism takes in identifying
women's pain with male power. How might we take advantage
of the insight that sexual violence simultaneously enf
and indicates the limits of male dominance? I argue thi
suggests a feminist strategy that incJudes the creation of
counter-hegemonic modes of representation for the experience
of sexual violence. The relationship between gendered
identity (masculinity and femininity) and sexual violence
changes. Even if we do not reveal a truth about gender
identity through the critique of sexual violence we do
participate in shifting the socially constructed terms of
gender identity that inform how sexual violence does its
damage. I have criticized the tendency of feminist
strategies to focus on understanding and articulating the
pain of sexual violence. I borrowed some ideas from Elaine
Scarry to suggest why that approach has not stopped men from
raping and beating women. I have not addressed specifically
those feminists who strategize to prevent sexual violence.
I am not going to review the extensive feminist literature
on separatist strategies or the 'pro-woman' theories which
argue an essential difference between women and men vis-a-
vis violence. Instead, I will discuss this question from a
post-structuralist perspective because I think it
discussion about those kinds of violence. But, as I will
discuss, the strategic implications for action do not apply
in the same way.
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contributes to a non-identitarian approach which I suggested
Scarry's warnings about reinvesting women's pain in male
power imply.
Posu-structuralist feminist theory contends that gender
dominance is enacted through language and discursive
strategies. As a response, it seeks to identify the
political efficacy of challenging the discursively
constitutive habits of gendered life. « How might this
approach contribute to strategic opposition to the systemic
logic and particular realities of sexual violence? Does it
further the project of demobilizing male dominance? In an
essay about how feminism might rethink the politics of rape
prevention, Sharon Marcus argues from a post
-structuralist
perspective that the experience of rape should be understood
as culturally scripted or encoded. She argues that the
^success' of rape is dependent upon a sequence of events,
not on the biological or historically determined powers of
men to possess women at their will.
Marcus appropriates insights from post-structuralist
theory to argue that the linguistic habits through which
masculine and feminine identities are enacted create the
terrain on which sexual violence takes place. From this
perspective, she goes on to argue that rape as an engendered
practice might be understood as a culturally scripted
interaction, rather than an inevitable reality. Her
approach treats sexual violence as a variable practice of
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dominance rather than as an immutable reality of gendered
identity. she argues that feminist strategies focus too
much on the experience of a rape that has already happened
and its effects on women's lives and too little on how to
strategically demobilize masculinist cultural processes that
enable rape.
Feminist theorists have named the experience of rape as
the 'reality' which disproves post-structuralist arguments
about the discursive production of subjects and experience.
Marcus argues that this insistence reflects a general
tendency to name rape as an irreducible reality in-itself.
She argues that this guarantees that the rape will always
have already happened before the social world is held to
account
.
To treat rape simply as one of [quoting Mary
Hawkesworth]
... 'the realities that circumscribe
women's lives' can mean to consider rape as
terrifyingly unameable and unrepresentable, a reality
that lies beyond our grasp and which we can only
experience as grasping and encircling us. In its
efforts to convey the horror and iniquity of rape, such
a view often concurs with masculinist culture in its
designation of rape as a fate worse than or tantamount
to, death; the apocalyptic tone which it adopts implies
that rape can only be feared or legally repaired, not
fought. (Marcus, 1993:387)
Marcus goes on to discuss feminist anti-rape literature that
advises caution in avoiding sites where rape might happen
and against resistance in the event that it does happen. 80
If women took the advice of most rape-prevention manuals to
heart, they would live lives of utter caution and
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defensiveness in the interest of protecting their bodies
from violation.
I think the most profound insight in Marcus' discussion
is how easily talk of the 'reality* of rape slides into an
assumption of the inevitability of rape. Feminist
insistence on the 'reality of rape as a foundation for
political action serves only to reify the inevitability of
the physical act by eliding its socially constructed nature
(i.e, Marcus' "script"). Marcus tells us that men's bodies
become weapons and tools of violence and women's bodies
become objects of violence; there is nothing intrinsic or
ahistorical or natural about the differential in male/female
recourse to or capacity for violence. She advises women to
understand themselves as subjects of violence, not just in
practicing reactive self-defense techniques, but through
aggressively intervening in any cultural and linguistic
inscription of their bodies as always already rapable. She
also argues against collapsing all offensive sex talk,
including harrassment, into the category of 'rape. ' This
implies that there is no space for intervention in male
defined sexual politics; feminist strategies are thus left
to focus on proving the violence of the event after the
fact. (Marcus, 1993:389)
Marcus argues that thinking of rape as a cultural
production expands the opportunities for intervention before
and during the act which can actually prevent rape rather
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than assuming the rape to already have happened upon the
entrance of a rapist. Disrupting rapists' assumptions of
their own omnipotence and their victims' passivity is a key,
argues Marcus, to preventing rape. Her argument is
supported by the empirical work of Pauline Bart and Patricia
O'Brien who studied rape prevention strategies and conclude
that women who fight back immediately and use the widest
range of strategies, defensive and offensive, are most
likely to avoid rape. (Bart and O'Brien, 1985:33-57)
Marcus' discussion argues for the denaturing of the
sexual aspect of sexual violence so that it might be >read'
as a script and thereby interrupted. MacKinnon's
construction of female sexuality as a thing of male desire
inhibits this kind of interruption because, in her
understanding, sexuality is violence. In other words, for a
woman, the * success' of rape in its outcome as sexual
satisfaction for the man is as inevitable as the punch in
the nose during a male bar brawl. The vulnerability of the
sexual does not enter into MacKinnon's theoretical
framework. However, the research by Bart and O'Bien shows
how women who respond in aggressive ways not traditionally
associated with feminine behavior are more likely to avoid
rape. This implies rapists have particular expectations
which can be interrupted as feminism successfully exposes
them. Women who subvert what Marcus calls "the gendered
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grammars of violence" (Marcus i qq-iui , 1993:393) are more likely to
escape or fend off aggression.
Relevant to the question about the sexual in sexual
violence is the debate that has gone on within feminism
about the relationship between sex and violence in rape. in
the 1970' s
,
in order to emphasize the criminality of rape,
feminists argued that rape is an act of violence, not of
sex. This was in response to sexist assumptions about how
rape is really just rough sex, or that women >enjoy' being
forced and say >no' to communicate <yes.' Feminists argued
that what may feel sexual to men is in reality an act of
violence against women. in 1977 Michel Foucault added a
twist to arguments about the criminal violence of rape,
suggesting that rape should be decriminalized and, thereby,
juridically "desexualized" so that civil penalties could be
levied commensurate with other acts of civil harm.
Foucault' s motivating concern was that the surveillance of
sex and the investments of the state in regulating sex are
encouraged through the criminalization of rape as a sexual
crime. 81 Feminists responded that his strategy ignored the
fundamentally gendered quality of rape and that they were
not interested in protecting sexuality, ie. male-defined
sexuality, from the regulating mechanisms of the state.
They argued rape is a fundamentally different kind of crime,
one that places women or any femininized subject in the
subordinate position, unlike being punched in the
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nose. (Plaza, 1978) Their discussion shifted the terms of
debate once again to argue that rape is violence against
women even as it is sexual for men. Desexualizing rape
would leave its utility for enforcing gender dominance in
place; women may receive financial conpensation for their
injuries, but society would not recognize the specificity
and difference of the crime of rape as an act that enforces
masculinist dominance.
I agree that rape is different because it functions to
differentiate masculinity from the feminine; but another
reason to recognize rape as sexual is that it renders it all
the more fragile. 82 Sexuality has a complex, and, even if
deeply embedded, nonetheless permeable script attached which
is quite different than the scripts of generalized violences
people commit outside of the terms of gender and sex. Male
sexuality is not monolithic or self-assured. The drive to
rape ought to be shown to be a signifier of the
contradictions immanent in masculinist conceptions of
sexuality and not only significant in demonstrating their
dominance over women as gendered beings.
In a survey conducted by MS Magazine in the 1980' s, men
and women were asked what they feared the most from the
opposite sex. Women responded that what they feared most
was being killed. Men responded that what they feared most
was being laughed at. If we can get beyond our horror at
what this tells us about the different fears men and women
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live with, we can take advantage of the insight it offers
into gender relations. Emphasizing the fragility of the
male erection in the context of sexual violence may or may
not lead to an escalation of violence. « But if women are
thinking about the collapse of the penis as a possibility
rather than assuming the inevitability of penetration, the
possibilities for subverting the rapist's script internal tc
the event itself are multiplied.
Thus, the strategic implications of Marcus' criticism
of feminist insistence on the < reality' of rape as it
proscribes women's live are important to consider. However,
there are limits to her argument. She assumes sexual
violence is like a confrontation between autonomous subjects
rather than an event more often embedded in a relationship.
It is common knowledge now that the vast majority of rapes
are committed by men the victims know or are acquainted with
and that women who are battered are not only forced to have
sex but are subjected to a very complex environment of
intimidation, threat and physical violence. (Brown, 1984;
Walker, 1984) Even Bart and O'Brien note that women have a
difficult time differentiating between ' consensual' sex and
aggression during the relationship-
-which is not the same as
saying that women do not know if they have been raped. The
point is that given the complexities of sexual politics,
sexual violence is not only confrontational but relational.
Generalizing about sexual violence through the image of
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stranger rape again reduces the complexity of the phenomenon
and the difficulties in representing it to the social world.
Feminists have shown the tension immanent to the
relationship between the experiences of sexual violence and
the conflicting representations of it which then produce
hegemonic narratives that conceptually organize our
experiences. The question of how sexual violence is to be
re-presented in the political process of educating the
social world (including women) as to its prevalence and to
its terms of existence is not resolved by breaking it into
its component parts as a linguistic event.
In addition, we experience our bodies through social
relationships in ways unavailable to discourse. The sum of
linguistic strategies will not add up to the truth about
those experiences, though we can shift perceptions and
common interpretations of them over time. Marcus' argument
to deconstruct the rape script implies a prior analysis of
the whole in which that script is embedded. 84
Theorizing sexual violence with an eye towards the non-
representability of sexual pain shifts our focus to the
naturalized social truths embedded in the event itself.
Radical feminists have argued that sexual violence is
systemic and political. They then take another step of
arguing that it represents the totality of male power. As I
have said, this is to counter liberal perspectives that say
it is an aberration from the norm and place the burden of
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proof on the victim to show that she did not >want it.' But
we don't have to reverse the terms of dominant
understandings (sexual violence is not a sign of an aberrant
sexuality but a totalizing condition of sexuality) in order
to argue the prevalence of sexual violence.
Representing sexuality requires a certain level of
objectification, which is not necessarily anathema to
feminist theorizing about sex. Sexuality may thus become a
terrain for renewed discussion in feminism about self-other
relationships that do not rely on a presumed identity
between or among women as suffering, gendered or sexed
subjects. We can build alternative modes of representation
for understanding sexual violences in their specificity
without assuming dualist models for gender identity. We can
create counter-hegemonic modes of representation which will
not be static and enclose women in the identity of potential
victim.
Essentializing sex as the 'being' of woman colludes
with identity discourses that obscure differences among
women vis-a-vis sexuality and the history of sexual
politics. Arguing sexuality to be the * essence' of women's
identity and the violation of it to be the 'worst' thing
that can happen conspires with narratives that place women
in the role of passive victim. Rather than participating
in normalizing the idea of sexual violence by arguing it is
a potential experience for all women- -a theory that implies
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that women must construct their lives and feminist theory
around that potential, we should struggle to make sexual
violence appear to be as strange as possible in the moment
and in general. « By this I do not mean to participate in
the liberal assumption that formal' men do not rape or that
intimate violences- are an aberration in an otherwise
peaceful private sphere. 'Normal' men do rape. Intimate
violence is normal. Public speak-outs and support for
victims are crucial to building a society where sexual
violence does not successfully stigmatize victims. However,
building upon the thesis of the non-representability of
pain, we can render sexual violence strange through being
less systemic in our theorizing and taking the exposures of
each incident as an event in itself. The dearth of public
stories about women who successfully resist sexual violence
shows how our attention, while needing to remain focussed in
part on healing and justice for survivors, must be diffused
to take victories into account. They can tell us as much
about the logic of sexual violence as stories of
victimization. They offer the material to build alternative
modes of representation for understanding women and men in
relationship to the potential for violence. This may help
women, who carry all their particularity and differences
with them, take down the fragile edifices of male power
through the exposure of sexual violence as a practice rather
than working politically only in spite of or with the
purpose of overcoming the effects of sexual violences that
have always already happened.
CONCLUSION
The historicity of the identities of >women' challenge
feminism to take its own performative and experientially
driven constructions of >women' and 'gendered experience'
seriously as such rather than assuming these categories to
be lying in wait of discovery. Feminism does not bear
immediate witness to a truth beyond the terms of available
conceptual forms as MacKinnon argues. Experience is always
being interpreted as it is represented to the world. Those
interpretations carry crucial historical differences within
them. The effort to politicize sexual violence should not
displace the differences among women about sex and
sexuality. The appearance/reality dichotomy understood by
radical feminists to organize women's experiences of sexual
suffering inhibits and limits strategic interventions.
Interpretation exposes unintentional truths in the
details of everyday life in organized society. Feminism
offers a way of politicizing interpretations of the world
without forgetting the vagaries of experience. The socially
constructed quality of truths about experiences previously
taken for granted as part of x the nature of things' are
exposed. The v realities' of experience are not the
background to a foreground of ideological untruths, but
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something to be interpreted as potentially telling truths
about the social world.
The project of disarticulating patriarchal power does
not require feminism to express a univocal truth about
women's experiences of suffering. Experience is a sentient
relationship to the object world which becomes intelligible
as we engage in a process of political contestation and
interpretation. Through interpreting and interrupting the
phenomenon of sexual violence feminism intervenes in
distinct and critical ways with dominant discourses and
assumptions about gender and sexuality that unjustly shore
up male power; it does not ^discover' a previously hidden or
underlying truth about the totality of women's lives within
an undifferentiated patriarchy.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
in a recent essay called "Experience" (1992) Joan Scott
makes an argument about the question I raise in this
dissertation about the relationship between experience and
identity politics. Her discussion criticizes the deployment
of experience' as an authorizing moment of feminist and
other critical histories. she argues that experience slides
into static identity forms when it becomes a moment in
historical inquiry assumed to be transparent to interested
knowers. Scott looks at how "experience" is invoked in
historical inquiry to authorize discussions of previously
invisible histories such as those of gay men, lesbian women
and women of color. Scott argues that the invocation of
experience as a source of authority discourages and even
obscures inquiry into the political and social conditions
that render those particular historical experiences
invisible in the first place. I agree with her argument
against invoking experience as an authorizing strategy. it
renders it static, as if it is something one can have in the
sense of exclusive ownership. However, as I think I have
shown, the politics of experience are not exhausted by
rejecting its authorizing force in favor of explanations of
its historicity. Scott's essay defers commitment to the
politics of experience. She is essentially arguing for a
better explanation of historical silences and exclusions.
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She does not tell us how this is a transformative project
for social relations of domination, only that it can expose
the terms of those relations more effectively.
Through exploring the contributions of Theodor Adorno
to philosophizing identity and experience, this dissertation
takes up the politics of experience as a non- identical
dialectical moment that sustains a politics potentially
transformative of presently dominative and oppositional
self -other relations.
This work engages the debates about identity and
experience in contemporary feminism. It considers the
arguments about identity that have taken shape within
various discursive\theoretical frameworks of feminism.
Responses to the "problem" of identity within feminism have
proliferated in the last ten years. But I look at areas of
feminist theory I think most clearly profile the dilemmas of
identity itself as a social and historical effect in
modernity: materialist and post-structuralist feminisms. I
came to this project with my critical perspective on
identity politics informed by Theodor Adorno' s philosophy.
Reflecting on issues raised by feminism and Adorno'
s
critique of identity leads me to argue for a politics of
experience that is non-identitarian but driven by an
imperative to understand and change the material effects of
dominative self -other relations in the object world.
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Feminist identity thinking is not only present in
theory that would posit an immutable essence of womanness
(the sexual, maternal or sisterly self) as prior to all
social inscription. Materialist feminist epistemologies
concern themselves with the historicity of women's identity
and the potential therein for collective politics. I
examine feminist epistemologies which take a different path
from feminists who make ontological arguments about identity
and politics. Developments in feminist standpoint theory
have elaborated a complex lineage between Marxist
epistemology and feminism. Standpoint feminism develops a
materialist epistemology that will offer legitimacy to
women's particular situatedness as a site of struggle.
Standpoint feminists can be understood to be responding to
the falsely universalizing claims that plague some Radical
feminist versions of what it means to be woman in the world.
As I explain in my final chapter, Radical feminists assume
an unencumbered sisterhood present beyond the differences
apparent within patriarchal structures. Standpoint
feminists also try to get at the process of politicizing
experience in such a way that feminism becomes possible in
spite of perceived differences. But they do it through
examining the social and historical relationship between
being and knowledge. They pay attention to questions of
epistemic privilege and material privilege vis-a-vis the
production of knowledge, thereby avoiding the leveling
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discourses of some Radical feminisms. At their best,
standpoint feminists work within the tension between the
particular and the universal in trying to weave a moment of
solidarity out of the material differences in women's lives.
I've explored some of the questions raised by these
attempts to found feminist interpretation and political
solidarity in women's material conditions of life.
Standpoint feminisms consider how feminist identity emerges
out of the material conditions of being gendered "women" in
the world and explore the political potential in assuming
the necessary partiality of "objective" knowledge. They
argue this partiality is what makes women's knowledges
critical. Standpoint theory is an effort to legitimate the
distinct forms of knowledge available if one attends to the
lived experiences of women as specifically gendered
subj ects
.
Standpoint feminism thus approaches the kind of non-
identitarian materialist knowledge I want to develop; it
attends to and politicizes experiential knowledge as a
founding moment for the critique of systems of dominance.
Standpoint theory thus contains important potential to
collectivize women as an identity without imputing an
essence to "woman, " as less historically oriented feminisms
tend to do. However, as I have pointed out, each standpoint
theorist eventually relies on an ahistorical quality of
women's experience in order to found and/or legitimate
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feminism as a distinct form of knowledge production.
Standpoint feminists assume an identity between the subject
of feminism and the object-world of women's lives; they
depoliticize experience in an attempt to legitimate feminist
identity as possible in spite of differences among women.
While I acknowledge the political insights into the
relationship between material being and objective knowledge,
I critique the moments of identity thinking in standpoint
feminism.
Feminist epistemological attempts to reconcile the
contradictions between being and knowledge into a unified,
feminist subject of modernity ultimately rely on static
notions of experience and social identity. Their attention
to experience slides into a reliance on identitarian forms.
I discuss how the efforts of standpoint theorists to
identify the subject of history for feminism do not
adequately address the challenges differences among women
pose for feminism as a transformative project. The politics
of difference are more relevant to the future of feminism
than the location of a singular feminist perspective.
Standpoint theorists argue for establishing a stable
political identity for feminism. (see especially, Hartsock,
1988) I argue the critical potential of experiential
knowledge is obscured within this organizing logic of
feminist epistemology . The politics of representing,
identifying or conceptualizing otherness interrupts projects
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that construct the feminist subject out of the material
condition of women's lives. Because standpoint theorists
depend upon a particular meaning of gender identity as the
constitutive common denominator among women they rely on the
modern notion that the conditions of different women's lives
in the world are ultimately the material politics works on
rather than that which provokes politics. In effect, the
closer feminist methods come to identifying the terms of
gendered life, the more differences emerge to defeat the
solidarity presumed to be the desired goal of feminism.
Thus, as I point out above, even "experience" has become a
contested political concept in feminism rather than the
foundational material upon which feminism as a movement
works. (see Grant, 1993; Scott, 1992) I critique the
identity politics of standpoint theory because it asserts a
correspondence between the positions subjects assume or are
historically placed within and the kinds of political
knowledge they will develop as feminists.
The politics of representation and the power\knowledge
relationship are central to the creation of a collective
identity among women. Feminism works through the
particularity of the self in relation to the organized
generality of the collective. This process is critical to
successful intervention in systems of abstract exchange
which govern modernity. Standpoint feminism does not
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adequately recognize the risks of collectivity in modernity
but strives to affirm the possibilities of collectivity.
In the next chapter, I have turned to Theodor Adorno as
a philosopher who is unrelentingly suspicious of
collectivizing forms, political and philosophical, in
modernity. While some have argued his suspicions are
historically appropriate only to the era of Facism, I think
his concerns should inform our critiques of contemporary
politics of collective movements. Adorno' s theory of non-
identity takes us toward political self-other relationships
in modernity that challenge the identitarian forms that
obscure or deny difference. For Adorno, persistent
attention to non-identity in philosophical and political
inquiry offers critical and liberatory potential.
Adorno argues that the continual search for closure,
for a politics based in the construction of collective
identity or the subj ect \obj ect of history, (the "German
nation" for Hegel, the proletariat for Marx, and the "new
social movements" for post -Marxist theory) enforces
conditions of abstract unity under concrete condition of
dominance. Adorno moves away from that search in both his
philosophy and his interpretative work about social
phenomenon
.
Adorno argues the disappearing subject to be both an
effect and a necessary condition of abstract relations of
exchange in modernity. He develops his argument for the
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critical politics of non-identity in Negative DialPrM^
For Adorno, no subject of knowledge "escapes" the
ideological forms which constitute the social whole. The
politics of identity through which subjective life is
articulated reflects the contradictions of the system of
exchange enforced by capitalist social relations.
Adorno warns us against asserting an identity between
subjective knowledge and the object world. He does not give
up on philosophical inquiry into the subj ect\obj ect relation
as inspired by the Marxian tradition of materialist
knowledge. But he sustains a commitment to theorizing the
mediated quality of inter-subjective life and the
possibility that truths may be found in the particulars of
the object world while the whole remains false to its own
immanent promises of freedom.
The rest of this work takes up the question of whether
political movement becomes paralyzed as the non-identical
self is silenced or stilled by the awareness of the
incoherence of its own history and agency. Are the
possibilities for active intervention in relations of
dominance shut down or multiplied through the critique of
materialist foundationalism in feminism?
Adorno contributes to understanding the contradictory
quality of feminist commitments to gender as a form of
identity. But I turn to Judith Butler's work in order to
elaborate more fully how representations of gender work to
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condition the terms on which we can "be" as gendered
subjects in the world. Post-modern feminists reject even
limited gestures toward materialism as a grounds for
politics. in particular I consider the implications of
Butler's theory of "performativity " and her implicit
displacement of experience from interpretation and politics.
She critiques commitment to ontology in feminist theorizing
as constraints on political action. Her theory of
performativity detaches her vision of feminism from "women"
as subjects prefigured for politics by material conditions
of life. Relying on Lacan, she argues that gender identity
is a habit performed within the naturalized constraints of a
historical but intrinsically punitive process of exclusion.
Butler reminds us that even materialist approaches like
that adopted by standpoint theorists can reify the "reality"
of gender if they do not call into question the founding
moments of their own inquiry. In standpoint theory, one of
those founding moments is the material relations of sex and
reproduction. For Butler, however, the sexed body is
political through and through. If theory reproduces as the
grounds for its possibility the reality it professes to
challenge, for example, the condition or existence of
material (and maternal) bodies, it will obscure
possibilities for subversion immanent to the terms of the
historical emergence of that reality.
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Feminist post
-structuralism organizes politics around
the terms of representation. Identities emerge through
practices of exclusion and abjection. Those exclusions are
never finally accomplished but remain in process. For
Butler, subverting the multiple processes of gendering
subjects means deferring commitment to the priorly gendered
subject as a condition of feminist politics. If gender is
habituated, feminism must learn to work on the "groundless
grounds" of representations that are political all the way
down. "For the subject to be a pregiven point of departure
for politics is to defer the question of the political
construction and regulation of the subject itself; for it
is important to remember that subjects are constituted
through exclusion, that is, through the creation of a domain
of deauthorized subjects, presubjects, figures of abjection,
populations erased from view." (Butler, 1993:13)
The political differences between Adorno's and Butler's
critique of the modern subject and identity can be
summarized as follows. They both critique identity as it
enforces particular exclusions, but Adorno theorizes
identity as an historical effect and material condition of
cognition. In his work, this does not imply the dialectical
"overcoming" of identity into a synthesis of freedom.
Rather, he argues forms of identity thinking to be
historically specific to the condition of abstract exchange
relations andd commodity culture in capitalism. Butler's
critique of identity tends to be ahistorical because she
never quite explains what is at stake in the material
conditions that sustain the exclusionary habits of identity.
Her claim for the normative value of detaching politics from
identity does not take the quality of historical experience
into account. I argue this material quality of experience
makes political argument intelligible. Women of color do
not critique the exclusions of feminist theory as
constructed by white women because of an abstract claim
about the injustice of exclusion. They critique the
exclusions practiced by white feminists because they
prohibit or defer attention to what women of color do and
how they interpret their conditions of life as significant
for a transformative politics. The material suffering
caused by exclusions demands the reconfiguring of self -other
relations in their immanent and historical sociality. In
Adorno's theory, we are necessarily social. Our
"performances" fulfill historical conditions of necessity
which are riven with inequality and dominance, yet
ideologically proclaimed to be acted out in freedom. Adorno
reminds us of the somatic moment that will drive critical
inquiry into these performances. Butler worries that any
reference to the subject or to the "reality" of women's
lives will reinscribe the terrain on which dominance does
its work. My reading of Adorno argues that it is through
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the object world, the world of experience, that we expose
the suffering caused by dominance.
In the final chapter I look at sexuality as part of the
world of experience feminists have exposed as a site of
suffering but also of possibility.
Feminists have referred to the sexualized violences
committed against women's bodies as one of the "realities"
of gender that post-structuralist theory ignores. My
engagement here with the politics of sexual violence was
motivated by the challenge of thinking about the suffering
caused by sexual violence as a discursively constructed
experience. We may argue that sexual violence is a result
of discursive constructions of sexuality, of women or of
masculinity. But how do we politicize the phenomenon as a
practice in itself without reducing it to the terms of a
socially constructed narrative? How might we problematize
the way feminism has developed the political terrain around
the event of sexual violence without denying its urgency as
a constitutive limit on how women can be in the world?
Sexual violence is an experience of subjects engendered
as feminine, or as women, obscured through the ideological
commitment to keep sexuality in the realm of the private and
of the individual. Taking a critique of identity thinking
into account while attending to the interpretation of
material experience, I suggest a shift in our focus to the
process of politicizing sexual violence. Feminist
238
interpretation should not rely on women identifying as
potential victims in order to assert that there is a
political problem. I argue we should pay more attention to
what sexual violence as a practice does in the world.
Theorizing it as a result of gendered dominance collapses it
into one limited framework for understanding its effects.
Instead, we should interpret sexual violence as an event
that potentially expresses truths about multiple systems of
dominance in the world. The reality and the potential of
being a victim of sexual violence telescopes women's
possibilities for being the world. But the political
strategies we develop for combatting it do not have to
reflect that narrow space.
Multiple strategies for resisting apparently
intractable phenomenon can emerge through interpreting the
many-sidedness of experience. Feminist commitments to
interpreting experience encourage expanded possibilities of
oppositional practices. I try to show the limits of
feminist theoretical frameworks without using them as a foil
against which to create yet another framework. Feminism has
emerged as a political discourse through differences among
women, not in spite of differences among women. Present
debates about identity and difference in modernity are well-
served by focussing attention on feminist history and theory
as a place where the questions are about the survival of a
historically necessary movement rather than abstracted,
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disembodied considerations of democratic practices or the
politics of representation.
My discussions about identity and experience culminate
in a chapter about sexual violence because-
-in spite of the
currency of popular suspicions about feminisms that deploy
sexual violence as a signifier of women's ultimate victim
status-
-I continue to think it is a defining issue for
feminist struggle. In discussing the embodied experience of
sexual violence as a political practice, I argue that as we
critique identity discourses in feminist theory, we do not
necessarily give up political argument and strategizing over
improving the actual, material conditions of women's lives.
My final chapter looks at how the questions raised
earlier about the politics of identity are related to the
social or collective capacity to bear witness and to offer
meaning to suffering. Adorno's specific historical concern
was with how the Holocaust gathers meanings which bear false
witness to that which cannot be rationalized or finally
explained on the terms modern cognition offers. My
discussion of how sexual violence is politicized reflects
this concern. The focus on whether feminism defeats its
transformative potential through its emphasis on women's
suffering, or as Wendy Brown has put it, their "wounded
identities," draws attention to the implications of imputing
historical meaning to experiential suffering as the
inaugural moment for political action.
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I draw on a number of resources to consider the
contentious debates about sexuality and sexual violence in
feminism. My discussion is partially driven by a concern
with how the political/discursive terrain on which the
struggle against sexual violence takes place precludes
consideration of race as a structuring principle of the
phenomena of sexual violence and of the possibilities for
collective movement among women. Many feminists have
pointed out how racism constructs a wholly different set of
images and demands women of color (for example) are expected
to live up to within the mainstream of sexual culture in the
United States. In addition, an anti-racist feminism must
take into consideration the differential treatment of
victims and perpetrators in cases of inter-racial rape. All
rape is not the same in the eyes of the law nor in the eyes
of a racist social order. (Estrich, 1987; Hall, 1983; Davis,
1974) It therefore must not be treated as essentially the
same by feminists in the struggle to stop it. Through the
dialectic of experience and the representation of that
experience within the various institutions women go to for
justice and protection, racism structures and restructures
the image of the proper victim. In combatting this it is
not enough to say that the reality of rape is the same once
racist constructions are exposed, but to develop a
constellation of fields of recognition for women's different
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experiences and histories that will render them intelligible
to the public world in their particularity.
In light of these concerns, my final chapter explores
the possibility that feminism may participate in
constructing spectacles for consumption rather than
deconstructive narratives of resistance through the struggle
against sexual violence. it suggests how feminism may be
complicit in rendering women's particular suffering
available for consumption in a world organized through
abstract systems of exchange which level experience into
manageable categories for mass consumption. Without
pretending to find an answer to the problems embedded in
representing suffering or rejecting out of hand the
priorities of the movement, I draw upon the philosophical
work of Adorno and Elaine Scarry to consider how they might
intervene in arguments about the effects of imbuing
otherwise privatized suffering with political or historical
meaning as a justice-seeking strategy.
I've concluded through this work that feminism should
not understand the project of representing the experience of
sexual violence as expressing a settled reality but as a
means to disrupt and transform the social terrain on which
sexual violence thrives and does its damage. The political
terrain on which feminism works never holds still. A non-
identitarian approach encourages practices that demobilize
sculinist power through exposing its fictions rather thanma
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insisting that we can overturn the » reality.' It moves
feminist struggles against sexual violence forward through
differences among women. it responds to the articulation of
concrete experiences without constraining feminism to the
grounds of prior assumptions about the sexual identity of
women as vulnerable.
Antagonism and conflict is inherent in feminism. it is
necessarily a part of feminist struggle because of the
feminist respect for the particular, for experience and the
sentient qualities of everyday life. Conflicts over the
definition of the personal and of the political, and over
how the relationship between them works have driven feminist
politics as have conflicts over whose voices and experiences
count in feminist interpretations of the political world.
In the course of this struggle, however, the critical
politics of experience are too often subdued by the politics
of identity in a search for affirmative or 'positive'
collective knowledge and action. My dissertation argues
that a non-identitarian feminism will reside in the tension
created by the pressure to rationalize commitments to one
another in the name of conceptual order and the imperative
to listen to women's voices and interpretations of their
experiences with an attitude of radical receptivity to what
may be at the margins or even outside of the given terms of
the rational. Because he reconfigures the dialectic to take
account of this tension, Adorno contributes to this project.
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ENDNOTES
atharine MacKinnon argues that "difference" and even
"differences" among women are the "velvet glove" on the ironfist of patriarchy. This does not recognize differentexperiences as significant moments for politics, but reducesthem to representative symptoms.
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CkJ^ 987) criti^es feminist theoretical
wJ f w«? Michel Foucault on the grounds that he is ahite, Western male who exercises the privilege ofdisclaiming identity and subjectivity. She finds it
suspicious that just as women and people of color and post-colonial subjects are finding their voices, post-
structuralist theory begins to argue that the subject isirrelevant and indeed a ruse of history. in a similar vein,Seyla Benhabib (1991) argues "Given how fragile and tenuous
women s selfhood is in many cases, how much of a hit and
miss affair their struggles for autonomy are, this reduction
of female agency to a 'doing without the doer' [reference isto Judith Butler's critique of the female subject] at best
appears to me to be making a virtue out of necessity "(Benhabib, 1991:142) In other words, women are not yet
ready to give up on subjectivity and notions of self. Theimplication is that formerly subjugated subjects, the
invisible others to dominant forces, must move through the
power of subjecthood to achieve whatever emancipated state
lies in the future. This of course begs the question of the
politics of the subject which I will address specifically in
my chapter on Theodor Adorno.
3. Foucault 's work contradicts this claim. He argues that
power relations produce what is accepted as knowledge; that
we are never transparent to ourselves as autonomous subjects
who know the world through reason. (see esp. Foucault,
1984)
4. Kirstie McClure (1992) critiques Sandra Harding from a
somewhat different position than I do. She argues that
Harding, in her efforts to delineate how the 'science
question' works within feminist thinking, effectively shuts
down much of what makes feminism such a vital political
discourse for late modernity. The overriding concern with
causality and a properly scientific form for feminism, ie.
objectivity and explanatory breadth, scientizes politics
rather than politicizing science through feminist critique.
McClure follows in the tradition of Laclau and Mouffe (1986)
in arguing for a feminism that encourages the proliferation
of politicized sites of contest rather than trying to
organize feminism into a 'proper' theory of causality vis-a-
vis women's oppression.
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6. This term reappears in Adorno's work in several
contexts. it refers to the world governed
epistemologically, economically and politically by svstemsor exchange. it is similar to Weber's metaphor of the 'ironcage in that it does not imply a closed system, but onewhich appears' out of reach of the individual as agent.
7. Angela Harris (1990) argues that on the one hand, there
exists within feminism the tyranny of particularity or self-
referentiality which, because all experience must be equally
valued, makes everything eventually the same. This is akin
to an extreme and simplistic form of relativism. On the
other hand, there exists the tyranny of abstraction or the
universalizing 'we' which removes the power to identify from
the individual. Neither pole furthers a critique of
identity as a necessarily relational political concept.
Abstraction posits an identity beyond the reach of
particular individuals, and has been shown to be contingent
upon the power to silence while particularity posits a fully
self
-referential identity. Both result in privileging
sameness, or equivalence, over difference as the key to
political understanding and movement. If everything is
self -referential or contingent upon the subjectivity of the
knower, then everything eventually is the same. If
everything fits under the abstract concept then those who
would otherwise declare difference are necessarily silenced.
8. "Positivity" is in quotes because for Adorno, the
potential for an affirmative moment only rests in the
negativity necessary for any moment of reflection on
cognition or knowledge production.
9. As I will discuss Adorno did believe a certain distance
from lived experience, a kind of alienation from the given
world around the subject, was necessary for critical
knowledge
.
10. see Robert Hullot-Kentnor (1989); Andrew Hewitt (1992);
Peter Uwe Hohendahl (1993)
.
245
11. Mimesis signifies a relation to the object prior to rh P
suSie?t°
r
In
n
Di^
U%liZat j°n ° f that °b ^ ect ^ * ^„g°bj c m ial ectic of EnUghtenment the concept of
nature"
3 ,^"^^^^^1 relationship o^ ma^to
"
hlp^
-LS mythical in that there . s not
orior
S ratlonal individual as one who names; it isp to the emergence of knowledge through naming it is arelationship of non-identity.
12. see Jay (1993) for a discussion of Habermas' rhetoricalstrategies
.
13. Susan Buck-Morss discusses the methodologicalimportance of the concept of ^natural history' (1977-52-62)However, she does not discuss the concrete relevance 'of the'domination of nature to Adorno and Horkheimer's argument
about identity. Patricia J. Mills argues that the attemptto resuscitate nature as an independent moment in thedialectic of history is central to the critique of Marxiantheories that celebrate ^productive man' as engaged in aliberatory project (1989:86-88). The domination of internal
and external nature by the repressive forces of modernity
remained central to Adorno' s philosophy beyond The Dialectic
of Enlightenment. However, taking the two above mentioned
dicussions into account, we can see that reason and desire,
identity and nature always remain in a relationship, the
former is never finally successful in eliminating the
latter
.
14. As Patricia J. Mills has argued in a critique of Isaac
Balbus and Ynestra King, nature is not benign in Adorno'
s
work (1991)
.
Rather, it is also known as what is repressed,
dangerous, other.
15. As I will discuss later, Lysaker and Sullivan, in an
article about Adorno' s attention to critical practices,
argue that he remained committed to figuring out the
implications of the inherent tension between the subject and
object of knowledge rather than succombing to the collapse
into identity or the reified separation.
16. In addition to the connection between the exchange
principle and justice, we learn from Nietzsche that the
right to determine these equivalencies is contingent upon
relations of power. Adorno does not theorize power. To
supplement his critique of identity with a theory of power
we can turn to Foucault
.
17. Participants in the Critical Legal Studies movement,
the Critical Race Theory movement and Feminist legal
theorists have been arguing for years that the law, as
constituted in liberal doctrine, cannot take differences in
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cal forms and with different, usuallytragic historical consequences. I disagree with thepragmatic response that women 'do what they need to do tosurvive and thrive,' including ignoring difference in favorof expediency. I also disagree, as I will discuss later,with the alternative response, ie. that identity thinkingamong women is somehow different than for men orparticipants in patriarchy because of women's relativelypowerless position.
19. in an extrememly lucid account of the exposure of theimperialist, bourgeois self that Adorno and Horkheimer
engage in throughout their exegesis of the Odyssey
, MichaelClark points out how the double movement of creating the
enemy other and the conquest of that enemy other is never
quite complete. Those who are different never succomb
totally to conquest so the process of x othering' must be
carried on as if it has no history even while its
historicity is continually being exposed by the resistance
of the object of conquest (Clark, 1989)
.
20. Socialist feminists have worked out sophisticated
epistemological arguments for subjugated knowledges that in
themselves are objective perspectives on the world because
they x confess' to their partiality and interest.
Traditional, disembodied knowledges disguise or mask their
interest and therefore are not objective but ideological.
The potentiality for social change is more likely to reside,
therefore, with marginalized peoples who have an interest in
overturning the status quo. (see Haraway, 1990 and Harding,
1993)
21. See Ernst Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1986) for one of
the most complete theorizations of "new social movements."
22 . Two of the best statements about the necessity and
politics of this 'discomfort' come from Minnie Bruce Pratt
(1984) and Bernice Johnson Reagon (1992)
.
23. In "The Storyteller" Benjamin differentiates between
storytelling and information:
Every moning brings us the news of the globe, and yet
we are poor in noteworthy stories . This is because no
event any longer comes to us without already being shot
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through with explanation. in other words, by nowalmost nothing that happens benefits storytelling;
everything benefit s information. Actually, itis half the art of storytelling to keep a story freetrom explanation as one reproduces it. Leskov is amaster at this... The most extraordinary things,
marvelous things, are related with the greatest
accuracy, but the psychological connection of the
events is not forced on the reader. It is left up tohim to interpret things the way he understands them,
and thus the narrative achieves an amplitude thatinformation lacks. (Benjamin, 1968:89)
24. When I use the term "other" I mean anything outside ofthe self that is potentially knowable but still strange or
unfamiliar. This could, of course, apply to anything, adesk or a chair in the room with us. Here, however, because
I am concerned with the political world, I am concerned with
the generalized others that the political world constructs.
Currently, within and without feminism, these include
racialized, gendered, ethnic, and sexual others. To
confront oppressive systems of power we must be explicit
about how contemporary relations of domination work in their
historical contexts and be specific about who and what we
mean by "otherness."
25. See Susan Buck-Morss (1977:96-110).
26. See Judith Grant (1994) for a critique and a rejection
of N experience' as a necessary concept for feminist
analysis
.
27. By object, I do not mean something necessarily
exogenous to or fully separate from the subject, I mean the
object world to be the external and internal means by which
we sustain ourselves as social, conscious beings.
28. This is what Wendy Brown is arguing as she says
feminists must "assume responsibility ." (Brown, 1991)
29. It is now common among feminists to cite to Sojourner
Truth's speech at the Akron convention (1851) as emblematic
of the contradictions racial differences present to the
unity of 'woman' as a concept. Truth took the truth out
from under white feminists whose presumptions about what
'woman' was a reflection upon who they were expected to be
as white, middle-class, keepers of the hearth. Feminists of
color have continued in her tradition of supporting feminist
struggle but also persistently making trouble for any
feminism that relies only on gender for its political terms
of reference.
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equality" problem between men and women onlyin relationship to gender and sex difference.
32. While the scope and intelligence of her discussions offeminist theory, French and American, are impressive, RosiBraidotti fails m her discussion of the future of feminism
to take into account that it is contingent upon
reconfiguring relations among women vis-a-vis systems ofdomination that render them participants in and" not just
victims of relations of dominance. For her, figuring outhow to write sexual difference without repeating the sins of
the father is the future of feminism. But women's lives are
not only defined by their sexual difference from men or even
from one another. (Braidotti, 1991) Alice Jardine's text,
Gynesis
,
published six years earlier is just as guilty of
this myopia with respect to the imperative that feminism
become anti-racist, anti-classist and post-colonialist in
its very self definition. (Jardine, 1985)
33. This is a paraphrase of Rosi Braidotti (1991) and Alice
Jardine's (1986) arguments about feminism and feminist
theory. Each places the conditions of emergence for
feminist theory and politics in the late 1960 's within the
fissures of Western civilization. This privileges Western
systems of thought and practice beyond the scope of their
actual effectivity in creating the terms on which people
live. In addition, it places all feminisms in the context
of resistance against that particular paradigmatic history,
though historically, the social messages addressed to and
the demands on women of color and colonized women have been
significantly different.
34. Foucault did not accept the label of 'post-modern', and
in fact understood his project as an exploration of the
"attitude" that is modernity. (Foucault, 1984/39, 1983/34)
His conceptualization of modernity as an attitude precludes
thinking of it as a period of time that has come and
(perhaps) gone. Nonetheless, his historical positioning
vis-a-vis Marxism and particular Althusser's Marxism, and
his critique of those paradigms as they existed in France
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Much ° f the anxiety aroused by the post-modern turn infeminist theory relates to the seeminq unwillingness ofpost-modern theorists to assert, or render explicit, theirpolitical agendas. Nancy Fraser has shown how Foucault's
work, particularly that of Discipline and Punish , relies ona humanist impulse in order to make its argument about theindividuating internalization of social discipline and
surveillance in modern society. (Fraser, 1984) SeylaBenhabib_ argues that critical social theory must assume a
subject m the world to whose immanent self
-understanding it
addresses its claims. Otherwise it will remain in an
aporetic state of static self -referentiality
. (Benhabib,
1982) I think these commentaries miss the point made by
Adorno, that critical theoretical practice in late modernity
exists in a necessary tension with the colonizing and
absorbing tendencies of identity logic. To proceed in a
space "between a rock and nowhere" (Lysaker and
Sullivan, 1992) in a time when it is not possible to claim we
know how the relationship between theory and practice- -or
between consciousness and revolutionary agency- -works
, is
the task of critique. For Foucault the imperative to
historicize or theorize the present through the conditions
of the past- -to render the familiar strange and the normal
bizarre-
-meant theory had to be locally oriented and
attentive to the tasks various concepts, like humanism or
the revolutionary subject /object have been put to in
stablizing given forms of domination. This approach may
have implicitly humanist grounds in some sense, but I am not
sure why that undermines the critical possibility in
unearthing how humanisms have been deployed in the context
of various humanly constructed catastrophes of modernity.
37. This point is best made Foucault's essay "What is
Enlightenment" (1984) . In it he displays a certain
ambivalence about the project of Enlightenment and modernity
and disabusing any notion that he was simply opposed to
Enlightenment or to modernity. This essay reflects on
project of interrogating the nature of Enlightenment
illustrated by Kant's letter to a newspaper in the 18th
century. Foucault shows how explanations of Enlightenment
often claim it is about finding the exit from the present,
finding a x way out' of bondage to necessity (the body) , or
constructing a limit to what the possibilities are for an
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3 common theme in contemporary attempts toarticulate the sublet of feminism. Teresa de Lauretisdraws on many theorists who use a similar theoretical
strategy vis-a-vis totality to argue that feministpositioning is a positioning from the outside that offers aradically new vantage point. Feminists like Marilyn FryeAdrienne Rich, Gloria Anzaldua, Barbara Smith and Monique'Wittig are all said to create figures of 'otherness' thattake on the task of unsettling every definition arrived atthrough dominant, patriarchal conceptual systems. FordeLauretis, feminist consciousness "can only exist
historically, in the here and now, as the consciousness of a
'something else. ' " (DeLauretis, 1990:145)
41. Mary Hawkesworth* (1989) critiques both feminist
standpoint theory (for simplistically arguing that women
have superior access to truths) and post-modernist theory
(for privileging text and fiction over world and realities)
.
It is not clear what she is arguing for except, perhaps, a
more 'rigorously' rationalist epistemology that takes
women's lives into account in asserting truth claims. Her
argument about cognition as a human practice seems to
welcome a sprinkling of standpoint and postmodern insights.
But she adamantly dismisses these latter theoretical
approaches once she has distilled them into "intuitive" vs
"relativist" epistemologies
. For Hawkesworth, 'Reality'
gets in the way of both these approaches to feminism and any
epistemology must 'recognize' that. Post-modern feminisms
do not displace or disavow reality in favor of fiction.
Hawkesworth' s use of the terms 'fact' and 'fiction' already
sets up a dichotomy between them that post-modern theory
rejects. In addition, Hawkesworth says post-modernism is an
epistemology. It is not an epistemology, it is anti -
epistemology because it refuses the subj ect\obj ect basis on
which all epistemological theory must rest.
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44. Foucault similarly focusses on those practices
considered marginal to or derivative of political life iethe construction of madness, of illness, and of crime, 'to
see what he could learn about the construction of sanity or
wellness or good citizenship. He did not assume in advance
a binary opposition between the categories.
45. Bonnie Honig similarly takes up the thesis of
performativity in her critical readings of modern political
theory. She argues, "The feminism I have in mind does not
embrace and repeat the constations of gendered
subjectivities, it does not organize itself around them. It
announces their indeterminacy, celebrates their perpetual
failure to achieve the closures they assume, and seeks their
subversion through as series of performative appropriations
and negotiations." The thesis of performativity, in other
words, takes the constations of gender into account but
refuses the political position that settles itself within
their terms. (Honig, 1991: 209)
46. See Joan Nestle (1987) for a personal history
describing this unearthing of the codes of lesbian
communication in literature.
47. In Adrienne Rich's essay "Compulsory Heterosexuality
and Lesbian Existence" (1976) she argues that lesbianism
should not be reduced to sexuality or to having sex with
women. She shows how lesbianism exists on a continuum of
women's relating to one another on the margins of
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™ desire is constructed in its differentiatedtorms. It is falsely universalising of "lesbian existence."
48. See above discussion of Monique Wittiq's
conceptualization of lesbian identity.
49. Shane Phelan (1991) makes a similar argument.
50. This is most apparent in the 4 sex debates' where the
^sides' articulated are those of the pro-sex factions andthe vanilla sex factions. The former argue for the
x freedom' to experiment with violence and dominance (sado-
masochism) against the latter claim that those practices of
sex further represent the terms of heterosexualist desire.
(Vance, ed. 1984; Ferguson, 1984) Butler would not argue that
there exists any v freedom' to experiment but that all
practices will reflect cultural and social constraints. The
question for Butler is not x what kind of sex is
permissible?' but N why do we produce such a panic when we
talk about or do sex in particular ways (eg. with women) and
how can we further produce such panic in order to expose the
vulnerabilities of heterosexualism? ' The other ways of
thinking about sex reproduce the assumption that
heterosexualist desire is complete in itself instead of
dependent upon its other (homosexuality) to affirm its
normality.
51. In the following chapter, I address how thinking through
the tensions of the forms and substances of this
participation is precisely where a reading of Adorno can
intervene in the debates about performativity
.
52. This is how bell hooks reads the film (1992). I think
she takes too much away from the wo\men in the film with
this assessment of their actions and desires. hooks
further interprets the film as an exploitative act of
voyeurism on the part of a white filmmaker who essentially
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nnf nniST ^ UveS ' In °ther words ' Livingstone isot only a voyeur but is participating affirmatively in thelives of the subjects of the film through the apparatus ofthe camera. I think hooks' critique is more to the point.
53. The classic title, of an anthology of black feminist
writings, All the Women are White. All the Blacks are Men.but Some of us are Brave (Hull and Smith, eds 1984)
expresses this.
54. See for example, an exchange between Linda Gordon andJoan Scott (1990)
.
55. Christine Distefano (1991) makes a similar argument. :
agree with her discussion of the historically political
critiques of gender but disagree that post-modern critiques
of gender theory are "merely" playful and too theoreticized
Deconstructing gender as a discursive effect may shift our
attention to otherwise obscure sites of resistance, like
performance
.
56. See Martha Albertson Fineman and Roxanne Mykitiuk,
eds. (1994) for recent discussions and critiques of feminist
strategies for bringing sexual violence to the surface of
public consciousness. See also Vicki Bell (1993) for an
excellent discussion of feminist projects as they relate to
sexuality and violence.
57. Susan Brownmiller (1975) makes a biologically
deterministic argument that when men discovered they had the
capacity to rape they proceeded to do so, finding ways
around women's resistance and setting up an unquestionable
regime of patriarchal power buttressed by the threat of
rape
.
58 . Just a brief list of the most comprehensive critiques
(focussing on her theory of sexuality, not on her arguments
about pornography and its harms to women) includes:
Drucilla Cornell (1991) ; Marianna Valverde (1989) ; Angela
Harris (1990); Carole Vance (1992); Judith Grant (1993:74-
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appearance/reality' grid lay across sexuality, ie theappearance is that women are asexual or passive, the realityis that women's sexuality has yet to be discovered. Onemight interpret MacKinnon as claiming women engage inalienated sex, but she so adamantly rejects the notion thatwomen have agency as sexual subjects that gender dominance,
not sexual repression remains her determinant reality.
60. MacKinnon argues: "My suggestion is that what we have incommon is not that our conditions have no particularity in
ways that matter. But we are all measured by a male
standard for women, a standard that is not ours »(MacKinnon, 1983:70)
61. In a critique of MacKinnon's essentialism, Angela
Harris argues that "...feminist essentialism repesents notjust an insult to Black women, but a broken promise to
listen to women's stories, the promise of feminist method.(Harris, 1990:601) She argues that MacKinnon's feminism
identifies the condition of Black women as essentially the
same as White women, only worse.
62
.
I use reif ication deliberately here to argue that the
conceptual framework constructed by Radical feminism ignores
its own historicity and limiting exclusions as a cognitive
appraoch to exuality and sexual suffering. This is how
Adorno understands reification in sociology and philosophy-
-
as that process of cognition which renders the object
ahistorical or part of second nature through the hypostasis
of its conceptualization. See Rose (1978) for a discussion
of Adorno' s theory of reif ication.
63 . This is what I think Alice Echols and Ellen Willis are
talking about when they critique the "decline" of Radical
feminism into what they have labeled "cultural" feminism.
(Echols, 1987; Willis, 1984) Also, many observers have
noted the change in the movement against domestic violence
from a collective project organized around the assumption
that women who are beaten are potential feminists to a
movement organized around service and therapeutic "helping."
(Fraser, 1991:177-181)
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66. Foucault argues in Disciolinp and Punish (1979) that as
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67. This reminds me of recent claims that sexualharrassment and date rape and even domestic violence againstwomen are the result of failed communication between
otherwise potentially compatible partners. This renders theviolence derivative of desire, implicitly forgiving theperpetrator and obscuring the intent to use violence in
order to assert power.
68. Again, by the language of sharing I do not mean aharmonious site of mutual giving but a place where even in
conflict we should remember the essentially social quality
of our own participation.
69. This description of the literal deconstruction of the
boundaries of the body reflects themes in narratives about
sexual violence, especially those about domestic violence.
Women's bodies become objects which are then used against
themselves as torture victims bodies becomes objects used
against themselves
.
70. In my discussion of Butler's work in the previous
chapter I showed how the construction of the 'real,'
particularly with regard to stabilizing gender/sex
identities can become a life and death enterprise.
71. In the x sex wars' of the I980's,(see Snitow, Stansell
and Thompson, 1983; Vance, 1984; Ferguson, 1984) much of the
disagreement focussed not just on questions about power and
inequality in sexuality. Protagonists argued about whether
violence and pain could be part of consensual pleasure or
whether they were just manifestations of sexist attitudes
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73. Kimberle Crenshaw discusses the role of identitypolitics and differences among women as they impact thepolitics and policies of battered women's shelters indifferent communities. She shows how many women are
excluded from services because of an emphasis on thepsychological effects of battering, she argues we need an
approach that takes into account individual women's
structural places in the intersecting systems of race,
class, sexuality and gender. For her, effective strategies
for serving the complex needs of women would entail
understanding any identity-based group as always already a
coalitional gathering. (Crenshaw, 1994)
74. An example of the problematic politics of
representation in the context of sexual violence is how use
of x the battered woman syndrome' has evolved as centerpiece
of feminist strategy in litigating cases about domestic
violence. This descriptive phrase was developed by Lenore
Walker through extensive research on women who are battered.
As a feminist and as a clinical psychologist, Walker
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domestic v?olPnl raS of . women trapped in situations ofa iolence, and in spite of Walker's own effortsthis approach has rendered battering a medical rather than apolitical question. In order to be forgiven on legal termswomen's response to violence (especially if they ule
rlac'onVoT rT^ed a s^rome, Lt a ra^iontl
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Sir abuser ™ay increase the danger (Mahoney,1991)
--but because they have been rendered 'helpless' in the
aaaini?^ ^ ^ exPlain takin9 aggressive actiong inst a batterer women have to prove they were helpless.
75_ Elizabeth Schneider interprets the contradictory
effects of feminist jurisprudence through reading court
opinions regarding the admissability of expert testimony inthe defense of women who kill their abusers. She arguesthat the 'battered woman syndrome' has been interpreted bythe courts as an explanatory rather than a descriptive
framework for women's behavior thereby rendering their
responses to violence as symptoms of an illness rather than
actions taken in the interest of their survival. (Schneider
1986)
76. in response to Schneider's article, Lenore Walker
correctly points out that until the rules of evidence which
are sex-biased in favor of typically masculine rules of
behavior in cases of self-defense are changed, the expert
testimony she has to offer about battered women will
continue to be heard by courts as proof that women are
different from men in the sense that they are lesser beings
than men. (Walker, 1986)
77. In spite of the popular attention to the issue, studies
have shown that the numbers of rapes, and the frequency of
wife and partner abuse has not shifted even with city-wide,
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strategies, like mandatory arrest sclented J?glCalcommunities in radically 5j« tatutes, affect different
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78. see my discussion in chapter 4.
79. See Hawkesworth (1991).
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been ^iFically shown that men who rape thinkabout it and experience as a sexual act. Twenty years aaoDiana Russell interviewed rape victims and rapists in orderto show that, while from the victim's perspective rape istraumatic and stigmatizing from the rapists' perspective isa relatively predictable response to »Snccmtr5u3lS' desirefor sex Rapists often speak of themselves as loving womenor merely wanting to show women *what they have.' (Russell1975; Scully, 1990) However, men also use rape specifically
as an act of violence against a particular woman,particularly in the context of intimate or *dom-stic'
violence. in these testimonies of torture-like situations
men use sex as a weapon among others against women.
83. Bart and O'Brien's research on rape prevention showsthat there is no necessary increase in violence when women
resist. in fact, they show the absurdity of telling womentelling women not to resist in the interest of ' avoidinginjury as if the rape itself is not an injurious act. (Bart
and O'Brien, 1985)
84. For example, in a survey of research on family
violence, Linda Gordon and Wini Breines (1987) point out how
recently family violence has been named and that and the
exposure of the ideological terms on which it is discussed
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of a woman to her batterer in the context of the home andtheir relationship.
"Domestic violence" reminds of the davswhen the violence was understood as somehow less severe thanthe real violence that happens in the public world
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